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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the approach adopted by the European 
Commission in recently regulated energy markets. Antitrust investigations indicate 
that the European Commission increasingly tends to implement competition law, in 
particular through commitment decisions, in order to create a quasi-ex ante 
regulatory effect in the markets. The main conclusion of this thesis is that a lack of 
legal certainty and insufficient clarification of the law originating from this approach 
might have detrimental impacts on a single and competitive energy market design in 
Europe. 
This thesis consists of three substantial chapters in addition to the introductory and 
final conclusion chapters. The first chapter analyses long-term supply contracts 
concluded in the wholesale markets from both an economic and a legal perspective. 
The economic analysis of the contracts shows that the functioning of European 
energy markets remains ambiguous. The European Commission thus seems to 
adopt a strategy to balance spot market trading with long-term supply contracts and 
vertical integration through antitrust investigations.      
The second chapter aims at examining the tendency of European Commission to 
assess the foreclosure effects of a preferential use of cross-border energy 
transmission networks within the new liberalised energy markets. While a pro-entry 
bias approach of the European Commission is observed in the case law, it is difficult 
to find recognition by the Commission as well as secondary EU law of the likely pro-
competitive effects of long-term cross-border transmission network reservations 
resulting from the associated long-term cross-border supply contracts. Besides, it 
can be observed from the case law that the European Commission and the 
European Courts tend to approve the preferential use of networks as long as the 
right holder engages in a major investment in these networks. As a consequence, 
the methodology adopted by the European Commission for the antitrust analyses of 
priority access rights to cross-border infrastructure might fail to correspond with legal 
predictability and economic accuracy.   
The aim of the third chapter is to show the tendency of the European Commission to 
finalise antitrust investigations through a public settlement procedure, which seems 
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to be a convenient tool for the facilitation of market regulation through antitrust 
enforcement. The increased number of commitment decisions in the energy markets 
raises a concern regarding the possible detrimental effects of this trend. With the 
consideration of the importance of legal certainty in the regulated markets in terms of 
market building and social welfare, the chapter proposes a hypothetical framework 
guideline including certain measures which may increase the efficiency and 
sustainability of public settlement procedures and also improve legal certainty in the 
energy markets.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Background and Research Questions of the Thesis 
Before market liberalisation, the European electricity and gas markets mostly 
consisted of vertically integrated state-owned monopolies, which engaged in 
generation, transmission through networks and supply. These markets therefore 
were typically defined within the limits of legal monopolies and geographic 
demarcation. Until the 1980s the physical characteristics of networks, such as fixed 
grids and pipelines, seemed to constrain the scope for liberalisation and market-
opening. A further constraint was perceived in the high degree of government 
ownership and control in these industries, especially in much of continental Europe.1 
However, since the idea of liberalisation has emerged, underlying assumptions about 
these constraints on the scope of competition have increasingly been challenged. As 
a result, the structure of the electricity and gas industries has been transformed by 
institutional reforms.   
Some drivers for this policy change are listed below. At the economic level, there 
was a desire to reduce energy prices by promoting national and regional 
competitiveness within these industries, which have become more interconnected 
and mutually dependent marketplaces. The important role of economies of scale has 
radically changed due to the fact that smaller independent operators have managed 
to provide consumers with cheaper energy. Technological developments have had a 
significant role as well, particularly in lowering costs and entry barriers in electricity 
generation. The intense use of information technologies has proved that it is possible 
to have competition within energy supply markets, even though the supply chain is 
part of a complex system that has elements of a natural monopoly and needs to be 
balanced and managed.2 
                                                          
1
 P. Cameron, Competition in Energy Markets: Law and Regulation in the European Union (1
st
 edn., 
Oxford University Press 2002) p. 20 
2
 Since electricity cannot be stored generation and supply must be balanced. Historically, this balance 
was created through vertically integrated energy companies. However, the development of 
information technologies has made it possible to balance generation and supply, and this has thus 
resulted in an improvement in competition in the markets of energy generation and supply. Cameron,  
ibid, 24 
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The creation of an Internal Energy Market programme in the 1990s was the first step 
taken towards market integration. Nevertheless, the most significant measures for 
market liberalisation were adopted through the establishment of the Directives 
concerning common rules for the electricity and gas industries. The electricity 
Directive was established in 1996, whereas the gas Directive was enacted in 1998.3 
In 2003, the legislative process took a major step forward with the adoption of the 
second electricity and gas Directives.4 Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 
2003/55/EC made a significant contribution towards the creation of a single and 
competitive internal energy market within the European Union (hereafter the EU).  
Although more than two decades have passed since national markets were opened 
to competition and gradually integrated to create European-wide markets in 
electricity and gas, the competition in the markets has not reached an ‘ideal’ level5 
as expected by the European Commission (hereafter the Commission).6   
In order to overcome the remaining barriers to competition in the energy markets, the 
Commission, on the one hand, issued a proposal for the so-called third legislative 
package,7 which strengthens the regulatory provision in order to reinforce 
                                                          
3
 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [1996] OJ L 27/20; Directive 98/30/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas [1998] OJ L 204/1 
4
 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity [2003] OJ L 176/37; Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas [2003] OJ L 176/57 
5
Commission, ‘Making the internal market work’ COM(2012)663 final, p. 2   
6
 In 2005, in order to identify and address potential shortcomings of the liberalisation process, the 
Commission launched a sector inquiry into the functioning of the electricity and gas markets. In 2007, 
the Commission published the final report on the Sector Inquiry, which identified a number of 
interconnected deficiencies, including: an insufficient level of unbundling between network operations 
and supply activities; the existence of traditional sale patterns through long-term supply contracts 
which resulted in vertical foreclosure and thus prevented potential competitors from entering the 
markets; ineffective and inefficient allocation and use of cross-border transmission network capacities; 
and finally, a low degree of competition; DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 
2007 SEC(2006) 1724;  See A. Van Hassteren and G. S. Georgiev, ‘Commission Launches Inquiries 
into the Energy and Financial Service Sectors’ (2005) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn 
Issues 51; G. Olsen and B. Roy, ‘The New World of Proactive EC Antitrust Enforcement? Sector 
Inquiries by the European Commission’ (2007) Vol.21(3) Antitrust 82 
7
 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L 
211/55; Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC 
[2009] OJ L 211/94; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
repealing Regulation 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European 
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competition and market integration.  On the other hand, the Commission initiated8 a 
number of antitrust investigations in the energy markets,9 as it was clear that 
achieving greater competition in the energy sector through the legislative process 
had not been entirely successful and that the benefits for consumers had been rather 
limited.10 This action of the Commission caused the occurrence of a substantial body 
of cases,11 which seem to have been driven by energy policy objectives, i.e. 
liberalisation and integration of the energy markets, rather than the aim of 
addressing illegal past conduct.12 Indeed, the willingness of the Commission to 
remove the deficiencies of liberalisation through employing EU competition law as a 
relevant vehicle can be seen from the declaration of the former Competition 
Commissioner, Neelie Kroes. She stated that ‘... I intend to use our competition tools 
actively to speed up the liberalisation process in gas and electricity markets’.13 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission 
networks and repealing Regulation 1775/2005 [2009] OJ L 211/36 
8
 The Commission started these investigations following the Sector Inquiry (see n.6). In this sense, 
the Sector Inquiry can be defined as a ‘curtain-raiser’ of antitrust enforcement, which prepared the 
ground for competition proceedings. Olsen and Roy, supra n 6, 83         
9
 Commission, ‘Competition: Commission has carried out inspections in the EU gas sector in five 
Member States’ MEMO/06/205; Commission, ‘Competition: Energy sector inquiry confirms serious 
problems and sets out way forward’ IP/06/174 
10
 M. M. Roggenkamp et al. (eds.), Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation 
(2
nd
 edn., Oxford University Press 2007) p. 55 
11
 As seen in the above mentioned declaration, over the last decade the Commission has openly 
stated its intention to use competition law to foster the liberalisation and integration of energy markets, 
and thus push forward its energy policy agenda. Besides, as will be seen within chapter 3, the 
Commission is not limited to antitrust investigations. If Member States are under the obligation to 
transpose EU laws into their domestic legal systems, the Commission may take procedural steps 
under Article 258 TFEU in an instance where a Member State fails to fulfil this obligation, in order to 
bring them before the European Court of Justice. Nevertheless, with the consideration of the content 
of the Article, the Commission can only ask the Member States concerned to adopt EU laws into the 
national law system under an infringement procedure. However, under antitrust investigations, 
commitments proposed by undertakings concerned may go beyond EU laws including ex-ante sector-
specific regulatory, as will be seen within the discussion chapters. As a result, from a policy objective 
point of view, antitrust investigations seem to provide the Commission with a broader discretion with 
which to push market liberalisation one step further.  
A list of infringement procedures for non-transposition of the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 energy packages is provided 
under the Commission Staff Working Document Energy Markets in the European Union in 2011 COM 
(2012) 663 SWD (2012) 367 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121115_iem_swd_0368_part1_en.pdf>, for the list 
of provisions see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/20121121_iem_swd_0368_part3_en.pdf> accessed 
15 October 2014.   
For recent developments about infringement proceedings see Commission, Staff Working Document, 
‘Enforcement of the Third Internal Energy Market Package, SWD(2014) 315 final, pp. 1-6   
12
 M. Sadowska, Committed to Reform? Pragmatic Antitrust Enforcement in Electricity Markets 
(Intensentia 2014), p. 70 
13
 Commission, ‘Competition: Commission secures improvements to gas supply contracts between 
OMV and Gazprom’ IP/05/195; M. Monti, ‘Applying EU Competition Law to the Newly Liberalised 
Energy Markets’ Speech/03/447 
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Furthermore, this idea was boosted by the former Energy Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs. He said that, ‘in this time of economic and financial crisis, it is simply 
unacceptable that the European consumers and companies suffer the burden of an 
ill-functioning energy market. The Commission is determined to take all necessary 
action to ensure that European consumers can benefit from real choice, better 
prices, and enhanced security of supply that only an open and competitive market 
can provide’.14 
The ultimate research questions of this thesis therefore are: How does EU 
competition law apply to the newly liberalised energy markets? How does the 
Commission address regulatory shortcomings in energy through antitrust 
enforcement? To what extent do the current dynamics of regulatory practices 
motivate the Commission to engage in EU antitrust investigations? And also, to what 
extent is the quasi-regulatory role of EU competition law within these markets likely 
to create other market problems? In the light of these research questions, within the 
discussion chapters, this thesis will investigate the following key themes: (i) the 
relationship between competition and regulatory goals;15 (ii) the possibility and 
danger of the Commission using antitrust enforcement to achieve outcomes that are 
beyond the regulatory objectives defined under the EU regulatory framework; and 
(iii) the importance of legal certainty for market operators in the recently liberalised 
                                                          
14
 Commission, ‘Commission acts to ensure effective and competitive energy market across Europe’ 
IP/09/1035 
15
 Competition law and sector-specific regulation are different tools that the Commission has to shape 
market structure in Europe; the relationship between them has been discussed in the context of 
different sectors, particularly telecommunications and energy, and is still a hot topic for many 
scholars. Because of the fact that this thesis focuses on the tendency of the Commission to use 
competition law for the purpose of achieving regulatory objectives, this thesis is interested in the 
interplay between these two tools. 
See H. Ungerer, ‘Use of EC Competition Rules in the Liberalisation of European Union’s 
Telecommunications Sectors. Assessment of Past Experience and Conclusions for Use in Other 
Utility Sectors’ (2001) COMP/C/2/HU/rdu, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_009_en.pdf> accessed 14 October 2014; N. 
Petit, ‘Circumscribing the Scope of EC Competition Law in Network Industries? A Comparative 
Approach to the Us Supreme Court Ruling in the Trinko Case’ (2004) Vol.13 Utilities Law Review 6; 
R. O’Donoghue, ‘The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin 
Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector’ (2005) Vol.1(2) Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 355; D. Newbery, ‘The Relationship Between Regulation and Competition Policy for 
Network Industries’ (2006) Working Paper CWPE 0631 and EPRG 0611 
<http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/eprg0611.pdf> accessed 23 February 
2012; P. Larouche, ‘Contrasting Legal Solutions and the Comparability of EU and US experiences’ 
(2006) TILEC Discussion Paper 2006-028 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=943615> accessed 24 June 2014; G. Monti, 
‘Managing the Intersections of Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law’ (2008) Vol.4 The 
Competition Law Review 2 
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energy markets regarding changing and developing the regulatory legal 
environment.    
For the purpose of addressing the above-mentioned research questions and key 
themes, this thesis examines antitrust investigations, including investigations that 
were initiated by the Commission before and after the modernisation of EU 
competition law, from both substantive and procedural points of view. The aim of the 
case analyses is to critically study the role of competition law in the liberalisation of 
the energy markets. From a substantive point of view, the case law shows that the 
investigations have been based on long-term supply contracts under Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU as well as on the abusive conduct of dominant market players, mainly 
in the form of refusal to supply access to an essential facility under Article 102 TFEU 
such as cross-border transmission infrastructures.    
For long-term energy supply contracts concluded within Member States, the 
competition concerns of the Commission mostly stem from anticompetitive 
foreclosure effects of the contracts, because of either the duration/volume of the 
contracts or the contract clauses. On the other hand, they pose certain advantages 
for facilitating investment, market operation and entry. Therefore, from an economic 
perspective, the main problem in assessing long-term supply contracts under 
competition law lies in speculative economic analyses of these contracts.16 The 
situation may become even more complicated when the Commission needs to offset 
short- and long-term efficiencies such as entry and investment. The effects of these 
contracts in the energy markets are thus ambiguous and need to be clearly 
explained. In addition, from a legal point of view, ex-ante sector-specific regulatory 
rules naturally do not shed light on the status of long-term supply contracts and leave 
them under the scope of competition law. With the consideration of economic 
uncertainty as well as the procedural aspects of the investigations, as will be argued 
below, the Commission’s competition decisions regarding long-term supply contracts 
within the energy markets should be organised methodologically and clarified in 
                                                          
16
 A. De Hauteclocque, Market Building through Antitrust: Long-term Contract Regulation in EU 
Electricity Markets (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) p. 35 
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order to draft a framework model for the sake of future antitrust investigations at both 
the EU and domestic levels.17 
With regard to abusive behaviours of dominant undertakings in the energy markets, 
the competition concerns of the Commission derive from preferential cross-border 
network reservations associated with existing long-term supply contracts concluded 
among Member States and from strategic network blocking by vertically integrated 
network companies. In both situations, competition in the relevant downstream 
markets is jeopardised due to network foreclosure. The problem here arises not only 
from ambiguous effects of pre-liberalisation long-term supply contracts concluded 
among Member States (and/or operators) but also from the Commission’s approach 
to preferential network reservations associated with long-term supply contracts. In 
addition, it stems from a relationship between ex-ante energy regulation and ex-post 
competition law. Conceptually, the regulatory legislation provides rules on third party 
access, vertical unbundling as well as the allocation and management of cross-
border transmission networks in order to increase non-discriminatory, transparent 
and efficient use of cross-border infrastructure. Within this context, the role of EU 
competition law should be complementary and limited to competition policy and 
objectives. Nevertheless, in practice, it seems that competition law is used to 
achieve not only the goals of competition policy but also the objectives of regulatory 
policy in energy. In this sense, it should be carefully analysed as to whether, in 
practice, the Commission fulfils its duty regarding competition policy in the EU, or 
whether the politics of liberalisation have a significant impact on the way in which EU 
competition law is implemented.      
When it comes to the question of how EU competition law is applied within the 
energy markets, the case law indicates that, from a procedural point of view, the 
investigations have mostly been concluded through either informal antitrust 
settlement under former Regulation 17/6218 or formal antitrust settlement under 
                                                          
17
 Note that, to the knowledge of the author, this methodological clarification has been done by A. De 
Hauteclocque through his PhD thesis (‘Long-term supply contracts in European decentralised 
electricity markets: an antitrust perspective’ (DPhil thesis, University of Manchester, 2009)), yet his 
analysis mostly reflected the economic aspect of the cases. However, this thesis handles and 
analyses them from a legal perspective.      
18
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 17 First Regulation implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
[1962] OJ 013 
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Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.19 This ultimately raises questions over the 
proportionality of the commitments proposed by the energy companies concerned, 
the appropriateness of the arrangements reached through bargains, and the effect of 
the settlements on legal certainty in the markets, particularly with regard to the 
Commission’s possible regulatory policy motivations when exploring energy markets 
through antitrust enforcement.   
The functioning of energy markets can be improved through the preservation of legal 
certainty and clarification of the law as much as the substantial analysis and 
termination of possible competition infringements, given that legal certainty may 
facilitate the entry of new competitors who already suffer from information 
asymmetry with respect to the incumbents.20 Legal certainty may also promote 
investment in electricity generation technologies as well as the network capacities 
necessary for security of supply. Thus it will have a positive impact both on short and 
long-term efficiency criteria. Consequently, it is crucial to develop a critical view of 
the procedural and substantial aspects of the antitrust settlements pursued in order 
to bring a swift end to possible violations of EU competition law without impairing 
legal certainty.    
II. Methodology 
In dealing with the research questions presented above, this thesis is developed on 
the basis of various legal and economic analyses, observations, comments and 
solutions that have been generated by legislators, courts, authorities, academics and 
practitioners. In consideration of these legal and economic studies and works, this 
thesis offers its own interpretations, suggestions and solutions, which render it an 
original doctoral thesis.  
As a document-based and doctrinal piece of research, this thesis employs as its 
main method the examinations and evaluations of primary and secondary 
documentary materials. The primary materials include EU competition legislation, 
particularly Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, EU secondary law, particularly energy 
liberalisation Directives and Regulations, and the decisions and judgments of the 
European Commission and the European Courts. Although the jurisdictional scope 
                                                          
19
 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ  L 1 
20
 Hauteclocque, supra n 16, 33 
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and the case analyses are limited to EU law, the EU courts and institutions, 
references have been made to documents and decisions from other legal systems, 
authorities and/or courts where these are particularly relevant. The second group of 
material includes policy documents such as sector inquiries and scholarly literature 
from different disciplines including law and economics. 
III. Structure and Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis has three discussion chapters in addition to the introductory and final 
conclusion chapters. In the light of the clarifications above, the discussion chapters 
aim to determine potential answers to the key research points and identify a 
consolidated solution to the main thesis question. Each chapter handles one of the 
main competition problems in the energy market, and critically analyses the 
approach that the Commission adopted in order to solve them. In this sense, the 
second chapter of the thesis deals with the problem of long-term supply contracts 
concluded within Member States from both an economic and a competition law point 
of view. While the chapter specifically aims at providing a methodological framework 
on antitrust investigations regarding long-term supply contracts, it also provides an 
opportunity to observe that the Commission tends to solve competition problems 
resulting from long-term supply contracts in the energy markets through formal or 
informal settlement proceedings. In this regard, the chapter addresses the main 
question of the thesis, which is, to what extent does the Commission strategically 
use competition law in order to achieve the goals of the market regulation? Similarly 
to chapter two, the third chapter focuses on another main competition problem in the 
energy markets, which is the problem of long-term preferential network reservations. 
The chapter aims to clarify the relationship between EU secondary law and 
competition law on the basis of preferential network reservations. The chapter points 
out that the Commission not only handles the above-mentioned problem on the 
grounds of competition law but it also addresses regulatory deficiencies in the 
energy markets through antitrust enforcement. Again, the chapter attempts to 
contribute to the main research discussion of the thesis while analytically addressing 
the problem of preferential network reservations. Finally, the fourth chapter 
addresses the question, what is the cost of the Commission’s strategic use of 
competition law to achieve its regulatory objectives? In this regard, the chapter 
critically analyses certain antitrust cases and the proportionality of commitments 
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offered by the undertakings concerned, and examines the importance of legal 
certainty in the energy markets for market operators, national regulatory and 
competition authorities. More specific information about the chapters will be provided 
below. 
The second chapter initially explores the advantages of long-term supply contracts 
from an economic point of view and shows that the policy recommendations for 
antitrust authorities remain ambiguous. These economic analyses bring originality to 
the chapter, as they provide a comparison between the competitive and 
anticompetitive effects of long-term supply contracts, and highlight the economic 
ambiguity by mixing economic and legal points of view.21 It then examines 
competition decisions made by the Commission over long-term supply contracts 
concluded within Member States in order to analyse the Commission’s perspective, 
and provide market operators as well as national authorities with framework 
guidance. The case analysis indicates that the approach of the Commission to long-
term supply contracts has evolved according to the objectives of energy 
liberalisation. With regard to the recent energy cases, it seems that the antitrust 
investigations of the Commission have been motivated by not only competition policy 
objectives but also the goals of market regulation in energy. 
The third chapter studies the legal, political and institutional parameters that 
determine how the dimensions of the European competition model, namely vertical 
                                                          
21
 Note that there is significant literature on the economics of long-term contracts; yet, to the 
knowledge of the author, this literature does not have a legal perspective. See S. E. Masten and K. J. 
Crocker, ‘Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-pay Provisions for Natural Gas’ (1985) 
Vol.75 The American Economic Review 1083; P. Aghion and P. Bolton, ‘Contracts as a Barrier to 
Entry’ (1987) Vol.7 The American Economic Review 388; P. L. Joskow, ‘Contract Duration and 
Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets’ (1987) Vol.77 The 
American Economic Review 168; D. M. Newbery, ‘Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity 
Spot Market’ (1998) Vol.29 RAND Journal of Economics 726; L. Onofri, ‘Contracts, Investment 
Incentives and Efficiency in the Restructured Electricity Market’ (2002) Vol.16 European Journal of 
Law and Economics 23; A. Cretiand and B. Villeneuve, ‘Long-term Contracts and Take-or-Pay 
Clauses in Natural Gas Markets’ (2004) Vol.13 Energy Studies Review 75; A. Neumann and C. 
Hirschhausen, ‘Long-term Contracts for Natural gas Supply- An Empirical Analysis’ (ISNIE 
Conference, Barcelona, 2005); J. M. Petrash, ‘Long-term Natural Gas Contracts: Dead, Dying, or 
Merely Resting?’ (2006) Vol.27 Energy Law Journal 545; A. Neuman and C. von Hirschausen, ‘Long-
Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of Producer–Importer Relations 
in the Natural Gas Industry’ (2008) Vol.32 Review of Industrial Organisation 131; J. M. Glachant, and 
A. De Hauteclocque, ‘Long-Term Energy Supply Contracts in European Competition Policy: Fuzzy not 
Crazy’ (2009) EUI Working Papers-Robert Schuman Centre for Advance Studies 
<http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/working-paper-eprg0919/> accessed 21 April 2011; G. Meunier 
‘Imperfect Competition and Long-term Contracts in Electricity Markets: Some Lessons from 
Theoretical Models’ in A. De Hauteclocque, J. M. Glachant and D. Finon, Competition, Contracts and 
Electricity markets (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2011) 
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unbundling and single market integration, have been implemented in the energy 
sectors. Chapter three shows that the problem of long-term supply contracts 
concluded across Member States needs to be addressed in a different way given the 
fact that their effects on competition diverge from the contracts signed within the 
States due to the necessity of the analysis of long-term priority rights for 
interconnectors. This chapter thus proposes that the Commission should take the 
possible positive effects of associated long-term supply contracts into account while 
assessing preferential network use. Nevertheless, regarding the general approach of 
the Commission under Article 102 TFEU investigations into objective justification 
defence, it seems hardly possible to witness that associated long-term supply 
contracts would be considered objective justifications.  
The fourth chapter highlights the termination of antitrust investigations through 
commitment decisions which result in quasi-regulatory effects within the energy 
markets.22 It indicates that the generalised implementation of commitment decisions 
with the purpose of eliminating market deficiencies and improving market regulation 
might result in detrimental effects on the energy markets in terms of the generation 
of legal uncertainty. The chapter emphasises the importance of legal certainty as 
well as the sustainability of it in the light of the evolving regulatory rules and 
                                                          
22
 There is a huge ongoing debate on commitment decisions. Nevertheless, to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no in-depth case studies on the Commission’s commitment decisions in energy, 
although the Commission’s interventions in the energy sectors through antitrust investigations over 
the last decade have provided an opportunity to ascertain whether the concerns over the quasi-
regulatory use of competition law is well-grounded. On the other hand, a significant number of 
scholars have referred to these energy cases or examined them to some extent as examples of the 
use of competition law as a regulatory tool. See J. T. Lang, ‘The Use of Competition Law Power for 
Regulatory Purposes’ (2007) Regulatory Policy Institute Oxford Annual Competition Policy 
Conference <http://www.rpieurope.org/2007%20Conference/JTL%20Paper%20July%2007.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2014, pp. 6-9; P. Willis and P. Hughes, ‘Structural Remedies in Article 82 Energy 
Cases’ (2008) Vol.4(2) The Competition Law Review 147, pp. 151-153; A.  De Hauteclocque and L. 
Hancher, ‘Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The Current Dynamics of Regulatory Practice’ 
(2010) EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2010/01 <http://ideas.repec.org/a/sen/journl/v11y2010i3p307-
335.html> (accessed 16 February 2013) p. 20-22; J. Tapia and D. Mantzari, ‘The 
Regulation/Competition Interaction’ in D. Geradin and I. Lianos (eds.) Research Handbook on 
European Competition Law: Substantive Aspects (Edward-Elgar 2013), p. 588; K. Talus ‘(More than) 
10 Years of Antitrust Enforcement in EU Natural Gas Markets’ 2012 Vol.10(3) Oil, Gas and Electricity 
Law, pp. 17-22; U. Scholz and S. Purps, ‘The Application of EU Competition Law in the Energy 
Sector’ (2012) Vol.3(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice pp. 76-87 
Besides, the instrumental use of merger control in the energy markets has been subject to a 
significant amount of research. See F. De La Pena Fernandez-Garnelo, ‘Has Merger Control Made a 
Contribution Towards the Liberalisation of the Gas and Electricity Markets in the EU?’ (DPhil thesis, 
King’s College 2012); A. Christiansen ‘Regulation and EU Merger Control in the Liberalised Electricity 
Sector’ in F. Fichert, J. Haucap and K. Rommel (eds.) Competition Policy in Network Industries (Lit 
Verlag Münster 2007) p. 233; Sadowska, supra n 12, 135-191  
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liberalisation policies. Chapter four is therefore dedicated to providing a proposition 
to alleviate the legal uncertainty in the energy sector. 
To sum it up in a sentence, this thesis addresses the problem of the instrumental use 
of competition law23 through commitment decisions, particularly in the energy 
markets with the purpose of regulatory objectives that could not be achieved through 
market regulation.24 
   
                                                          
23
 ‘Instrumental use’ has been used by Sadowska in order to describe the strategic use of competition 
law. See Sadowska, supra n 12 
24
 It can be argued that this is mostly due to the fact that the energy sectors have a strategic political 
and economic value because of which energy reforms have been slowed down by the governmental 
opposition in several countries. For instance, eight Member States, Austria, Bulgaria, France, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia and the Slovak Republic, indicated their strong opposition for 
full ownership unbundling by submitting an alternative model for the provision of ownership 
unbundling in the third regulatory package. EurActiv, ‘Eight EU states oppose unbundling, table ‘third 
way’’ (1 February 2008) <http://www.euractiv.com/energy/eu-states-oppose-unbundling-tabl-news-
219274> accessed 1 November 2014     
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CHAPTER 2 
THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
ENERGY MARKETS 
I. Introduction 
In the European energy markets, a top-down reform process to initiate a competitive 
market structure has been pursued by the EU since the early 1990s. As mentioned 
previously, the goal of the reforms introduced recently was to create a single 
competitive market by removing national monopolies and introducing competition, 
supposedly in order to lead to better services for lower prices.1 However, in practice, 
long-term supply contracts remain a pervasive characteristic of the electricity and 
gas markets in most Member States, as the liberalisation process has not been 
successful in changing many of the traditional trade patterns. 
The current market liberalisation and harmonisation among the European markets 
which were refined in order to end the monopoly era may be pointless if incumbents 
continue to engage in long-term supply agreements to control the markets.2 These 
agreements frequently create anti-competitive foreclosure effects and these effects 
are likely to be worsened in energy markets where a monopoly supplier was in place 
for decades. On the other hand, there is also growing acceptance that their positive 
impacts on market functioning makes them desirable. As a result, there is a tension 
between the pro- and anti-competitive effects of these contracts. The impacts of 
long-term supply contracts are thus ambiguous, and there is a need to balance the 
efficiency-enhancing effects for individual contracting parties with some possible side 
effects on competition in the markets.3 
                                                          
1
 A. Cretiand and B. Villeneuve, ‘Long-term Contracts and Take-or-Pay Clauses in Natural Gas 
Markets’ (2004) Vol.13 Energy Studies Review 75, p.77 
2
 A. Neuman and C. von Hirschausen, ‘Long-Term Contracts and Asset Specificity Revisited: An 
Empirical Analysis of Producer–Importer Relations in the Natural Gas Industry’ (2008) Vol.32 Review 
of Industrial Organisation 131; J-M Glanchant and F. Leveque, ‘Electricity Internal Market in the 
European Union: What to Do Next?’ in J-M Glanchant and F. Leveque (eds.) Electricity Reform in 
Europe: Towards a Single Energy Market (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 
3
 A. De Hauteclocque, Market Building through Antitrust: Long-term Contract Regulation in EU 
Electricity Markets (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013), p. 73 
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Despite their importance in the energy markets, long-term supply contracts are 
hardly mentioned within the gas and electricity liberalisation packages.4 Therefore, 
guidance for them must be sought in case law. The current energy cases handled by 
the Commission indicate that there is significant uncertainty about the 
competitive/anticompetitive effects of long-term supply contracts. However, in 
addition, the decisions on the contracts themselves seem rather ambiguous in terms 
of a procedural aspect regarding the informal/formal antitrust settlements pursued. 
This uncertainty will be addressed by showing how the Commission tends to 
investigate these contracts by taking into account competition policy on the one hand 
and by considering regulatory objectives within energy sectors on the other.   
Prior to the first regulatory Directives, there were few antitrust cases over long-term 
energy supply agreements. In most of these cases the subject matter was the supply 
of energy on an exclusive basis by power producers to national incumbents. The 
Commission concluded these investigations by limiting the duration of the contracts. 
These decisions did not display any insight into the methodology used for the 
analysis of the foreclosure effect of the contracts. On the other hand, in the early 
post liberalisation period, the decisions made by the Commission indicated mainly 
anticompetitive effects of the contract clauses, and also, possible economic and non-
economic efficiency gains such as investment and security of supply in terms of 
steady availability of the primary energy sources. However, a clear model for 
assessing long-term supply contracts in the context of liberalised energy markets 
was still missing. Nevertheless, a new series of cases concerning domestic long-
term supply contracts across energy industries started to give some hints regarding 
building up a methodological framework for the analysis of long-term supply 
contracts.     
                                                          
4
 Article 37(1)(l) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L 211/55; Recital 37,42 and Article 32(3) , 41(1)(l) of Directive 2009/73/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L 211/94. Recital 42 of the gas 
Directive highlights the importance of long-term contracts in the gas sector, and states that such 
contracts should be maintained as an alternative way of supplying gas for undertakings unless they 
are not compatible with EU competition law. Moreover, the Directive states that its provisions should 
not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts as long as they comply with the European 
competition rules.   
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The aim of this chapter therefore is to indicate the ambiguous effects of long-term 
supply contracts from an economic point of view in order to point out the importance 
of carrying out a case-by-case analysis of them during antitrust investigations. Also, 
the chapter aims to build up a clear methodology from the decisions of the 
Commission regarding these contracts. Since this methodological clarification will 
shed light on substantive analyses adopted by the Commission the chapter will also 
provide a prescription for market operators and national competition authorities for 
the assessment of agreements, in particular regarding ambiguity in the economic 
structure of the contracts. The chapter is divided into two sections in order to explore 
both the economic side of long-term supply contracts and the legal side of them from 
the competition policy point of view. Thus, the first section will explore the negative 
and positive effects of the contracts from an economic point of view. In the second 
section, energy cases will be analysed in order to show the assessment of long-term 
supply contracts from a legal perspective. Finally, the section will attempt to create 
methodological guidance through the case law.  
II. The Appraisal of Long-term Supply Agreements from an Economic 
Perspective  
The objectives of EU competition policy can be briefly explained as the promotion of 
social welfare with an explicit bias in favour of consumer welfare, and the creation of 
an integrated single market.5 These objectives may constrain the freedom of market 
players in the short-term so as to reach higher social value over a period of time.6 
This is similar to the liberalisation of the energy markets where the commercial 
activities of pre-liberalisation incumbents should be restricted to facilitate 
environmentally sustainable and secured energy for affordable prices for everyone, 
i.e. to promote competition and to increase social welfare.7 However, the 
liberalisation process may pose a challenge for the Commission, as it needs to 
balance the likely efficiency gains deriving from the engagement of the market 
players in long-term supply contracts and the potential detrimental effects of these 
                                                          
5
 A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law (5
th
 edn., Oxford University Press 2014), pp. 33-54 
6
 J. M. Glachant and A. De Hauteclocque, ‘Long-Term Energy Supply Contracts in European 
Competition Policy: Fuzzy not Crazy’ (2009) EUI Working Papers-Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advance Studies <http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/working-paper-eprg0919/> accessed 21 April 
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7
 D. M. Newbery and M. G. Politt, ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of Britain CEGB – Was it Worth 
it?’ (1997) Vol.45 The Journal of Industrial Economics 269, p. 271; Commission, Communication from 
the Commission, Progress towards Completing the Internal Energy Market, COM(2014) 634 final 
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contracts on the functioning of the market. Within the next section of the chapter, 
there will be an assessment of the economic analyses of long-term supply contracts, 
considering both the negative and positive effects of the contracts on individual 
market players and society as a whole.  
A. Negative Effects of Long-term Supply Contracts: Market Foreclosure 
and Decrease in Wholesale Liquidity 
One of the main problems with long-term supply contracts is the risk of market 
foreclosure which hinders market entry by market players that are probably more 
efficient. Market foreclosure may result from the possible strategic aim of one or 
several operators to limit the ability of potential competitors to enter either upstream 
or downstream markets. This strategic aim can be achieved in many different ways, 
including signing up exclusive long-term supply contracts.8  In a situation where a 
significant part of the demand is tied for a long time at a wholesale level an output 
foreclosure might occur. On the contrary, if a generation market is highly 
concentrated input foreclosure may occur and prevent market entry downstream. 
Therefore, long-term supply contracts may constitute a barrier to entry and result in a 
negative effect on competition in the upstream and downstream markets.9 For 
example, in the electricity markets, long-term supply contracts concluded within 
Member States may lead to market foreclosure for potential electricity generators 
(output foreclosure) as well as potential traders (input foreclosure) since these 
contracts will reduce the number of open positions that need to be closed by 
wholesale trading. In the gas markets, on the other hand, existing import contracts 
cover the production from almost all of the existing gas fields from which gas can be 
transferred to Europe by pipeline (input foreclosure). Such contracts may make it 
difficult for new entrants to obtain access to adequate supplies of gas. Thus, 
upstream long-term supply contracts do not allow for effective ex-ante competition in 
the gas markets.10 Since the foreclosure of markets is very likely to be a result of the 
combination of long-term supply contracts and a monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structure, most of the investigations carried out by the Commission into long-term 
                                                          
8
 T. G. Krattenmaker and S. C. Salop, ‘Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary 
Rights’ (1986) Vol.76(2) The American Economic Review’ 109, p. 114; K. Talus, Vertical Natural gas 
Transportation Capacity, Upstream Commodity Contracts and EU Competition Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2011) p. 73 
9
 Glachant and Hauteclocque, supra n 6, 3-6 
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 DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724, para. 63-75 
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supply contracts have been based on market foreclosure, as will be seen in the 
second section of the chapter.   
The Sector Inquiry highlights certain negative effects of long-term supply contracts 
signed within a country on spot market development particularly in electricity 
markets. As they are likely to affect the volume that is regularly traded in spot 
markets they may dry out these markets. The Sector Inquiry states that long-term 
supply contracts diminish the volume to be traded in a spot and forward market(s) 
within a Member State, which reduces the liquidity in the wholesale market(s). The 
absence of competitive spot markets is detrimental to social welfare in two ways. 
First, a liquid and competitive spot market leads to market integration and price 
formation based on the supply and demand for electricity.11 The market-based price 
formation reduces the commercial risk by enabling market players to predict and 
manage the potential risks, which facilitates market entry. Second, a lack of liquidity 
in spot markets causes volatility, which encourages market players towards vertical 
re-integration or long-term contracting. As a result, liquid spot markets reduce the 
market risk for market players and promote market entry and thus competition in the 
markets, which promotes social welfare.   
Other than the duration and exclusivity of long-term supply contracts, some 
provisions such as territorial/use restrictions concluded within the contracts pose 
similar anti-competitive foreclosure effects and endanger market integration. These 
clauses artificially create multiple dominated markets and increase switching costs 
through market compartmentalisation, thereby impairing the current market building 
efforts of the EU.12 In addition, they reduce competition intensity in the downstream 
market.13 Long-term supply contracts concluded between energy producers and 
wholesalers in the gas markets are mostly subject to competition investigations due 
to the anticompetitive contract clauses, as will be seen in the case law section. 
Moreover, long-term supply contracts signed between gas suppliers and end-
customers such as large industrial users may include a use restriction, which hinders 
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 DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724, para.377; 
Within the context of this thesis, liquidity means a level of market activity that ensures that a counter-
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the latter from reselling gas to the market. Such a restriction has an evident negative 
impact on overall market liquidity.14  
B. Positive Effects of Long-term Supply Contracts 
Despite the negative effects that long-term supply contracts may have under some 
circumstances, they can be useful in particular situations. Furthermore, they have 
various positive effects that are likely to help realise efficiencies and these may offset 
the possible negative effects.  
1. Limitation of Double Marginalisation, Prevention of Abuse of Market 
Power, Facilitation of Market Entry 
Long-term supply contracts may have a positive impact on consumer welfare by 
limiting double marginalisation and thereby decreasing final energy prices. Double 
marginalisation may occur to the detriment of consumers when upstream and 
downstream market players have their own market power.15 Both upstream and 
downstream firms want to maximise their profits by choosing a monopolistic mark-up 
over their own costs. This profit maximisation increases the final price of the product 
to more than it would be if instead the upstream and downstream firms maximised 
their joint profit under a vertically integrated structure, since the final price decision 
would be taken with only a mark-up over the total cost.  However, different types of 
vertical restraints such as quantity fixing can be instruments to control this vertical 
externality.16 As a consequence, in the presence of market powers at both levels 
(upstream and downstream) of the markets, such as electricity and gas, long-term 
supply contracts might contribute to decreasing prices and increasing efficiencies by 
preventing the double marginalisation problem if the contracts include certain vertical 
restraints.17  
Besides, long-term supply contracts may bring some advantages for individual 
market players such as price and quantity risk reductions, if the contracts are 
sufficiently long and cover sufficiently high volumes, as will be analysed below. 
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2. Decrease in Transaction Costs, Improvement in Risk-Sharing 
Mechanism, and Encouragement to Invest 
One of the main advantages of long-term supply contracts for market players is that 
they hedge price and quantity risks and therefore they may facilitate investments.18 
During the monopoly era, reliability and investment were guaranteed through vertical 
integration, but in return there was a hidden cost for society.19 Yet, with the 
liberalisation of the energy markets, risk-averse investors seem to under-invest in 
generation capacities in electricity markets, as a result of under-developed spot 
markets.20 This is because the illiquid and unstable spot markets do not enable firms 
to sink their fixed cost investments based on reliable investment signals. This is the 
fact for European spot markets, which are still under-developed. As a result, energy 
companies tend to make more durable vertical arrangements such as long-term 
supply contracts, since these contracts increase certainty and provide an insurance 
device, which reduces the risks for market operators.21      
By the same token, according to transaction cost theorists, long-term supply 
contracts can help to minimise transaction costs that are linked to the uncertainty, 
identified above and economise on significant asset specific investment.22 These 
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 A. Boosm and S. Buehler, ‘Restructuring Electricity Markets When Demand is Uncertain: Effects on 
Capacity Investment, Prices and Welfare’ (2007) CIE Discussion Paper 2007-09 
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Vol.12 Utilities Policy 253, pp. 253-256 
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accessed 11 May 2011, pp. 16-23 
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Publishing Co.,Inc. 1975);   B. Klein, R. G. Crawford and A. A. Alchian, ‘Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process’ (1978) Vol.21 Journal of Law and 
Economics 253, pp. 253-255;  P. L. Joskow, ‘Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific 
Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets’ (1987) Vol.77 The American Economic Review 
168, pp. 184-185 
According to Williamson, a dilemma in making contracts is that, on the one hand, it is technically 
impossible and prohibitively costly to make complete contingent claims contracts by considering each 
possible circumstance that may arise in the future. On the other hand, if a contract is seriously 
incomplete, the diverged interests of the contracting parties will lead them to engage in individually 
opportunistic behaviour and joint losses. Therefore, Williamson argues that vertical integration can be 
a better solution to possible opportunistic behaviours of contracting parties, as vertical integration 
harmonises interests and permits an efficient decision process to be utilised. O.E Williamson, ‘The 
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theorists argue that if a long-term agreement between a seller and a buyer involves a 
relationship-specific investment, the contracting parties may have a tendency to 
benefit from circumstances that may arise in the future such as fluctuations in supply 
or demand by increasing the costs or reducing the revenues obtained by the other 
party.23 This uncertainty or ‘opportunistic behaviour’ can be eliminated through long-
term contracts, as they may provide flexibility in terms of price and quantity via 
contract provisions such as take-or-pay,24 price indexation25 or redetermination 
clauses.26 Therefore, long-term contracts with flexible contract conditions may help 
to solve the problem of counterparty credibility.27 The price and quantity risks that 
parties face depend on their positions in the supply chain and the technology they 
use. Long-term contracts then enable the parties to allocate the risk to the party that 
is best able to manage it.28  
Regarding the market positions of the contracting parties, long-term supply contracts 
display different results in terms of surplus and risk management depending on the 
contract’s characteristics.29 For instance, tacit renewal and exclusive purchase 
clauses may decrease the transaction costs for both parties, whereas reduction 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consideration’ (1971) Vol.61 American Economic 
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clauses allow the buyer to reduce the volume that must be bought under the terms of 
the contract in case the supplier starts reselling in its commercial area; this protects 
the buyer’s market share. Volume clauses including rebates may reduce the price for 
the buyer. Take-or-pay clauses may provide enough flexibility to avoid a breach and 
thus expensive renegotiation of contracts.30 Thus incomplete long-term supply 
contracts might be the most efficient governance structure for the contracting parties, 
as they provide them with flexibility regarding renegotiation and solve the 
counterparty credibility problem. Yet, at the same time, they may result in market 
foreclosures due to certain characteristics of these contracts, as will be seen in the 
next section.  
Regarding the technology involved in energy markets, the advantages of long-term 
supply contracts can be observed in the longer term. If long-term supply contracts 
are long enough and cover enough volume of commodity they may facilitate market 
entry and promote market building while spot markets remain under-developed.31 In 
electricity generation markets, long-term supply contracts may improve fuel mix 
diversity by enabling new entrants to invest in base-load technologies with high-fixed 
costs such as nuclear or coal.32 As these technologies require high-fixed costs, the 
price and quantity risks are relatively greater than for other types of electricity 
generation plants, such as combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT).33 Therefore, 
investments in more capital-intensive technologies are more risky for generators, in 
particular for new entrants, since unstable spot markets do not help them to hedge 
their risks. In order to make an investment in capital-intensive technologies they 
therefore need to allocate part of their investment risk to their consumers or suppliers 
through vertical agreements such as long-term supply contracts.34 Consequently, the 
application of long-term supply contracts may encourage potential competitors to 
invest in high-fixed cost technologies for electricity generation by reducing their risk. 
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European energy case law could be a significant indicator of the role of long-term 
supply contracts in facilitating investment in generation capacity. In fact, the Scottish 
Nuclear and Synergen cases35 might be given as examples to show the positive 
effects of long-term supply agreements in terms of removing the problem of 
counterparty credibility.36 As will be evaluated in the case law section, the facilitation 
of investment in energy generation was recognised as an economic efficiency gain 
by the Commission.  
Up to now the chapter has discussed the effects of long-term supply contracts from 
the economic point of view. In the next section, these effects will be analysed. Before 
that Table 1 will provide a summary of the effects of long-term supply contracts.  
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Table 1: The positive and negative effects of long-term supply contracts  
 
POSITIVE EFFECTS 
 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
 
Double marginalisation can be limited 
through vertical restraints included within 
the contracts such as maximum resale 
prices, quantity fixing, and non-linear 
pricing. 
 
The duration and volume of long-term 
supply contracts, and contract clauses 
such as exclusive supply obligations may 
result in input/output foreclosure. 
 
Relationship-specific investment might 
be encouraged as a result of the 
minimisation of transaction costs and the 
decrease in the hold-up problem and 
also, in the counter party credibility risk 
for individual market players. 
 
The European energy market can be 
compartmentalised by anticompetitive 
clauses such as territorial/use restrictions 
included in long-term supply contracts. 
 
Investment in high-fixed cost 
technologies could be facilitated through 
the allocation of price/quantity risks, and 
hedge-price. 
 
The division of Europe into national 
energy markets may limit the objective of 
the creation of a single European energy 
market. 
 
Market entry and competition in the 
energy markets may be improved as a 
result of the increase in investment. 
If individual market players do not have 
the ability to effectively negotiate, 
incomplete long-term supply contracts 
might facilitate losses for them in the long 
term. 
 
 
*Source: Own illustration but expired by A. De Hauteclocque, Market Building through Antitrust: Long-
term Contract Regulation in EU Electricity Markets (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 
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C. Analysis of Economic Effects of Long-term Supply Agreements  
Although the economic literature on long-term contracts provides useful insights, 
theoretical ambiguities over the effects of long-term supply contracts remain. In other 
words, they can be both pro- and anti-competitive. Therefore, the effects of these 
contracts are highly context specific.37 This makes it difficult to appraise them from a 
competition policy point of view. The contracts might, for instance, cause input/output 
foreclosure, thereby preventing market entry. Yet, at the same time, they may 
facilitate investment, which may improve competition and encourage market entry. 
As a consequence, it is hardly possible to conclude that there are ‘net pro- or anti- 
competitive effects’ of long-term supply agreements.  
However, these effects may vary depending on various factors, namely the market 
positions of the contracting parties, the structure of the agreement itself, the level of 
competition in the market, and the general level of vertical integration.38 Hence, 
these factors should be taken into account by the Commission in order to explore the 
competitive effects of these agreements during antitrust investigations. On the other 
hand, these factors are deficient with regard to indicating either how to measure the 
efficiencies of long-term supply agreements or how to balance them from a dynamic 
long-term efficiency perspective.39 Dynamic efficiency creates an appropriate 
incentive, in the long-term, for a dominant undertaking to invest in its business, 
develop new ways of delivering better services and engage in efficiency-enhancing 
transactions, as the undertaking is allowed to benefit from a restrictive agreement.40 
Therefore, it seems difficult to assign precise values to dynamic efficiencies 
regarding this existing restrictive agreement.41  Nevertheless, it might be helpful to 
consider that the objective of the assessment of these kinds of efficiencies is the 
same as for static efficiencies: to ascertain the overall impact of the agreements on 
the consumers within the relevant markets.42 Apparently, this is a subject of case 
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law, as the Commission needs to consider the negative and positive effects of long-
term supply contracts in order to appraise the dynamic or static efficiency gains that 
may stem from the contracts.  
To sum up, long-term supply agreements appear both as barriers to entry and as a 
solution to the problem of counterparty credibility and a lack of investment.43 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to encourage long-term supply agreements 
when it is likely that the negative effects will be outweighed by the positive effects. 
However, this advice may change in less competitive markets, since strong 
anticompetitive results may derive from the long-term supply agreements in these 
markets.44 Thus, it is necessary to examine these agreements individually on a case-
by-case basis to see whether long-term supply contracts are anti- or pro-competitive 
in each case. Diagram 1 below shows certain criteria that are considered by the 
Commission during antitrust investigations, and the possible outcomes of the 
assessment of long-term supply contracts.  
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Diagram 1: The assessment of long-term supply contracts from a competition law 
point of view  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Source: Own illustration 
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III. The Appraisal of Long-Term Supply Agreements from a Legal 
Perspective 
As mentioned previously long-term supply contracts may be detrimental to the 
improvement of effective competition and the development of a single European 
energy market. On the other hand, they can pose efficiencies for individual market 
players by having a direct effect on social welfare in terms of encouraging energy 
investment and the development of new energy resources. Thus, the Commission 
and other national competition authorities might encounter considerable challenges 
when assessing the effects of long-term supply agreements. This section will explore 
how the Commission deals with the problem of long-term supply contracts and 
reaches solutions to decrease the detrimental effects of them. In addition, the drivers 
that may shape an antitrust strategy in energy will be observed. First, early case law 
will be evaluated in order to see the way in which long-term contracts were examined 
during the monopoly era. Later, certain antitrust investigations that were initiated by 
the Commission with regard to the possible anticompetitive effects of long-term 
supply contracts after market liberalisation will be explored in order to develop a 
methodological model out of these decisions.    
A. Early Cases-Monopoly Era 
In its early decisions, the Commission, within the limits of the legal environment, 
aimed to improve the energy markets in terms of security of supply45 rather than 
                                                          
45
 Energy supply security can be broadly defined as a concept which is ‘geared to ensuring the proper 
functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical availability at a price which is affordable while 
respecting environmental concerns. Security of supply does not seek to maximise energy self-
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policy of security of supply. These are economic efficiencies such as investment in order to facilitate 
an uninterruptible supply of energy from different energy sources, and non-economic efficiencies that 
enhance energy supply security without investments. For instance, in Electrabel, the case was 
concerned with an exclusive right granted to Electrabel to supply the distribution company with the 
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through the introduction of competition or the development of integrated European 
energy markets. Therefore, as can be seen from these decisions, the Commission 
was happy to let incumbents make exclusive long-term supply contracts for 15 years 
or so due to the efficiencies that could be gained from these contracts such as 
improvements in the generation, transmission and distribution of energy as well as 
the diversity of primary energy sources.  
In Scottish Nuclear,46 two long-term contracts concluded between Scottish Nuclear 
and Scottish Power and Scottish Hydroelectric were notified to the Commission by 
the former pursuant to the previous Regulation 17/62.47 The Commission authorised 
these two long-term supply contracts, although they restricted competition in the 
market in three ways.48 First, Scottish Nuclear was not allowed to supply the nuclear 
electricity produced to any parties other than Scottish Power and Scottish 
Hydroelectric, unless the contracts between those companies were terminated. 
Second, an exclusive purchase obligation was imposed on Scottish Power and 
Scottish Hydroelectric for 74.9% and 25.1% respectively of the production of Scottish 
Nuclear. Third, the price at which nuclear electricity was purchased was fixed under 
the contracts and was identical for both companies. In addition, the contracts were 
signed for an initial period of 30 years.  
Despite the anti-competitive features of the contracts, the Commission deemed that 
the conditions under which an individual exemption for each contract under Article 
101(3) TFEU could be obtained were satisfied.49 The objective economic benefit 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
electricity required for resale to its final consumers for a 20 to 30-year period. The Commission ended 
the investigation with final commitments, which were to reduce the duration to 14-years and to 
gradually decrease the volume of the power supplied. In this case the Commission sought to balance 
free competition and the principle of security and continuity of supply. See Commission, ‘Electrabel: 
the European Commission obtains satisfaction on the revision of the statutes of mixed intercommunal 
electricity distribution companies in Belgium’ (IP/97/351) 
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arising from the contracts was the improvement in the generation and distribution of 
electricity. Also, the second criterion of Article 101(3) TFEU was satisfied through a 
fair share of the benefit for consumers as a result of the gradual introduction of 
competition into the energy market. However, the Commission shortened the 
duration of the contracts from 30 to 15 years. A sufficient timeframe was therefore 
provided to Scottish Nuclear for long-term planning and necessary adjustments in 
the new situation after the start-up period. To sum up, the Commission considered 
an investment in electricity generation as an efficiency gain that outweighed the 
foreclosure effects of the long-term supply contracts.   
In another case, Jahrhundertvertrag,50 through a set of long-term supply contracts, 
German electricity generating utilities and industrial producers of electricity 
undertook to purchase a specific amount of German coal in order to produce 
electricity. The first was a supplementary agreement on the sale of German coal up 
to 1995, concluded between the General Association of the German Coalmining 
Industry (GVSt) and the Association of the German Public Electricity Supply Industry 
(VDEW). The second was a supplementary agreement on the sale of German coal 
to industrial producers of electricity up to 1995, signed between GVSt and the 
Association of Industrial Producers of Electricity (VIK). The problems with these 
contracts were exclusive purchase and supply obligations imposed on the coal and 
electricity companies who were members of the Associations. The importance of the 
case stems from an argument that was put forward by the Associations. The 
argument was that the agreements could not be caught by Article 101 TFEU, as the 
application of competition rules was precluded by Article 106(2) TFEU51 because the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
will improve the production or distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress, (2) 
consumers will have a fair share of the resulting benefit, (3) the anticompetitive restrictions concerned 
will not be indispensable to the attainment of these objectives, and (4) competition will not be 
eliminated in the substantial part of the product market.   
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necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.’ Also see Commission 
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competition rules could prevent the electricity generators and coalmining companies 
from performing the services of general economic interest52 assigned by law and the 
Federal Government for the purpose of safeguarding energy. Therefore, the 
agreements were not within the scope of the competition rules. However, the 
Commission deemed that there was an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. In addition, 
Article 106(2) TFEU was not applicable in the case, since, as long as the application 
of competition law did not preclude the undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
the services of general economic interest from performing these services, they were 
under the scope of the competition rules.53 Besides, the final decision on the case 
was in line with the decision given in Scottish Nuclear regarding the application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU. Although the contracts restricted competition among the 
electricity generators for primary energy resources, the Commission considered that 
the contract contributed to improving electricity generation and coal production, and 
safeguarded the procurement of primary energy sources. In addition, the 
agreements secured the energy supply in the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, 
the consumers had a fair share of the resulting benefits.54  
In other cases, namely Pego,55 REN/Turbugas,56 Isab Energy,57 Rosen,58 Api 
Energia,59 Sarlux60 the Commission approved the contracts with a condition that their 
durations should be reduced to 15 years, although no explicit explanation about the 
duration was provided. There was however one exception. In the 
Transgas/Turbogas61 decision, the Commission approved a 25-year supply contract 
with a take-or-pay provision concluded between Transgas (a Spanish Power station) 
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th
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and Sonatrach (Algerian gas producer). Here, the longer contract duration was 
balanced with the facilitation of security of supply resulting from the development of 
new Algerian supplies. In all these cases the objectives of the Commission were 
almost the same. They were to facilitate the development of generation technologies, 
improve electric supply conditions and to develop primary energy sources that had a 
favourable impact on the environment.  
The cases handled by the Commission in the monopoly era imply that the 
Commission was willing to support the development of generation and supply, and 
the improvement of security of supply through long-term supply contracts. It was 
accepted that these efficiencies provided the ability to be exempted under Article 
101(3) TFEU. However, none of these cases display a methodological model that 
was used by the Commission while investigating the long-term supply contracts.  
Nevertheless, in the cases handled by the Commission after the liberalisation of the 
energy markets started, the alleged anticompetitive effects of long-term supply 
contracts have been addressed. The Commission seems to tend to remove these 
anticompetitive effects through antitrust enforcement. These differentiations in the 
substantive appraisal of the contracts and the procedure used in the investigations 
have resulted from both the market liberalisation and the modernisation of 
competition law in the EU. The investigations into long-term supply contracts carried 
out by the Commission since the market liberalisation will be evaluated below.  
B. Some Changes in Methodology after Liberalisation Started in the Energy 
Markets  
In this section, decisions given by the Commission will be divided into two groups 
according to the level of the relevant product markets in which the long-term supply 
contracts were signed: upstream and downstream cases. However, before analysing 
the decisions, it is crucial to mention two facts that have caused significant changes 
in the Commission’s approach to energy cases: the liberalisation of the energy 
markets as well as the modernisation of EU competition law culminating in the 
enactment of Regulation 1/2003.62 These steps pose some notable issues.     
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i.) Before the liberalisation process started, all segments of the energy markets, 
including generation/importation, and network and supply, were run by national and 
very often state-owned monopolies. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Commission 
started to scrutinise long-term supply contracts concluded between energy 
incumbents with a monopoly power under EU competition law.63 The decisions made 
by the Commission regarding long-term agreements in energy are remarkable 
because they show the Commission’s approach to energy cases under different 
economic structures. The Commission’s approach seems to have changed with the 
market liberalisation. 
The first energy regulatory Directives, which were in force between 1996 (1998 for 
gas) and 2003, aimed to create a partially open market in that the largest consumers 
were able to choose their suppliers.64 With the adoption of the second energy 
package a major step forward was taken to creating a fully open competitive internal 
market.65 Finally, in 2009, the third energy package was enacted with the objectives 
of delivering real choices for all consumers and creating a competitive single energy 
market in Europe.66 In addition, the package aimed to create new business 
opportunities and more cross-border trade in order to achieve competitive prices and 
higher standards of service. The evolution of the regulations and the level of 
liberalisation directly affected the Commission’s approach to energy cases. For 
instance, as will be seen below, the Commission has tended to significantly 
decrease the duration and volume of contracts in the cases that it has handled 
recently compared with the cases investigated in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the 
Commission has started to build its decisions upon the objectives of competition 
policy as well as the goals of regulatory policy. Case law indicates that while 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘EC Antitrust Enforcement in the Aftermath of the Energy Sector Inquiry: A Focus on Long-term 
Supply Contracts in Electricity and Gas’ in B. Delvaux, M. Hunt, and K. Talus, EU Energy Law and 
Policy Issues ( Euroconfidentiel 2008), pp. 205-234  
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applying general competition law, the Commission takes the specific regulatory 
choices into consideration such as third party access and ownership unbundling. 
This approach not only underlines the clash between the objectives of EU 
competition law and those of the sector-specific regulations, such as promoting free 
competition in order to generate efficiencies in favour of consumers,67 it also 
indicates that the Commission attempts to balance competition objectives with 
regulatory objectives. This attitude generates a question regarding the extent to 
which the Commission intervenes in market regulation through antitrust enforcement 
pursuant to the market liberalisation agenda and whether there is a possible danger 
of using competition law as a regulatory tool. These questions will be discussed 
within Chapter 4.  
ii.) The structure of the implementation of competition rules was changed with the 
announcement of Regulation 1/2003. Under the previous regulation, Regulation 
17/62, the Commission was the only authority that could exempt long-term supply 
contracts under Article 101(3) TFEU.68 With the enactment of Regulation 1/2003, the 
‘notification system’ was replaced by the ‘legal exception’ regime.69 Accordingly, 
long-term supply agreements falling within Article 101(1) TFEU but meeting criteria 
in Article 101(3) TFEU are directly valid and enforceable without any prior decision. 
Undertakings have therefore become more responsible under the ‘self-reliant’ 
system for making a competition assessment of their agreements or commercial 
behaviour as well as their potential efficiencies pursuant to Article 101(3) TFEU.70 
Besides, the Commission has started sharing its monopoly power to apply the 
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competition rules to bilateral anticompetitive behaviour of market operators with 
national competition authorities and national courts.71 
This new system has apparently brought some advantages in terms of saving time 
and economic resources for other tasks such as the pursuit of cartels and abusive 
behaviour, which are of much greater significance for the public interest than dealing 
with notifications, many of which concern agreements that have no serious 
anticompetitive effects.72 Nevertheless, in the recently liberalised energy markets, it 
might be difficult to assess possible efficiencies, since the appraisal of long-term 
supply contracts that could result in vertical restraints from both the legal and 
economic aspects is complicated.  
Another novelty that came with the enactment of Regulation 1/2003 was the 
introduction of commitment proceedings into the enforcement of competition law.73 
Accordingly, the Commission can impose a binding decision through commitments 
proposed by the parties to address the concerns of the Commission without clarifying 
the existence of any infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU.74 As will be seen 
below and particularly within Chapter 4, in most of the energy cases handled by the 
Commission, the investigations were concluded through commitment proceedings 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Consequently, the observation of Article 9 itself 
                                                          
71
 Articles 5 and 6 of Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1. There are some concerns that the new system 
might increase uncertainty in the application of Article 101(3) TFEU, since non-binding guidelines 
might not be followed by national competition authorities or national courts. In addition, national courts 
may not have enough expertise and investigation power to assess the anticompetitive effects of 
vertical contracts as well as the possible efficiency gains resulting from them. However, this argument 
might be rebutted by the report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, which shows that no major 
difficulties with the direct application of Article 101(3) TFEU have been indicated by either national 
enforcers or firms or their legal counsels following the change in the system of notification and 
administrative authorisation. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Report on the Functioning of Regulation 1/2003 SEC(2009) 574  
72
 Whish and Bailey, supra n 52, 166  
73
 Article 9 Council Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1: 
‘(1) Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to 
an end and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them 
by the Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision make those 
commitments binding on the undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and 
shall conclude that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. 
(2) The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings: 
(a) where there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; 
(b) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments; or 
(c) where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the 
parties.’ 
74
 Whish and Bailey, supra n 52, 255-261 
48 
 
may give some insights into undertakings’ and the Commission’s attitudes to these 
cases. Since this issue will be discussed in detail within Chapter 4, for now just an 
abstract will be given. One of the reasons to invoke commitment proceedings for both 
parties is convenience in terms of using time and economic resources efficiently. 
Since a preliminary assessment is sufficient to initiate commitment proceedings, the 
Commission does not have to clarify the existence of an infringement of competition 
rules, which decreases its workload. Besides, this yields a sort of guarantee 
mechanism for undertakings not to be subject to any financial punishment as long as 
they do not breach the commitments imposed. In addition, from the regulation policy 
point of view, imposing commitments on the undertakings concerned can be more 
effective as they push the liberalisation of the energy markets further. Commitment 
proceedings also enable the Commission to reduce the anticompetitive effects of 
vertical contracts, for instance by reducing their length as well as their volume. Yet, at 
the same time, possible economic efficiencies can be still gained from these 
contracts such as investment in energy generation plants or in transmission 
infrastructure. Furthermore, on the one hand, commitment decisions give 
undertakings an opportunity to by-pass negative publicity as well as possible private 
enforcement. On the other hand, commitments proposed by undertakings concerned 
under Article 9 might go beyond possible remedies that could be imposed under 
prohibition proceedings.75 
In the next section, the cases will be explored with consideration of the changes in 
both the energy regulation process and competition law in order to observe the 
impact of these in case law.  
1. Long-term Supply Contracts: Anticompetitive Contract Clauses 
The most important aim of this section is to show that the Commission, particularly 
after the first regulatory Directives came into force, started investigations in the 
energy markets on the basis of competition policy. The focus of the Commission 
apparently shifted from improvements in energy generation and supply to the 
enhancement of competition and the creation of a single market in Europe.  
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Besides, given the strategic importance of long-term supply contracts,76 particularly 
in the gas sectors in terms of the security of gas importation from non-EU states, the 
Commission seems to take into account energy supply security when dealing with 
competition problems and considers balancing trade-offs between competition policy 
and the security of supply.77 Regarding the increased dependence on gas imports, 
long-term supply contracts may limit the risks linked to this dependence and 
enhance the security of supply.78 Apparently, even though it is not explicitly 
displayed, commitment decisions are useful instruments in the hands of the 
Commission to balance the objectives of competition policy and sector-specific 
regulation.79      
With regard to long-term supply contracts signed between energy producers and 
importers/wholesalers, possible anticompetitive outcomes seem to be mainly 
resulted from the contract clauses. Thus, in most of the competition investigations 
the concerns of the Commission are over these anticompetitive contract provisions 
that strengthen the market power of historical monopolies by dividing the markets 
into the regions, i.e. the compartmentalisation of the relevant markets. For instance, 
territorial restriction (or destination clauses) prevents a buyer from reselling the 
product concerned outside of a specified country or area, whereas use restriction 
forces a buyer to use the product purchased for certain purposes decided within the 
contract. These restrictions not only contribute to price maintenance, but also reduce 
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liquidity in the European energy markets through facilitating collusion between 
market players.80 The idea behind the provisions is that by dividing the market into 
regions or Member States, buyers/wholesalers are precluded from engaging in 
commercial activities with other buyers/wholesalers; in other words, energy-to-
energy competition (mostly gas-to-gas competition) is hampered. This clearly 
undermines the creation of a common market.81 Article 4(b) of the block exemption 
regulation on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices identifies territorial 
restrictions as hard-core restrictions and states that the exemption provided by the 
Regulation does not apply to vertical agreements that contain any provisions that 
have the direct or indirect effect of territorial restrictions.82 Therefore, these 
agreements need to be handled under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
The Commission has dealt with territorial restrictions contained within long-term 
supply agreements in a number of cases. The contracts signed between Gazprom 
(Russian gas producer) and ENI (Italian oil and gas company), OMV (Austrian oil 
and gas company), and E.ON Ruhrgas (German gas company), were investigated 
by the Commission due to territorial restriction provisions included in the contracts.83 
As a result of the settlements between the parties and the Commission, the 
investigations were closed. The parties agreed to delete the territorial restrictions 
and other clauses such as a right of first refusal84 and most favoured customer,85 
which infringed EU competition law on restrictive business practices (Article 101 
TFEU). Another remarkable commitment proposed by ENI and OMV was to promote 
increased capacity in Trans Austria Gasleitung (hereafter TAG), and to improve third 
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party access, which would facilitate efficient and effective use of TAG as a transit 
pipeline.86 The commitments also included the introduction of an effective congestion 
management system, the introduction of a secondary market, and the regular 
publication on the Internet of the available capacity.87 The commitments were 
apparently suggested to achieve non-discriminatory and transparent capacity 
allocation and congestion management systems, which were directly related to 
neither the territorial restriction clauses nor long-term supply agreements.88 These 
settlements show that the commitments given by the parties indicate that the aim of 
the Commission is to intervene in the energy markets via antitrust investigations, as 
claimed by former Competition Commissioner, Neelie Kroes: ‘... I intend to use our 
competition tools actively to speed up the liberalisation process in gas and electricity 
markets’.89 As a consequence, these three settlements between the Commission 
and the parties concerned, and the general approach of the Commission to the 
energy cases raise the question of whether the Commission should undertake such 
expanded responsibility in the energy markets, and whether it should pursue the 
scheme of energy regulation.    
Other significant decisions were GDF/ENEL and GDF/ENI.90 In most of the cases 
related to territorial restrictions, the Commission closed the investigations through 
settlements between itself and the undertakings concerned. Nevertheless, in 
GDF/ENEL and GDF/ENI, the Commission concluded the investigations through 
prohibition proceedings. Regarding the contract signed between GDF and ENEL, 
GDF was supposed to deliver gas purchased by ENEL from NLGN at the delivery 
point Oltingue, on the border between Switzerland and France. According to the 
contract, the gas carried from Nigeria by GDF was only to be used in Italy. Similarly, 
within the contract signed between GDF and ENI for the transportation of liquefied 
natural gas (thereafter LNG) purchased by ENI in Northern Europe, it was specified 
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that the LNG could only be re-sold in France. After the investigations started the 
parties terminated the infringement. However, this did not help to bring the 
investigations to an end. At the final stage of the investigations, although there was 
no fine to be imposed, the Commission adopted a decision indicating the existence 
of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. These were the first actual decisions in a 
string of cases arising from the same anticompetitive concerns. Apparently, the aim 
of the Commission was to provide clear guidance regarding the legal assessment of 
territorial restriction clauses within the recently liberalised energy markets.  
However, the approach of the Commission in GDF/ENEL and GDF/ENI was 
criticised on the basis of discrimination between EU and non-EU companies, 
particularly regarding the settlements reached with Norwegian Statoil and Norsk 
Hydro (2002), Nigerian NLNG (2002), and Russian Gazprom (2003 and 2005), and 
specifically with Algerian Sonatrach (2007).91 In the Sonatrach decision, the problem 
was Sonatrach’s insistence on replacing the territorial restriction clauses with profit 
splitting mechanisms within the long-term supply contracts signed between itself and 
several Member States including Italy, Spain and Portugal (gas) and France, 
Belgium, Italy, Spain, the UK and Greece (LNG).92 Profit splitting mechanisms 
impose an obligation on the buyer to share with the seller a certain part of the 
revenue gained from reselling the product outside of an allocated territory, typically a 
Member State, or using the product for a purpose other than that agreed upon.93  
Again, similar to territorial and use restrictions, the mechanism helps a seller to save 
each geographic market within its portfolio by preventing gas-to-gas competition 
between buyers. In this way, the seller will be better off from an economic point of 
view by maximising its profit by for instance, protecting its wholesale outlets or 
imposing different prices on different purchasers. After seven years of at times 
                                                          
91
 In 2000, the Commission started to investigate territorial restriction clauses in gas contracts, with 
the aim of increasing supply competition. A number of contracts concluded between external 
suppliers and the European importers were examined and several cases were opened. E. Waktare, 
‘Territorial Restrictions and Profit Splitting Mechanisms in the Gas Sector: the Algerian Case’ (2007) 
Competition Policy Newsletter 19, pp. 19-22 
92
 The other one is a change in the delivery point for the products concerned. Since this clause does 
not create anticompetitive outcomes as profit splitting mechanisms do, it will not be covered by the 
paper. See also H. Nyssens, C. Cultrera and D. Schnichels, ‘The Territorial Restrictions Case in the 
Gas Sector: a State of Play’ (2004) Vol. 2 Competition Policy Newsletter 48, pp. 48-51 
93
 Waktare, supra n 91,19-21; Faull and Nikpay, supra n 12, 367  
Profit splitting mechanisms may also force a purchaser to share commercially sensitive information 
such as resale price and the volume of energy resold in a downstream market with an upstream 
supplier, as the supplier has an interest in knowing how much of the product is diverted into other 
territories or to other users, and how much of the profit should be split. 
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discussions the Commission and the Algerian Ministry for Energy and Mines reached 
a common understanding with regard to the clauses dealing with profit sharing 
mechanisms.94 This long lasting negotiation might indicate the enthusiasm of the 
Commission to end investigations through settlements rather than by making 
infringement decisions. This approach of the Commission could be justified through 
energy supply security, particularly given that Algeria was the third largest external 
gas supplier after Russia and Norway in 2006, with in total 54.6 BCM of gas and an 
LNG supply that was 11% of the EU’s total consumption.95 After long lasting 
negotiations, former Commissioner Kroes remarked that: ‘the agreement reached 
constitutes a major breakthrough in our relations with one of Europe’s most 
important suppliers for natural gas and eliminates an important obstacle for the 
creation of a single EU-wide market in gas’.96 
The situation of non-EU energy companies can also be ascertained from the aspect 
of extraterritorial application of EU competition law.97 According to the Court of 
Justice, with regard to the universally recognised territoriality principle, an 
anticompetitive agreement can be considered partially or wholly invalid if it enters 
into force in the EU, although the contracting parties are non-EU energy 
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undertakings.98 Nevertheless, the extraterritorial application of EU competition law to 
external energy companies seems difficult with regard to the dependency of the EU 
on non-EU gas supply. This can be observed in the case law, in particular in 
settlement proceedings with non-EU companies such as Sonatrach. As a result, it 
seems that antitrust enforcement can be a solution for anticompetitive contract 
clauses only if politics permit.99  
Other provisions that restrict the commercial activities of market operators are 
exclusive supply obligations and reduction clauses.100 Exclusive supply/purchase 
obligations require a generator to sell the product concerned only to a wholesaler in 
an agreed territory, normally a Member State. This reduces the ability of the 
generator to sell the product to other market operators such as the rivals of the 
wholesaler, distributors or end users. Consequently, entry barriers are rendered for 
wholesalers or retailers who want to participate in upstream or downstream 
markets.101 As mentioned before, the foreclosure effect of the provision is 
detrimental to competition in the energy markets due to the fact that it strengthens 
the dominant position of the wholesaler. Moreover, this provision may aggravate the 
position of the generator itself by preventing him from selling the product to end 
users in the downstream market. Thus, the market power of the wholesaler is further 
protected. Likewise, reduction clauses give the wholesaler the right to reduce the 
annual volume to be purchased from the generator if the latter starts selling the 
product concerned into the territory in which the former operates.   
These anticompetitive provisions namely exclusive supply obligations and reduction 
clauses were addressed by the Commission in the DONG/DUC decision.102 The 
concerns of the Commission in the case were, first, the joint marketing of North Sea 
gas by the Danish Underground Consortium (DUC-constituted by gas producers 
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Shell, A.P Moller, and Chevron Texaco), and second, anticompetitive clauses 
included in long-term supply contracts concluded between DONG, the incumbent 
Danish gas supplier, and the DUC partners. According to the joint marketing 
arrangement, the DUC partners were supposed to sell DONG enough gas to satisfy 
the entire Danish demand and supply additional volumes to Sweden and Germany. 
After the investigation started the DUC partners agreed to cease their joint marketing 
arrangements and market their gas individually. In order to facilitate the 
establishment of new supply relationships the DUC partners also offered 17% of the 
total gas production on an annual basis for sale to new customers over a period of 
five years. Since this commitment would bring competition to the Danish market as 
well as increase competition in neighbouring Netherlands and Germany, DONG and 
the DUC partners decided to build a new pipeline linking the Danish gas fields with 
the existing infrastructure on the European continent in order to increase the network 
capacity for potential competitors.  
According to the provisions of the gas supply agreements concluded between DONG 
and the DUC partners, DONG was obliged to report to the DUC partners the 
volumes sold to certain categories of customers so as to obtain a discount or special 
prices. In return, the DUC partners were supposed to offer all of their future gas finds 
to DONG first. In order to bring an end to the investigation the parties undertook to 
exclude anticompetitive clauses from the contract. To facilitate the market entry of 
the DUC partners and potential other suppliers, DONG also committed to introducing 
an improved access regime for DONG’s offshore pipelines linking the Danish gas 
field with the Danish mainland. In this respect, DONG undertook to increase the 
transparency of the system by publishing information on the available capacity, to 
allow for short term trading in line with the access regime, and to introduce 
interruptible transport contracts. This decision is another example in which the 
settlement between the parties and the Commission was not limited to the 
boundaries of the anticompetitive elements of the contracts but was extended to 
improvement of the access regime as well as the facilitation of investment in new 
pipelines.  
Furthermore, the contract granted DONG the right to reduce the volumes bought 
from the DUC partners in a situation where they started selling gas into the Danish 
market. DONG argued that the reduction clauses were needed for the protection of 
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the Danish market in respect of the take-or-pay obligations. The Commission 
accepted this argument because of the limited ability of DONG to sell the gas outside 
Denmark due to the scarce capacity of the interconnector.103 In this respect the 
Commission gave a 6-month transitional period in which reduction clauses could be 
imposed until a new pipeline was commissioned linking the gas fields on the Danish 
continental shelf with other continental European countries.   
From a competition policy point of view, the decisions explored above highlight 
possible anticompetitive effects of long-term supply contracts such as market 
compartmentalisation and market foreclosure stemming from the provisions included 
within the contracts. Besides, the effect of market regulation on competition 
investigations can clearly be seen particularly from settlements, i.e. from the 
commitments proposed by the undertakings concerned. The Commission apparently 
not only removed the anticompetitive clauses from the long-term supply contracts 
through competition law, but also addressed technical and legal obstacles such as 
scarce network capacity and inefficient access regimes preventing further 
liberalisation of the markets and the improvement of competition. These decisions, 
thus, demonstrate the Commission’s aim to use competition rules as vehicles to 
achieve the objectives of market liberalisation, as it seems to be more appropriate to 
conclude investigations on the basis of commitments in order to motivate or force 
undertakings to operate in a way which may be necessary to create conditions 
facilitating competition and market integration in the EU.104  
Nevertheless, these decisions do not provide any insights into the methodology used 
for the investigations into long-term supply contracts. Nor do they explain the 
economic perspective of these contracts. These two missing parts will be traced in 
the next section. 
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2. Long-term Supply Contracts: Volume and Duration of the Contracts  
a) The Steps Followed for the Investigation of Long-term Supply 
Agreements  
The long-term supply agreements concluded between wholesalers or importers and 
large industrial customers can be seen as structural reflections of the long-term 
supply contracts examined above. However, the focus within the competition 
investigations of the agreements that will be analysed below is mostly placed on the 
duration and volume of the contracts. In particular, long-term supply contracts having 
de facto or de jure exclusive purchase character are investigated by the Commission 
due to their foreclosure impact on the markets.105  
The decisions explored in this section give some hints regarding the creation of a 
clear model for the investigation of long-term supply agreements. Basically, the 
Commission divides the investigation into four sections. In general the Commission 
first defines the relevant product and geographic markets. Second, the Commission 
states its concerns about possible anticompetitive outcomes of the contracts. Third, 
the Commission examines the commitments proposed by the parties to remove the 
anticompetitive results of the contracts. Finally, in order to render the commitments 
binding on the undertakings concerned, the Commission assesses the effectiveness 
and proportionality of the commitments pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.  
More specifically, in order to estimate the detrimental effects of the long-term supply 
agreements, the Commission adopts a more analytical and comprehensive process 
by pursuing a path specified in the Sector Inquiry.106 The Sector Inquiry points out 
four features that should be considered: (1) the volume tied under the individual 
contracts, (2) the duration of the contracts, (3) the cumulative market coverage of the 
contracts, and (4) the efficiencies claimed by the parties.107 The first three factors are 
examined in order to find evidence to indicate whether new entry barriers have been 
created by the contracts. The aim of the assessment therefore is to reach a decision 
showing whether entry by potential competitors has been made more difficult from a 
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factual point of view rather than to define any certain forms in which Article 101 and 
102 TFEU may be infringed.108 With regard to the application of commitment 
proceedings under Regulation 1/2003, on the whole the Commission tends to 
emphasise and support its concerns about possible anticompetitive outcomes of 
contracts through examining these factors, without finding any particular proof 
pointing to the existence of any breach.   
In downstream energy markets, the Commission initiated a number of competition 
investigations with regard to the volume and duration of long-term supply contracts. 
These investigations have become key cases that illustrate the significant lines of 
inquiry pursued by the Commission during the investigation.109 These cases are Gas 
Natural,110 Synergen,111 Distrigas,112 and EDF.113  
In the Gas Natural decision, the Commission investigated a long-term gas supply 
agreement signed between Gas Natural, a dominant company in the gas market, 
and Endesa, the market leader in the electricity business in Spain.114 The 
Commission was concerned about the impediment of the contract to market entry at 
a particularly crucial moment in the early stages of liberalisation of the energy market 
in Spain. According to the Commission, the duration and volume of the agreement, 
which posed de facto an exclusive purchase obligation, could have raised market 
entry barriers for entrants into the Spanish gas market, as electricity generators were 
one of the largest customers for gas suppliers. The agreement may also have 
segmented the market to the benefit of the dominant firm through use and resale 
restrictions obliged on Endesa.115 In addition, it would have resulted in discrimination 
against Spanish gas purchasers by providing Endesa with better treatment than 
other future clients of Gas Natural. In order to remove the Commission’s concerns 
Gas Natural and Endesa proposed some amendments to the gas supply agreement.  
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The volume of the agreement was reduced by around 25% in order to free Endesa’s 
purchasing capacity as well as to eliminate the exclusivity of the contract by creating 
an available customer for potential entrants.116 The duration of the contract was 
reduced to 12 years so as to avoid excessive long-term dependence of the customer 
on the supplier. This is still rather long compared to other decisions by the 
Commission given later on. This may be justified through the evaluation of the 
Commission’s thinking and the different level of market opening.117 Moreover, the 
parties undertook to delete the use of restriction and other price differentiations 
compartmentalising the market. This would contribute to competition in both the gas 
and electricity markets, because, on the one hand, the access of power generators 
to gas as a substitute for coal would develop a competitive electricity market and, on 
the other hand, gas would also be a product that electricity purchasers could offer to 
final consumers.118 
Although Gas Natural did not provide tangible guidance for the industry, several 
interesting issues such as de facto exclusivity and energy release were pointed out 
in the decision. In addition, this case is a good indicator of the Commission’s 
approach to long-term supply agreements in the early 2000s.  
In the Synergen case,119 in 2000, ESB, a dominant company that effectively 
controlled 97% of electricity production in Ireland and more than 60% of the supply 
market for eligible customers, and Statoil, a powerful company with gas reserves 
inside and outside Ireland, and electricity activities in other countries, notified three 
agreements related to the construction and operation of a 400 MW gas fired 
electricity generation plant, Synergen, in Dublin, Ireland. According to the joint 
venture agreement, ESB would hold a 70% stake in the company while Statoil would 
hold the remaining 30%.120 
Regarding the joint venture agreement, the concern of the Commission was over 
whether the creation of the joint venture would remove Statoil as a potential 
competitor from the highly concentrated Irish power market, since the agreement 
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imposed an obligation on Statoil that prevented it from participating in any power 
project in Dublin or entering the electricity market independently. During the 
settlement process, the parties undertook to delete this provision. 
The second contract was a ‘supply agreement’ that foresaw that a subsidiary of ESB, 
namely ESBIE, would market electricity generated by Synergen for 15 years. The 
Commission deemed that the supply contracts would have strengthened the market 
power of ESB. The parties committed to making 600 MW of electricity available (400 
MW generated by ESB, 200 MW generated by Synergen), by means of auctions or 
direct sales, which would be used by new market entrants to build up a customer 
base when constructing a new power plant.121 Also, ESBIE was excluded from the 
Synergen sales.122 
Finally, the third contract was a ‘gas supply agreement’ that provided that Statoil 
would supply gas to Synergen for electricity generation for 15 years. The gas supply 
agreement was cleared by the Commission, which considered that it would improve 
the effective competition in the gas supply market through increasing the market 
share of Statoil slightly above the so-called de minimis threshold.123 Furthermore, the 
Commission took into account that Statoil offered a special price discount for its gas, 
which it would not have offered unless it had been assured long-term exclusivity. 
Apparently, the Commission exempted the contract under Article 101(3) TFEU as it 
considered that an objective economic benefit arising from the contract would be 
shared by consumers as well as the contracting parties.    
Overall, the Commission deemed that the commitments would facilitate market entry 
into the Irish electricity markets. Not only would the traders be able to purchase 
electricity from different sources, but also the new producers would have the 
opportunity to build up a customer base for their future power plant.  
This case demonstrates the importance of investments in energy, and also, how the 
Commission handles a long-term supply contract when it contributes to an 
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investment decision given by the parties to the contract concerned. In Synergen, the 
Commission first considered the special price offered by Statoil as a cost efficiency, 
which would not have been given if it had not been for the exclusive character of the 
contract, and counted it towards exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.124 In 
contrast, the price difference in Gas Natural was appraised as anticompetitive 
because of the segmentation of the market, and because it put Endesa in an 
advantageous position against its competitors. It point out that the Commission is apt 
to grant an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU in an instance where an 
undertaking concerned makes an investment.125 Second, the reinforcement of an 
incentive to invest through an exclusive long-term supply contract was taken into 
account by the Commission. The Synergen decision is, thus, a significant example 
which shows that the Commission considers an investment as an efficiency while 
granting an individual exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. 
In the Distrigas case, the Commission launched an investigation into the long-term 
gas supply contracts concluded between Distrigas (the largest gas importer and 
supplier in Belgium) and its variety of large gas customers such as industrial users, 
electricity generators and resellers.126  The concerns of the Commission were over 
the market foreclosure for potential competitors of Distrigas and the obstruction to 
the development of competition in the gas markets following the liberalisation. The 
long-term supply agreements concerned would have tied a significant part of the 
market demand to Distrigas for a long period and thereby prevented alternative 
suppliers from entering the market and building up a viable customer base (output 
foreclosure). The Commission was therefore concerned that the combined effect of 
the agreements would have been to significantly close off the market to potential 
market entrants.  
The importance of the case derives from two different angles. First, the Commission 
clarified all of the steps of the investigation. This disclosed a substantive model used 
by the Commission for the examination of long-term supply contracts. Second, while 
evaluating the commitments proposed by Distrigas under an Article 9 procedure, i.e. 
commitment proceedings, the Commission took the principle of proportionality into 
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consideration, which was recently interpreted by the General Court in the Alrosa 
case.127  
For the assessment of a long-term supply contract, the Commission listed five 
elements that should be considered: (1) the market position of the supplier, (2) the 
share of the customer’s demand tied under the contracts, (3) the duration of the 
contracts, (4) the overall share of the market covered by the contracts, and (5) 
efficiencies.128  
In its consideration of the first element, the Commission pointed out not only the role 
of having a dominant position but also the cumulative effects of several contracts. 
This approach, which considers the actual economics of a given situation, was also 
adopted in the Repsol case.129 Its subject matter was exclusive long-term supply 
contracts signed between an oil company, Repsol, and service station operators in 
Spain.130 Repsol’s market share was only around 30%, which hardly exceeded the 
dominance threshold. However, the Commission deemed that, because of their 
cumulative effects and the weak position of the retailers and final customers as 
compared to Repsol, the contracts would have blocked market entry. In both cases 
the foreclosure effect of a network of long-term contracts employed in the supply 
markets was highlighted.131  
Regarding the second (the share of the customer’s demand tied under the contracts) 
and fourth (the overall share of the market covered by the contracts) elements, the 
Commission took several important tools into account in order to appraise the 
contracts such as the total volume sold by a supplier and the proportion of that total 
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volume to the total demand in the relevant market, as well as the percentage of a 
customer’s demand tied to the supplier. According to the Commission, when a 
customer is obliged to buy all or a good part of its requirements from a particular 
supplier for a certain period of time, the customer is no longer available as a 
potential customer to other suppliers. Such contracts can therefore render market 
foreclosure. For this reason, Distrigas committed to reducing the volumes of gas sold 
in Belgium, and therefore other gas suppliers could compete with it for the demand 
that was freed up. For industrial users and electricity generators for instance, 
Distrigas undertook to ensure that on average 70% of the gas contracted to supply to 
the consumers concerned would return to the market every year.132 Besides, the 
Commission claimed that when consumers are bound to a particular supplier through 
long-term contracts that cover only a small part of the total demand, competitive 
concerns such as market foreclosure are unlikely to arise. The Commission 
considered that, given the market power of Distrigas, there would not be a significant 
anticompetitive effect as long as it met less than 20 to 30% of the total market 
demand. Thus, the effect of these commitments was to ensure that Distrigas did not 
tie up an excessive proportion of consumers for more than one year ahead, while 
they allowed Distrigas as much flexibility as possible in managing its portfolio of 
contracts.133 
Furthermore, in considering the third condition (the duration of contracts), in order to 
speed up the return of customers to the market, Distrigas undertook not to conclude 
new long-term supply contracts with industrial users and electricity producers for a 
duration of longer than 5 years, and with resellers for a duration of longer than 2 
years, which is far shorter than the duration specified within the Commission’s 
guideline on vertical restraints.134 In the decision, the Commission divided customers 
into two groups. Such an approach can be justified by the differentiated effects of the 
customer groups on the competitiveness of the market due to their attractiveness to 
a new entrant. The main aim of the commitments was therefore to ensure that 
Distrigas did not modify its behaviour to cherry-pick the most attractive customers 
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with long-term contracts.135 Distrigas was to be bound by these commitments as long 
as its market share did not fall below the 40% market share threshold.136   
A very similar approach to the restriction of contract duration was adopted in the 
E.ON Ruhrgas case by Bundeskartellamt. As compared with the Distrigas decision it 
is clear to see that the Commission accepted and endorsed the substantive 
assessment of E.ON Ruhrgas.137 In the E.ON Ruhrgas decision, Bundeskartellamt 
limited the duration of the contracts to within 2 and 4 years under which respectively 
more than 80%, and between 50% and 80% of a customer’s total demand was 
supplied. Reflecting the Distrigas decision by the Commission, the duration of the 
contracts signed with resellers was restricted to a time period of 2 years by 
Bundeskartellamt.138 Transaction costs could be a reason behind leaving at least 
20% of customer demand remaining untied by the long-term supply contracts. 
Providing a certain amount of gas, such as less than 20% of the total customer 
demand, might be uneconomic for an alternative supplier. Therefore, 20% of the total 
customer demand could have been considered as a threshold by Bundeskartellamt 
to attract a second supplier to enter into a relationship with a buyer.139   
Regarding the final element (efficiency gains), the Commission found that the likely 
positive effects of the long-term supply contracts that were concluded between 
Distrigas and newly established electricity generation companies seemed to 
outweigh their possible negative effects. As a result, the commitments did not cover 
newly constructed power plants, given that new generation capacity would promote 
competition in the market. Also, the investment would not go ahead, unless greater 
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predictability of prices and possible increased security of supply were guaranteed for 
the investor, i.e. the elimination of quantity and price risks.140      
In its consideration of the principle of proportionality, the Commission assessed the 
necessity and sufficiency commitments by taking into account a number of factors. 
First, the obligation to return an adequate volume of gas was necessary and 
sufficient to reduce the level of foreclosure of the customers, thereby enabling 
alternative suppliers to build up a significant customer base in the gas market. 
Second, the reduction of the duration of the contracts improved the level of 
competition in the market by facilitating market entry, as attractive customers such 
as electricity generators, industrial customers or gas resellers would not be tied for a 
long-period of time. Finally, the application of commitments was limited to a total 
period of four years, which was crucial to promote gradually developing competition 
and liberalisation of the market.141  
The approach adopted by the Commission and Bundeskartellamt in these gas cases 
can be seen in electricity cases as well. In the EDF decision, the Commission 
investigated the exclusive long-term supply contracts concluded between EDF and 
its large industrial customers by taking into account the factors clarified in 
Distrigas.142 Similarly to other long-term supply cases, the concerns of the 
Commission were the foreclosure effects stemming from the de facto exclusivity of 
the contracts and the imposition of resale restrictions on large industrial customers. 
Under the settlement proceedings, several commitments addressing these concerns 
were proposed by EDF. First, EDF undertook to ensure that at least 65% of the 
electricity contracted with large customers would return to the market every year. 
The main objective of the set of commitments was to enable consumers to meet their 
electricity demand from alternative suppliers, and to make it easier for alternative 
suppliers to enter the market or to expand their market power. In addition, EDF 
pledged that the duration of its contracts with industrial customers would not exceed 
5 years. However, given the interests of industrial customers, and on the grounds of 
greater cost transparency, the Commission highlighted that in a situation where the 
customer wanted to make a supply contract for more than 5 years, they could do so, 
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as long as EDF provided them with a termination right without any penalty at least 
every five years. Similarly to Distrigas, EDF would be released from its commitments 
only if its market share fell below the 40% market share threshold.    
b) The Analysis of the Decisions: Economic Efficiency Gains 
Although the investigations examined in this section seem respectively clearer and 
more detailed it is still hard to find effective guidance for possible investigations 
about long-term supply in the future. Nevertheless, by considering all of the related 
cases investigated by the Commission a brief formative guideline might be created. 
Broadly speaking, it can be stated that, from a procedural point of view, the 
Commission follows a general structure for settlement proceedings by dividing 
investigations into four stages: (i) the definition of the relevant product and 
geographic markets as well as the identification of the market positions of the 
companies under investigation, (ii) the specification of competition concerns of the 
Commission, (iii) the examination of the commitments proposed by the parties, and 
(iv) the assessment of potential efficiency gains which may offset the anticompetitive 
effects of the contracts. 
More specifically, it can be seen from the case law that the Commission adapts a 
more economic-based approach for the first and second stages. This observation 
could be captured from the matters indicated by the Commission during the 
investigations. For instance, the Commission takes the market shares of the 
companies under investigation into consideration in order to see whether they have 
market power or are likely to strengthen their market power. This consideration is 
clearly based on economic principles regarding the fact that anticompetitive effects 
will be correlated with the market power.143 Similarly, the cumulative effects of 
parallel contracts are also based on economic principles as the Commission 
appraises the share of market demand tied by each single contract to measure a 
cumulative effect.144   
In addition, the volume and duration of contracts are significant factors considered by 
the Commission during its investigations. The Commission tends to force the firms 
concerned to reduce the volume and duration of the contracts, given that the greater 
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volume and duration of the contracts the more likely it is that market foreclosure will 
occur. Regarding the volume of the contracts, it seems that the Commission wants to 
be sure that a significant amount of the demand for electricity and/or gas from large 
industrial customers and/or electricity generators is returned to the market every year 
so that other market players have an opportunity to enter the energy markets (i.e. the 
elimination of output foreclosure). Likewise, the duration of the contracts tends to be 
shortened to 5 years or less.  
Even though the market shares of firms, and the durations and volumes of contracts 
are certain elements that are considered by the Commission during its 
investigations, the outcomes of each investigation are different depending on the 
specific circumstances of each case. For instance, while the Commission cleared 
contracts with durations of more than 10 years in Gas Natural and Synergen, in 
Distrigas and EDF the duration was shortened to 5 years or less depending on the 
volume of the contracts and to whom the electricity or gas was supplied. Similarly, 
the threshold set by the Commission for the volume of the contracts that should be 
returned to the market was different in the Distrigas and EDF decisions. Overall, 
although there are no defined thresholds for either the volume or duration of 
contracts, the Commission follows general principles, which are based on economic 
grounds, and which are observed within the guidelines on vertical restraints.145 
Besides, if there is a relationship-specific investment or an objective economic 
benefit deriving from long-term supply contracts, the contracts could benefit from an 
exemption provided under Article 101(3) if a number of the conditions listed within 
Article 101(3) are satisfied.146 For instance, as demonstrated by the Synergen and 
Distrigas decisions, an investment in electricity generation capacity was recognised 
as a releasing efficiency by the Commission.  
Finally, the case law shows that since the modernisation of EU competition law with 
the enactment of Regulation 1/2003, commitment proceedings under Article 9 of the 
Regulation seem to be used to replicate in effect the functioning of the notification 
system for agreements under former Regulation 17/62, which was abolished by the 
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new Regulation.147 In this sense, in particular regarding the Distrigas and EDF 
decisions, it looks as though the Commission has cleared the long-term supply 
contracts by adapting necessary changes in order to make them comply with 
competition law as well as to eliminate possible anticompetitive effects of the 
contracts. In this way, while ensuring the compliance of the contract with EU 
competition law, the Commission guarantees the legitimacy of the contracts that 
generate economic efficiencies.  The case law also indicates that the Commission 
and energy companies have an increased tendency to use the settlement procedure 
under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 within the energy markets.     
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to draw a general frame around long-term supply 
agreements in two perspectives: economic and legal. First, the economic outcomes 
of the agreements were examined in terms of their negative and positive effects. In 
this part of the chapter, it was found that although there are a great number of 
academic works on long-term supply contracts there is no certain and unambiguous 
clarification regarding their net anti- or pro-competitive effects.148 Consequently, it is 
crucial to analyse each single long-term supply contract concluded in the energy 
markets with respect to its own market conditions such as the market positions of the 
contracting parties, the structure of the agreement itself, the intensity of retail 
competition and the general level of vertical integration, in order to properly assess 
the impact of them on competition in the relevant market. 
Second, the chapter drew a methodology adopted by the Commission for the 
investigation of long-term supply agreements through an analysis of case law. It was 
found that under monopoly market conditions, the Commission tended to support the 
application of long-term supply contracts regarding efficiencies, in particular the 
development of generation and transmission technologies and capacities, and 
improvements in security of supply. However, the early cases did not spell out a 
clear and certain methodology in terms of an analysis of the anti- or pro-competitive 
effects of long-term supply agreements. Even though there is a lack of explanation 
as to why and how these decisions were reached, the Commission intimated that 
                                                          
147
 N. Dunne, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’ (2014) Vol.6(3) Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 399, p. 407  
148
 Hauteclocque, supra n 3, 105-107 
69 
 
long-term supply contacts of less than 15 years would benefit from an exemption 
under Article 101(3) TFEU given the market conditions, and the high up-front 
investment cost in energy markets.149  
In contrast, since the liberalisation of the energy markets in the EU, the Commission 
has tended to focus on the likely detrimental effects on competition and market 
integration. Within the first group of decisions the Commission mostly pointed out the 
anticompetitive contract clauses such as territorial restrictions and non-compete 
obligations. In most of the decisions, the investigations were brought to an end 
following the undertakings concerned proposing to delete the contract clauses from 
the agreements. Yet, still the decisions examined within this group did not draw out a 
clear methodology. Besides, it was highlighted that the antitrust settlements reached 
after long-lasting negotiations between the Commission and non-European energy 
incumbents or relevant national authorities had a significant role particularly in the 
wholesale gas markets. 
With regard to the second group of the decisions, there are more detailed 
investigations and clarifications regarding the process of examination of the long-
term supply contracts. Although the decisions do not individually provide proper 
guidelines regarding the methodology they may help to create formative guidance. 
Therefore, it can be drawn out that the Commission examines long-term supply 
contracts in four stages: in the first step, the Commission analyses the undertakings 
and the relevant market subject to investigations by considering the market power of 
the contracting parties and the competition degree in the markets. In the second 
step, possible anticompetitive effects of long-term supply agreements are examined, 
and in the third and fourth stages, the Commission assesses efficiencies that could 
possibly arise from the agreements and accepts the commitments proposed by the 
parties to bring the investigations to an end. Then, the Commission attempts to 
eliminate the anticompetitive effects and protect or enhance the efficiency gains (if 
there are any) through the commitments, which are mostly energy-specific. 
One of the most remarkable points in the case analysis is the Commission’s 
tendency to use competition law to eliminate the anticompetitive parts of the 
contracts and the deficiencies of market regulation through commitment 
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proceedings. This problem will be discussed within Chapter 4. But, before that, the 
findings of Chapter 2 are summarised in a diagram below, and within the next 
chapter, the problem of preferential network reservations made by dominant 
undertakings on the basis of long-term supply contracts will be highlighted.    
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Diagram 2: Different types of treatments for different types of anticompetitive 
contracts clauses (*Source: Own illustration)  
Pre-liberalisation: 
After-liberalisation: 
 
Regarding the 
improvement of 
energy 
generation and 
supply, thereby 
the security of 
supply 
Assessed under 
Article 101(3) 
TFEU 
Exclusive long-
term supply 
contracts 
Upstream 
• Long-term contracts with anticompetitive  contract clauses such as 
territorial restrictions  and non-compete obligations 
• Antitrust settlements between the Commission and EU/non-EU 
undertakings or/and national authorities  
• Commitments eliminating contract clauses with/out quasi-regulatory 
effects 
Downstream 
• Long-term contracts  
• Antitrust settlements 
• Committments shortening the volume and duration of the contracts 
Both 
• Case law indicates (i)a general tendency of the Commission and 
contracting parties to finalise investigations through commitment 
proceedings, and (ii)the importance of investment and new entrants in 
the energy markets, i.e. new entrance- and investment-biased decisions  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROBLEM OF PREFERENTIAL CROSS-BORDER TRANSMISSION NETWORK 
RESERVATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKETS 
I. Introduction 
Energy regulatory reforms in Europe are based on a significant objective, which is to 
create an integrated single European market with a level of effective competition, as the 
gains from liberalisation would increase within a single and competitive market. Cross-
border transmission networks with optimal capacity within and outside the EU are thus 
desirable for both the enhancement of competition and market integration. Cross-border 
networks increase the number of competitors and thus limit the market power of the 
incumbents by generating a connection between otherwise isolated areas for both the 
electricity and gas markets. Integrating energy markets in the EU is thus a legitimate 
objective. 
Historically the level of cross-border interconnections has been low due to the national 
structure of energy markets. Energy production and supply were considered national 
issues and were owned or at least tightly controlled by the States. Cross-border 
transmission of energy was therefore necessary only for security of supply. Hence, 
transmission networks were built for centralised power generation by and for national 
monopolies. With liberalisation, however, the demand for the use of interconnectors has 
increased, usually because energy as a commodity, in particular electricity, might be 
cheaper on one side of the interconnector than on the other.1 Given this increased 
demand for access to cross-border transmission networks, the capacity of 
interconnector and cross-border gas pipelines is becoming increasingly insufficient. 
Besides, this insufficient capacity seems to be monopolised through long-term network 
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reservations. This monopolisation ultimately raises competition concerns under the 
essential facilities doctrine.2   
The competition concerns stemming from the use of cross-border transmission 
networks could be grounded on two different variables. First, vertically integrated 
undertakings may foreclose the relevant markets through blocking cross-border 
transmission infrastructures. Since energy is a network-based sector, vertically 
integrated energy companies may protect and/or strengthen their market positions in 
generation and supply by preventing potential competitors from entering the relevant 
markets through providing only limited network capacity. Second, long-term supply 
contracts signed among Member States may result in the monopolisation of cross-
border transmission networks. This is because the obligations arising from these supply 
contracts, such as the transmission of the commodities, can only be fulfilled through 
preferential cross-border network reservations given the volume and duration of the 
contracts. However, although these contracts could result in the monopolisation of 
interconnectors, they could be beneficial from an economic point of view, since they 
may increase the liquidity of a wholesale market in an importing Member State. In both 
situations, the reservations do not seem to be made pursuant to a transparent and non-
discriminatory method as identified by sector-specific regulation. Therefore, the problem 
of scarcity of interconnectors is getting worse due to the combination of (i) preferential 
network reservations either for strategic anticompetitive purposes or on the grounds of 
associated long-term contracts, and (ii) the non-implementation of sector-specific 
regulatory rules. In this regard, long-term cross-border network reservations are under 
the scope of both EU competition law and EU secondary law.  
Given the two dimensions of the problem of long-term network reservations, it is clear 
that the Commission handles this problem on the basis of ex-ante sector specific 
regulation and ex-post competition law.  Therefore, it is crucial to investigate these 
preferential reservations from two angles: first, the reflection of this problem within the 
scope of ex-ante market regulation, in particular under the provisions related to vertical 
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unbundling and third party access.3 The second angle is the case law including both 
certain judgments of the European Court of Justice (hereafter the Court of Justice) and 
certain competition decisions of the Commission. The judgments of the Court provide 
clarification over ex-ante regulatory rules, whereas the competition decisions of the 
Commission show the impact of market regulation on antitrust investigations. In this 
sense, the VEMW4 and Republic of Slovakia5 judgments of the Court of Justice are 
corner stones in terms of showing the approach of the Court to long-term preferential 
network reservations on the basis of both market regulation and competition law. 
Regarding these judgments, the Commission seems to adopt a rather rigid approach for 
the assessment of long-term preferential network reservations. Accordingly, as will be 
seen in GDF Suez, E.ON Gas and Marathon,6 the Commission is likely to pursue 
regulatory objectives within antitrust investigations. For instance, the Commission tends 
to introduce or improve the implementation of third party access through antitrust 
investigations. Moreover, the competition decisions show that, similar to the energy 
regulatory policy of the EU, the Commission, under antitrust investigations, is inclined 
not to accept any kinds of efficiencies as objective justifications for preferential network 
reservations other than major investments in networks by the holder of the priority 
access rights. It seems that the reason behind this tendency is to balance the tension 
between the objective of the creation of a single energy market and the objective to 
increase scarce network capacity through investments.  
The main goal of this chapter is to indicate a strategic approach of the Commission in 
the energy markets: to achieve regulatory objectives through competition law. Thus, the 
chapter will first attempt to reflect on the extent to which ex-ante sector specific 
regulation deals with the problem of access to cross-border transmission networks. 
Then, it will demonstrate that, in its handling of antitrust investigations, the Commission 
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aims to achieve regulatory objectives. Therefore, the discussion of the Commission’s 
decisions will mainly be based on the disposition of the Commission in achieving its 
regulatory objectives through antitrust investigations, particularly by considering 
investments in transmission networks as object justifications for network reservations 
under Article 102 TFEU investigations. The second aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
relationship between long-term supply contracts among Member States and preferential 
cross-border network reservations. Furthermore, it aims at analysing these contracts 
from an economic perspective in order to show possible competitive effects that they 
may have, which could be assessed as efficiency gains. Finally, the last goal of the 
chapter is to analytically discuss the possibility of the consideration of associated long-
term supply contracts as an objective justification for preferential reservations under 
Article 102 TFEU, because of the fact that they may actually generate economic 
efficiency gains.  
Hence, the structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section of the chapter will 
evaluate the provisions of ex-ante sector specific regulation, namely vertical unbundling 
and the third party access regime, which address the problem of inefficient allocation 
and use of cross-border transmission networks. In this section it will be observed that 
the anticompetitive investigations of the Commission are mostly finalised pursuant to 
the objectives of market regulation. The second section of the chapter will focus on 
long-term supply contracts among Member States from an economic point of view, and 
their relationship with preferential interconnector reservations. This section aims at 
showing that the Commission may take into account associated long-term supply 
contracts during antitrust investigations of preferential network reservations, particularly 
when the former results in economic efficiency. The final section of the chapter will 
analyse the case law, and provide a hypothetical example in order to critically examine 
whether there are other possible objective justifications, other than investments, for 
preferential network reservations, which could be claimed as an objective justification 
defence under Article 102 TFEU investigations.  
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II. The Reflection of Preferential Network Reservations within the Sector-
specific Regulation 
Given the vertically integrated structure of energy markets and the shortcomings of 
market liberalisation,7 different legal and institutional measures have been adopted by 
the Commission in order to confront the problem of preferential cross-border network 
reservations. These measures have two main purposes: first, to solve cross-border 
issues ex-ante through an improved regulatory framework; and second, to fight anti-
competitive market conduct ex-post through EU competition law.8 Regarding the first 
measure, the problem of preferential network reservations is handled within the scope 
of market regulation under vertical unbundling and third party access regimes. While 
vertical unbundling promotes the efficient and effective management of transmission 
networks by breaking the link between network and supply/generation companies, the 
third party access regime facilitates transparent and non-discriminatory allocation of 
network capacities. Therefore, there is a complementary relationship between these 
regulatory tools. They improve competition and market integration in energy. Similar to 
EU secondary law, the monopolisation of cross-border transmission networks has been 
subject to several investigations under EU competition law. In the next section, the 
problem of long-term priority access rights within market regulation will be highlighted. 
Later, the chapter will continue with an examination of the relationship between long-
term contracts and preferential access reservations. This will be followed by analyses of 
the case law including certain judgments of the Court of Justice and the antitrust 
investigations of the Commission, in order to see the approaches adopted by the 
European Courts and authorities to eliminate cross-border problems in the EU using 
different tools.   
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A. The Problem of Vertical Integration between Network and Supply Activities 
in the Energy Markets 
Vertically integrated energy companies, as mentioned before, have traditionally been 
active in wholesale, network (including cross-border interconnectors and transmission 
pipelines), and retail activities within Member States. With the liberalisation of the 
energy markets, however, this traditional market structure has been considered as an 
obstacle to the well-functioning of the energy markets, given that, in a situation where a 
holding company which is active in both non-competitive (network activities) and 
competitive (generation and supply) segments of the energy sector may misuse its 
transmission network by blocking access to it or by providing its supply chain with a 
competitive advantage over other market operators. Ex-ante market regulation thus 
aims at obtaining vertical de-integration in order to diminish the possible harmful effects 
of vertical integration on competition and market integration within the EU. Pursuant to 
this aim, EU secondary law states that energy transmission networks should be 
separated from other activities. In this way, an internal conflict of interest within a 
vertically integrated company would be eliminated or reduced, as would anticompetitive 
foreclosure behaviour of dominant companies operating within the network segment of 
the industry. 
 Ex-ante regulatory rules require the unbundling of transmission networks from 
generation and supply so as to improve access and reduce the risks of discrimination 
and cross-subsidy. The current regulatory package provides three different models that 
can be transformed into domestic regulatory systems within Member States in order to 
achieve the vertical separation of transmission services from supply activities at 
different levels.9 The three alternative models are: ownership unbundling, independent 
system operator and independent transmission operator.10 Under ownership 
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unbundling, an entity that is fully unbundled from generation and supply owns and 
operates transmission assets. This means that it has no further claim in generation and 
retail.11 The independent system operator model implies that the transmission assets 
are owned by a vertically integrated undertaking; in other words the owner of the 
transmission network is a part of the vertically integrated group. Yet, the transmission 
system is operated by a system operator, which is independent in ownership from this 
vertically integrated company. Finally, under the independent transmission operator 
model, similar to the independent system operator model, the vertically integrated firm is 
allowed to maintain ownership of transmission assets. Yet, unlike the independent 
system operator model, there is no ownership unbundled system operator. The 
neutrality and independence of the transmission operator is ensured through a set of 
detailed conditions such as independent management and a supervisory board (legal 
unbundling).12 
Despite the fact that EU secondary law provides three alternative models for vertical 
unbundling, the case law, in particular the E.ON,13 RWE14 and ENI15 decisions, shows 
that the Commission has adopted a strategy through antitrust enforcement to force 
private companies to divest their network assets and achieve ownership unbundling 
through competition law decisions. By means of this strategy, as will be examined in-
depth in the next chapter, the Commission seeks to control the impact of sector-specific 
regulation regardless of the choice left to the Member States.16   
Regarding these alternative unbundling models, there is a general discussion about 
which one of them delivers more effective and non-discriminatory access, as well as 
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more efficient and timely investment into network capacity. While the economic 
literature, as will be seen below, provides ambiguous observations, the Sector Inquiry 
favours full ownership unbundling. According to the Sector Inquiry, the main problems 
related to the vertically integrated market structure in energy stem from (i) a lack of 
adequate incentives for transmission system operators to invest in transmission 
networks, as this investment would increase the competition against the generation and 
supply branches of vertically integrated undertakings, and (ii) the provisions of 
preferential capacity reservations and privileged treatments in favour of affiliated 
generation and/or supply chains.17 Therefore, if the ownership link is fully broken 
between transmission systems and generation and supply, the incentives for the 
network operators to support the competitive position of their associated companies or 
to invest in transmission networks will change. They will seek to optimise their network 
businesses as opposed to acting in the overall interest of the vertically integrated 
groups.18 As a consequence, the Sector Inquiry stresses that full ownership unbundling 
is crucial in order to create a level playing field and improve investment incentives.19   
However, the economic literature provides more ambiguous observations with regard to 
this discussion. Unbundling can have several advantages, yet at the same time a 
number of potential disadvantages.20 Although the costs and benefits deriving from 
structural separation differ from country to county, depending on the market structure 
and the level of competition, generally speaking unbundling may bring the following 
advantages.21 Vertical de-integration, depending on the degree of unbundling, reduces 
incentives for cross-subsidisation and distorting actions of the network company due to 
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the proper allocation of tasks between network activities and generation/supply. It also 
increases the transparency of the costs and returns of the network company, which has 
a direct impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation. The increased 
transparency helps the regulator to set appropriate access tariffs for the network firm, 
which increases the performance of the network. The transparency also improves the 
regulator’s ability to monitor the markets. Due to the reduction in incentives for strategic 
behaviour, regulation becomes less complicated and hence more efficient. Both 
improved network performance and more efficient market regulation enhance 
competition. The network performance leads to less allocative distortion caused by high 
network tariffs as well as to better options for new entrants for using the grid.22  
On the other hand, vertical unbundling brings certain disadvantages. Briefly, unbundling 
may cause the problem of double marginalisation and increase transaction costs. 
Unbundling may also have a detrimental impact on economies of scope as network and 
other commercial activities are closely related to each other, particularly in electricity, 
given that, as it is a non-storable commodity, it is necessary to have close connectivity 
between generation, transmission, distribution and supply in order to keep demand and 
supply in balance. Finally, unbundling may result in the emergence of high capital costs 
for the vertically de-integrated generation firms. As a consequence, investment in new 
power plants by these firms could reduce. The outcomes stemming from vertical 
unbundling will be analysed in detail below.  
1. Advantages of Vertical Unbundling 
a) Performance of Transmission Networks  
One of the direct effects of unbundling is more independent management and financing 
of transmission networks. More efficient and effective network management without the 
need for compromising regarding the other needs of an integrated holding company can 
be created under vertical unbundling, since different network management requirements 
will be met.23 In particular, when the network is fully unbundled from generation and 
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supply, the network company concentrates on its own profit rather than on the profit of 
the group. As a result, it responds better to regulatory incentives and is more likely to 
invest in the network, which will further facilitate competition, since it will not aim at 
maximising joint profit.24 
With regard to the financing of networks, vertical unbundling seems more appropriate, 
as it is more likely to prevent cash flow generated by transmission activities from being 
diverted to other activities. In this way, the returns of the network company will be spent 
efficiently in its interests. In this respect, full ownership unbundling seems more effective 
than the other two options regarding the performance of transmission networks as it 
fully secures operational and financial independence. 
b) Effectiveness and Efficiency of Regulation 
As mentioned before, unbundling improves the transparency of the costs and returns of 
network firms and thus makes it more difficult for undertakings to engage in cross-
subsidisation and other distorting activities. While unbundling hinders the strategic 
reallocation of the internal costs of a network company, a vertically integrated company 
can shift the costs of commercial activities to the network firm and shift resources from 
the latter to the commercial part of the group. The financial transparency improves the 
efficiency and effectiveness of regulation, as it erodes informational and transactional 
regulatory constraints.25 The transparency of costs and returns also enhances the 
informational position of a national regulator, which helps the regulator to set tariffs 
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own part of the downstream industry, as the transmission operators can better decide on the size of the 
network by taking into consideration the future demand and supply conditions. However, the paper is 
criticised as it neglects the possible intention of the transmission operators to discriminate in favour of 
their own affiliates downstream.  
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 Mulder, Schestalova and Lijesen, supra n 20, 19-22 
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more appropriately.26 Furthermore, the surveillance of the regulator becomes easier and 
more effective as vertical separation decreases or completely eliminates the incentive 
for the network company to favour its supply chain.    
Again, full ownership unbundling seems the best option, as it eliminates cross-
subsidisation and other distortions that could be present under other types of vertical 
unbundling regimes. Only full ownership unbundling can remove the risk of an 
information exchange between the members of a vertically integrated company. In this 
regard, only ownership unbundling can create the most effective ‘Chinese Walls’ 
between the network and generation/supply. In addition, only full separation of 
transmission activities from the rest of the system can provide the best result in terms of 
the development of the effectiveness of regulation by removing the asymmetric 
information in the markets and increasing the tendency of the network firm to comply 
with sector-specific regulation.   
c) Development of Competition 
No doubt one of the most significant advantages of unbundling is the creation of a level 
playing field in the competitive segment of the energy sector. Improved network 
performance, more effective regulation and fewer incentives for network owners to 
engage in cross-subsidisation and other distortions result in the promotion of 
competition in the wholesale and retail energy markets. With the improved allocation of 
tasks in network firms, network activities become better managed and separated from 
wholesale/retail activities, thereby reducing incentives and opportunities for 
discrimination in favour of the affiliated generation and supply companies by, for 
instance, margin squeezing or network foreclosing.27 
A vertically integrated company could have the incentive and opportunity to strategically 
affect competition in the wholesale market. In this sense, this type of company may 
hinder new entry to the wholesale market and/or harm entrants’ operations in the 
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 D. P. Baron and D. Besanko, ‘Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing’ (1984) Vol.15 RAND 
Journal of Economics 447, p. 466 
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 When the price for access to the essential facility is regulated, the network firm may find it attractive to 
restrict access to it in order to restrict entry into unregulated markets in which the owner of the essential 
facility is also a competing supplier. R. Beard, D. Kaserman and J. Mayo, ‘Regulation Vertical Integration 
and Sabotage’ (2001) Vol.49 Journal of Industrial Economics 319, pp. 331-332 
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wholesale markets through high fees for access to the interconnector. Nevertheless, an 
effective national sector regulator might be able to control the access price so that such 
anticompetitive behaviour by the holding company can be prevented. Yet, in spite of 
regulatory measures over access prices, this type of holding company can still interrupt 
competition through non-price discrimination, for instance, by delaying a network 
connection or necessary repair, or by providing asymmetric information on balancing 
needs. Vertical separation is therefore likely to facilitate entry into electricity wholesale, 
which will lead to an increase in competition, as well as to improvements in productive 
efficiency.  
Under the independent system operator and transmission system operator models, the 
incentive for integrated undertakings to engage in anticompetitive conduct is not 
completely eliminated, as anticompetitive behaviour by an undertaking increases the 
total profit of the vertically integrated company.28 Only full ownership unbundling can 
entirely eliminate the incentive of the vertically integrated firm to impede competition in 
order to protect or strengthen its market position in the competitive segments of the 
energy markets.    
2. Disadvantages of Vertical Unbundling 
a) Double Marginalisation  
As discussed within Chapter 2, double marginalisation may occur when both upstream 
and downstream market operators have market power and when they separately 
maximise their profits.  The opportunity to eliminate the double marginalisation problem 
in the energy markets increases the incentives for vertical integration.29 This tendency 
however may reduce competition for the unintegrated firms. Thus, final prices may rise, 
                                                          
28
 For an opposing view see F. Hoffler and S. Kranz, ‘Legal Unbundling can be a Golden Mean between 
Vertical Integration and Ownership Unbundling’ (2011) Vol.29 International Journal of Industrial 
Organisation 576, pp. 600-604 
29
 If there is perfect competition in the downstream markets double marginalisation may not occur; yet this 
is not the case in energy markets. 
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and the effects of vertical integration on social welfare may become more ambiguous, 
depending on how the intensity of competition is affected by vertical integration.30 
b) Economies of Scope and Transaction Costs 
In the energy sectors the integrated management and/or operation of different types of 
activities by a holding company could reduce the average cost due to economies of 
scope.31 The unbundling of network systems from commercial businesses would lead to 
losses of synergy between these activities as unbundling decreases the options for their 
integrated and combined operation.   
The literature on vertical economies in the electricity industry shows that there are 
certainly scope economies in the joint operation of transmission networks and 
generation.32 In addition, it is indicated that integration between industrial segments 
leads to a greater reduction in the costs of coordinated economic activities relative to 
the unbundling models and long-term supply/purchase contracts.33  However, the cost 
efficiency of vertical integration might be countervailed by possible negative effects of 
integration on competition. 
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 M. A. Salinger, ‘Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure’ (1988) Vol.103 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 345, p. 355; M. Riordan, ‘Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm’ (1998) 
Vol.88 American Economic Review 1232, p. 1246; K. U. Kuhn and X. Vives, ‘Excess Entry, Vertical 
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 The loss of synergy between different types of activities, i.e. economies of scope, arises when the 
incremental costs for a second service are less when a first service is already on offer.    
32
 D. L. Kaserman and J. W. Mayo, ‘The Measurement of Vertical Economies and the Efficient Structure 
of Electricity Utility Industry’ (1991) Vol.34 Journal of Industrial Economics 483, pp. 496-500; K. Gilsdorf, 
‘Vertical Integration Efficiencies and Electric Utilities: A Cost Complementary Perspective’ (1994) Vol.34 
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 261, p. 278; B-L. Lee, ‘Separability Test for the 
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Goto, ‘Technological Externalities and Economies of Vertical Integration in the Electric Utility Industry’ 
(2004) Vol.22 International Journal of Industrial Organisation 67, p. 80 
For instance, the literature on organisational economics recognises that under vertical unbundling firms 
seeking to complete transactions must be ready to face a variety of potential transaction costs, and 
contractual and organisational hazards. These transaction costs include the direct cost of writing, 
monitoring and enforcing contracts as well as the cost associated with the ex-ante investment and ex-
post enforcing performance inefficiencies that may arise as a result of contractual hazards (Chapter 2). 
There is significant evidence that unbundling can raise transaction costs, as a result of the reorganisation 
and physical separation of the business. For example, the costs of finding a suitable salesperson and 
acquisition costs may increase. There could also be significant contract renegotiation costs. Clearly the 
transaction costs may increase as the degree of unbundling is increased. 
33
 R. J. Michaels, ‘Vertical Integration and the Restructuring of the U.S. Electricity Industry’ (2006) Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis Series No.572 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975682> 
accessed 5 November 2014, pp. 3-5 
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Since the existence of economies of scope is connected with the degree of market 
liberalisation, when comparing the three policy options for unbundling the main cost of 
losing economies of scope arises with the introduction of proper task allocation, i.e. an 
independent system operator. The cost tends to stay almost the same if full ownership 
unbundling is implemented after the adoption of an independent system operator. 
c) Insufficient Investment in Generation 
From a theoretical perspective, unbundling can have a detrimental effect on commercial 
parts of the energy industry. Unbundling may increase the cost of capital in generation, 
which may adversely impact generators’ investment incentives.34 This argument is 
based on the financial capabilities of a generator, namely the possibility of it using the 
network as collateral. This detrimental effect is more likely to happen under full 
ownership unbundling as this fully separates financing.      
In a vertically integrated firm, the combined risk of all activities could be lower than the 
risk of commercial activities, as the relatively low risk of network management would be 
associated with the risk of generation. Therefore, it can be stated that vertically 
unbundled companies have higher capital cost than integrated firms. In other words, 
unbundling would reduce the financing capabilities of generators and hence 
investment.35 Nevertheless, the effect of vertical separation on the cost of capital is 
uncertain. If generators became smaller this effect could emerge. However, if they 
became more focused and merged with similar firms the cost of capital may fall. 
Besides, this effect of vertical separation on generation could be eliminated through 
long-term supply contracts as they may increase the incentive for market operators to 
invest in generation capacities by minimising the price and quantity risks (Chapter 2).   
Clearly a careful social cost/benefit analysis should be done for each country so as to 
estimate the size of the costs relative to the benefits. For instance, the costs of 
unbundling are likely to be greater than the benefits in small countries where the scope 
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of competition is limited and managerial expertise is insufficient.36 The two tables below 
compare the advantages and disadvantages of vertical integration with the three 
unbundling models. 
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 J. E. Besant-Jones, ‘Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned?’ 
(2006) Paper No.19 Energy and Mining Board Discussion Paper 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENERGY/Resources/Energy19.pdf> accessed 03 June 2014, pp. 
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Table 2: The advantages of vertical unbundling under the alternative regulatory models 
compared to vertical integration 
          Advantages 
Models 
Performance of 
Transmission 
Networks 
Efficiencies and 
Effectiveness of 
Regulation 
Development of 
Competition 
Vertical 
Integration 
Dependent on 
holding firm 
Inefficient and 
ineffective 
regulation 
Underdeveloped 
competition 
 
Independent 
Transmission 
Operator 
More independent 
than vertical 
integration yet still 
might be affected 
by a holding 
company 
Relatively more 
efficient and 
effective regulation 
compare to vertical 
integration 
Improved competition 
yet dominant company 
in the wholesale 
market can abuse its 
market power via 
network activities 
Independent 
System Operator 
Better focus and 
more secure 
finance 
 
Due to more 
transparent 
information on 
costs and benefits, 
more efficient 
regulation 
 
Due to more effective 
separation between 
commercial and 
network activities, 
more competitive 
markets 
Ownership 
Unbundling 
Fully independent 
and solely focused 
on network 
business and its 
own profit 
Larger 
improvement in 
effective and 
efficient regulation 
 
 
Even larger 
improvement in the 
competition level in 
the markets 
 
*Source: Own illustration 
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Table 3: The disadvantages of vertical unbundling under the alternative regulatory 
models compared to vertical integration 
 
    Disadvantages 
Models 
Double 
marginalisation 
Economies of 
Scope 
Insufficient 
Investment in 
Generation 
Vertical 
Integration 
No double 
marginalisation 
problem 
Welfare from 
economies of 
scope 
No increased cost of 
capital due to the 
integration-so 
theoretically  sufficient 
investment in 
generation 
Independent 
Transmission 
Operator 
Unlikely to occur Welfare decrease 
 
(Un)Likely to change 
 
Independent 
System Operator 
Likely to occur Welfare decrease (Un)Likely to change 
 
Ownership 
Unbundling 
More likely to 
occur 
Larger welfare 
decrease 
(Un)Likely to change 
 
 
*Source: Own illustration 
B. Third-party Access Regime 
Generally speaking, the third party access regime is built on three levels of regulation 
with differentiated levels of detail.37 The core and basic framework is introduced in the 
general internal market Directives, which provide the basic rules and principles for third 
party access. Then, access Regulations for electricity and gas establish the content of 
the regime and the principles in order to specifically focus on access issues and 
complement the more general Directives.  Finally, the EU energy acquis includes the 
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network codes and guidelines, which are the third and most detailed level of regulation 
adopted on the basis of access Regulations.  
Following this hierarchical evolution, the third regulatory energy Directives38 provide the 
three fundamental principles of third party access: (i) non-discriminatory access to 
national and cross-border infrastructure; (ii) a strong regulatory overview for the tariffs 
and methodologies used for capacity allocation; and (iii) unbundled transmission 
systems, as discussed above, so as to reinforce non-discrimination and transparency.39 
In addition, there are provisions addressing many related issues such as balancing, 
publishing requirements, and fixing or approving the tariffs or methodologies for 
capacity calculations. 
In order to complete the first level of regulation, access regulations for electricity and 
gas were enacted by the Commission.40 These regulations further developed the basic 
rules for third party access by focussing preliminarily on access issues. The Regulations 
defined the main objective of the regime, which was to improve wholesale energy trade 
in spot and forward markets among Member States in order to enhance market 
integration, competition and security of supply. In order to reach this objective, the third 
party access regime covers: (i) transparent and non-discriminatory cross-border 
capacity allocation and congestion management; (ii) the harmonisation of cross-border 
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 Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] OJ L 211/55; 
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas [2009] OJ L 211/94 
39
 Third party access as a regulatory measure was first enacted under the first regulatory energy 
Directives (Directive 96/92/EC for electricity [1996] OJ L 27/20; Directive 98/30/EC for natural gas [1998] 
OJ L 204/1). Since the Directives reflected the limits of the political boundaries of the time, they could only 
bring regulated third party access with an addition, negotiated third party access, and could not cover the 
international infrastructure. Thus, they should be considered as the first step towards more market 
oriented regulatory model. The second energy regulatory package (Directive 2003/54/EC for electricity 
[2003] OJ L 176/37; Directive 2003/55/EC for natural gas [2003] OJ L 176/57; Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003 for access to the network for cross-border exchange in electricity [2003] OJ L 211/15; 
Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 for access to the natural gas transmission networks [2005] OJ L 289/1) 
improved the market regulation one step further by enacting regulated third party access as a single 
regulatory regime and by enhancing its applicability to cross-border interconnectors. 
40
 Regulation (EC) 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the national gas transmission networks and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 [2009] OJ L 211/36 
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tarifications; and (iii) promoting new cross-border infrastructure by both transmission 
system operators and third party market operators.41  
As the physical interconnection capacity is undersized, efficient mechanisms to allocate 
the existing capacity and manage congestion have become crucial in order to facilitate 
cross-border trade. To maximise the use of the scarce transmission networks in an 
efficient manner, the Regulations42 require Member States to adopt non-discriminatory 
and transparent market-based mechanisms such as explicit and implicit auctions for 
capacity allocation and congestion management.43 Furthermore, in order to reduce 
contractual congestion in cross-border transmission networks, the Regulations provide 
a use-it-or-lose-it principle, which is based on the freeing up of unused capacity. 
Accordingly, unused allocated capacity, otherwise re-allocated by transmission system 
operators, can be freely tradable on a secondary basis by the capacity owners.44 Given 
the large proportion of existing capacity reservations and the need to create a true level 
                                                          
41
 Article 12 of Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity [2009] 
OJ L 211/55, Article 17 of Regulation 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 
2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15, and Article 22 and 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC 
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electricity [2009] OJ L 211/15 and Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to 
the national gas transmission networks and [2009] OJ L 211/36  
43
 Congestion management can be based on two different mechanisms, namely non-market-based and 
market-based. While the former is usually less transparent and more prone to discrimination, the latter 
provides more efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators 
involved. Non-market-based methods such as first-come-first-served and pro-rate rationing were used in 
some Member States, namely France and Switzerland. These mechanisms resulted in inefficient use of 
interconnector capacity. This is due to the fact that first-come-first-served and pro-rate rationing do not 
necessarily allocate capacity to the participants that value the interconnection capacity the most. It can be 
allocated to participants that do not value it at all.    
The usual criticism of the first-come-first-served method is the potential for discrimination to the 
advantage of the parent company. In the case of a lack of adequate publicity and sufficient advance 
notice informally sent to the parent company to ensure it applies on time, discrimination will occur. With 
the pro-rate rationing method, all requests are accepted but capacities effectively granted ex-post are 
limited according to a percentage relating to the over-subscription, the obvious problem here being 
strategic over-subscription. It can be noted that a liquid and transparent secondary trading market could 
limit these shortcomings.  However, secondary capacity markets remain immature. 
See DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724 para. 180 
44
 Commission Decision 2006/770/EC amending the Annex of Regulation No 1228/3003 on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity para. 2; Recital 21 of Regulation (EC) No 
715/2009 on conditions for access to the national gas transmission networks [2009] OJ L 211/36 
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playing field between the users of new and existing capacity, the use-it-or-lose-it 
principle should be applied to all reserved capacities.45  
The access Regulations, as the most detailed legal framework for the third party access 
regime, bring innovation to the institutional side by creating an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (hereafter ACER) and the European Networks of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity and Gas (hereafter ENTSO-E for 
electricity and ENTSO-G for gas),46 which are obliged to develop non-binding 
Framework Guidelines as well as legally binding and directly applicable Network Codes. 
While the Framework Guidelines set out clear and objective principles for the Network 
Codes, the latter cover the following areas in detail: capacity allocation and congestion 
management, transparency, and the harmonisation of transmission tariff structures 
within the EU. In September 2012 the ENTSO-E and the ENTSO-G developed Network 
Codes on capacity allocation and congestion management, which comply with the 
principles of the relevant framework guidelines prepared by the ACER in 2011.  
With regard to the objectives of the Regulations, logically the Framework Guidelines for 
electricity and gas deal with the integration, coordination and harmonisation of the 
congestion management regimes so as to support the completion and functioning of the 
internal market and cross-border trade. The main objective of the Framework 
Guidelines is to complement, where necessary, the access Regulations and to specify 
the detailed aspects to be implemented in the Network Codes. As a result, the 
Framework Guidelines aim at ensuring more efficient allocation of capacity on the 
interconnection points between two or more Member States and/or adjacent entry-exit 
points for gas transmission within the same Member State.47 
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 Recital 21 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the national gas transmission 
networks  [2009] OJ L 211/36 
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 Regarding harmonisation among the Member States in terms of the operation of the networks, the 
establishment of the ENTSOs is significant. According to Article 8 of Regulation 714/2009 for access to 
the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity [2009] OJ L 211/15 and Regulation (EC) No 
715/2009 for access to the national gas transmission networks [2009] OJ L 211/36 the ENTSOs should 
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and emergency conditions, and a non-binding Community-wide ten-year network development plan. 
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 ACER, The Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms for European Gas Transmission 
Network, 2011, FG-2011-G-001, p. 12 
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In line with the Framework Guidelines, the objective of the Network Codes for electricity 
and gas is to support the completion and functioning of the internal energy market as 
well as the improvement of cross-border trade, including delivering benefits to 
consumers. In order to achieve this objective, they aim at harmonising the market rules 
for calculating and allocating capacity on the basis of yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily 
and within-day timeframes. Additionally, the Network Codes point out the necessity of 
using a common set of remedial actions, such as the establishment of common 
methodologies for determining the volumes of capacity available between regions, to 
deal with the congestion problems that can occur in cross-border interconnections.48  
To sum up, the third party access regime was introduced through three different 
regulatory sets of rules. The structure of this three dimensional provision is illustrated 
below in a diagram. 
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Diagram 3: The illustration of the three dimensional structure of third party access 
 
*Source: Own illustration 
In addition to the regulatory provisions which reinforce cross-border energy trade 
through efficient use of transmission network capacities, the market regulation aims to 
increase the capacity of cross-border infrastructures. Accordingly, EU secondary law 
identifies new major investments in cross-border transmission networks as a cause of 
the interruption in the implementation of third party access. Regarding the scarce 
capacity of interconnectors in the EU, sector-specific regulation covers a provision by 
which investors could have a priority access right if they fulfil certain conditions for a 
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defined period of time.49 It seems that the objective behind this provision is to improve 
the insufficient interconnectors in order to facilitate competition and market integration in 
the long-term, although this exemption seems to block competition and market 
liberalisation for a limited period of time in the short-term.  Thus, this provision 
demonstrates the tension between the two regulatory objectives covered by the EU 
energy acquis: the creation of a single energy market by promoting third party access 
and the improvement of scarce cross-border network capacity by granting an exemption 
from the implementation of third party access. It seems that both contribute to the 
development of a competitive integrated and single energy market in the EU but within 
different timeframes. While the former delays the above mentioned regulatory objectives 
for a while in order to increase facilities for cross-border energy transmission in the 
future, the latter provides all kinds of opportunities to reinforce market integration and 
competition among Member States in the short run. By the same token, new 
investments have been taken into account by the Court of Justice and the Commission 
as objective justifications during judgments of the former and antitrust investigations of 
the latter, as will be seen within the next section. 
Overall, generally speaking, the regulatory rules on vertical unbundling and third party 
access under ex-ante sector-specific regulation aim at creating a market design based 
as much as possible on short-term capacity allocation with liquid secondary trade 
platforms.50 The right portfolio of capacity periods is crucial to achieve a well-functioning 
energy system. The proper implementation of third party access and vertical unbundling 
provisions within domestic markets is significant since the structure of most energy 
markets in Europe still remains vertically integrated, which provides the incumbent 
undertakings with the ability and incentive to use cross-border network infrastructures 
for a long-time in favour of their supply chains. 
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 This provision related to new investments in cross-border transmission networks is covered by the 
second and third energy regulatory packages. According to Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchange in electricity and Article 17 of Regulation 
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 Talus, supra n 12, 192 
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Besides, the ex-ante regulation does not contain a comprehensive provision regarding 
existing long-term priority access rights. It only states that long-term access rights can 
only be provided to facilitate investments in networks.51 This raises uncertainty about 
the future of long-term network reservations. The case law, on the one hand, seems to 
shed some light on this uncertainty at some points. First, the Court of Justice, under 
infringement proceedings, has assessed the legitimacy of long-term priority access 
rights granted on the basis of pre-liberalisation long-term supply contracts, with the 
consideration that the provision of these rights can be regarded as discriminatory under 
the scope of sector-specific regulatory rules. Second, the Commission has investigated 
long-term priority access rights under the essential facilities doctrine. On the other hand, 
the case law shows that the Court of Justice and particularly the Commission have 
reflected the regulatory tools and objectives in their competition investigations and 
decisions. In this sense, the case law indicates that competition law may substitute the 
EU energy acquis under some circumstances. Nevertheless, covering regulatory 
objectives within antitrust investigations might be detrimental to the market as it may 
increase legal uncertainty, which will be discussed within the next chapter. 
The next section will first evaluate the long-term supply contracts concluded among 
Member States in order to show the relationship between long-term supply contracts 
and granting priority access rights. It will also analyse these contracts from an economic 
point of view so as to highlight possible economic efficiencies that could be gained. This 
relationship between the contracts and network reservations, and the possible 
economic efficiencies resulting from the former will reinforce the view which argues that 
the Commission may consider associated long-term supply contracts as objective 
justifications while investigating preferential network reservations under EU competition 
law. Later on, the chapter will continue with the case law.  
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conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15 and Article 36 of Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas [2009] OJ L 211/94 
96 
 
III. Long-term Supply Agreements among Member States and the Problem of 
Preferential Network Reservations 
As mentioned before, the aim of energy regulation in the EU is to promote market 
integration, and thus, facilitate competition and security of supply.52 This aim is based 
on the improvement of wholesale energy trade (within and) among Member States in 
the spot and forward markets by developing effective management of cross-border 
interconnectors and transmission pipelines. However, the completion of a truly 
integrated wholesale market at the level of the EU is still a work-in-progress that has 
been ongoing since the establishment of the first liberalisation Directive.53 Long-term 
supply contracts signed among Member States have a hybrid role in this progress.      
The first role of long-term supply contracts concluded between Member States might be 
slightly positive. Long-term contracts concluded between parties with opposing market 
positions within the same Member States will always tend to foreclose wholesale 
markets, since they reduce the amount of open long and short positions54 that need to 
be closed by wholesale market trading (Chapter 2).55 However, long-term electricity 
purchase/supply agreements signed among Member States, i.e. import and export 
contracts, can mitigate or worsen the effect of domestic long-term contracts depending 
on the short or long market positions of the Member States concerned, as the contracts 
will increase or decrease the amount of electricity that is available for trading within the 
Member States. For instance, Belgium and the Netherlands, which have short market 
positions, benefit from imports under long-term contracts, which increase wholesale 
market liquidity and thereby competition and market integration. However, the opposite 
is the case as France, as it has a net long market position. This means that the bulk of 
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 ACER/CCER, Annual Report on the Results of monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas in 
2012, November 2013, para. 115 
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 Commission, Communication from the Commission, Progress towards Completing the Internal Energy 
Market, COM(2014) 634 final, p. 3 
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 A company with a short market position needs to procure energy from other resources in order to meet 
the demand to supply energy in a downstream market, whereas a company with a long market position 
needs to sell its excess energy to other market players.     
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 In the gas sector, long-term supply contracts signed between European incumbents and non-EU gas 
producers with flexibility provisions enable the buyer to vary the volume of gas purchased in the future. 
This flexibility avoids situations where there is an excess or shortage of gas, thereby reducing the 
incumbents’ need to trade gas at national wholesale markets. Therefore long-term supply contracts 
decrease liquidity in wholesale markets. As a result, competition does not flourish, since new entrants are 
hesitant about entering the markets, as they do not have enough confidence about gas availability.   
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long-term contracts are export contracts, which further increase the impact of domestic 
contracts.56    
The second role of long-term supply contracts might be indirectly detrimental. One of 
the main barriers to market integration, among others, is long-term cross-border 
network reservations stemming from pre-liberalisation long-term supply contracts signed 
between Member States.57 Long-term cross-border network reservations hinder 
wholesale market integration, since they result in physical and/or contractual 
congestion, and thus cause inefficiencies in cross-border capacity allocation. Physical 
and contractual congestion on cross-border interconnectors is currently a problem in 
both the electricity and gas sectors due to the fact that they prevent cross-border flows 
from placing any significant competitive pressure on market players.58  
For instance, in gas, an overall analysis of cross-border network capacity reservations 
indicates that these network capacities are, to a significant extent, fully pre-booked for a 
long period of time on the grounds of historical long-term energy supply contracts. 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that there is a substantial difference between the 
contractual capacity and the actual utilisation of this capacity, which indicates 
contractual congestion, i.e. contractual foreclosure. As a result, in the wholesale gas 
markets, long-term cross-border network capacity reservations on the basis of pre-
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liberalisation long-term supply contracts remain significant barriers to the completion of 
a single European energy market.59 
The effect of long-term supply contracts signed among Member States should thus be 
considered by taking into account an additional variable, as compared to the analysis of 
long-term supply contracts concluded within Member States, which is cross-border 
transmission network reservation.60 With the consideration of physical and contractual 
congestion on most EU borders, granting long-term priority access rights to cross-
border transmission networks could amount to the monopolisation of an essential facility 
and hence an abuse of dominant position, depending on the market position of the right 
holder.61 The competition analysis of long-term supply contracts across Member States 
should therefore introduce the analysis of the effect of the associated long-term priority 
access rights on competition.62 Vice versa the economic analyses mentioned above 
show that, during the antitrust assessment of long-term preferential network 
reservations, the effect of associated long-term supply contracts and the possible 
efficiencies that might stem from these contracts should be covered. Regarding these 
economic analyses and the relationship between contracts and network reservations, 
the final section of this chapter will discuss the probability of the consideration of this 
relationship as an objective justification under antitrust investigations by the 
Commission. Before that, there will be a critical discussion of certain decisions of the 
Court of Justice and the Commission within the next section. This discussion will show 
the evolution of the approach of the Commission to the legitimacy of preferential 
network reservations on the basis of long-term supply contracts. 
IV. Case Law 
As mentioned before, the monopolisation of scarce cross-border transmission network 
capacities by granting long-term priority access rights is very problematic in the 
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European energy markets in terms of competition and market integration. Since the 
provision of these rights is mostly based on pre-liberalisation long-term supply 
contracts, the validity of long-term priority access rights used to be recognised by the 
Commission. Nevertheless, one of the judgments of the Court of Justice, VEMW, had 
enormous effects in the electricity markets as it examined the legitimacy of these 
rights.63 In the judgment, the Court emphasised the importance of granting access rights 
in a non-discriminatory and transparent way, and underlined the importance of the 
implementation of third party access for market liberalisation.  
On the other hand, the Commission, in the GDF Suez64 and E.ON Gas decisions,65 
examined long-term capacity reservations and strategic underinvestment in 
transmission networks under the scope of competition law. It found that granting 
preferential access rights, for historical reasons, without any transparent or non-
discriminatory procedure, could constitute an abuse of dominant position within the 
meaning of the essential facilities doctrine. Besides, it was highlighted that if there is an 
economic efficiency gain such as an investment in transmission network capacities 
stemming from preferential network reservations, the firms under investigation can 
escape antitrust liability through objective justification. This approach by the 
Commission was reinforced by the Viking Cable66 decision, in which the Commission 
deemed that a preferential network reservation was lawful as there was an investment 
in this interconnector. In addition to the above-mentioned cases, this section will also 
appraise the Marathon67 decision of the Commission. This decision is crucial in terms of 
showing that the Commission may use an antitrust settlement as a tool to achieve its 
regulatory objectives such as the proper implementation of third party access.   
These judgments and decisions are significant as, first, they show the role of the Court 
of Justice in the market regulation and, second, they demonstrate the extent to which 
the Commission takes into account the principles and objectives of market regulation 
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while concluding antitrust investigations. In this sense, the case law indicates the fact 
that the Commission seems to assess investments in cross-border transmission 
networks solely as objective justifications for existing preferential network reservations 
in order to improve scarce cross-border transmission network capacity around the EU. 
Furthermore, apparently, the Commission uses the settlements in order to promote the 
third party access regime with the consideration of the creation of a single integrated 
energy market in the EU.  
This part of the chapter will first examine the judgments of the Court of Justice. Then, 
the Commission’s decisions will be evaluated. Finally, as regards the limited 
assessment of the Commission of objective justifications under these investigations, 
there will be a discussion regarding possible objective justifications under Article 102 
TFEU other than network investments for preferential network reservations.  
A. The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Assessment of 
Preferential Network Reservations: VEMW and Republic of Slovakia 
1. The VEMW Judgment of the European Court of Justice  
The VEMW judgment of the Court of Justice is significant in terms of showing how the 
European Courts would ascertain long-term preferential cross-border network 
reservations. The case was referred to the Court of Justice under Article 267 TFEU by 
the Dutch Administrative Court for Trade and Industry, which had to rule on the legality 
of the long-term priority access rights granted to the former electricity monopoly, 
Samenwerkende Elektriciteits Produktiebedrijven NV (hereafter SEP),68 on Dutch 
interconnectors. Before the liberalisation of the electricity market, under the 1989 Law, 
the SEP was the only undertaking that was authorised to import electricity, and it was 
entrusted with providing a service in the general economic interest, including the reliable 
and efficient public distribution of electricity at the lowest possible cost. For the 
performance of its task the SEP concluded three long-term electricity purchase 
contracts in 1989 and 1990: 
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- In 1989 with EDF for the purchase of 600 MW per annum until 2002 and of 750 MW 
per annum from 2002 to 2009,  
- In 1989 with Preussen Elektra AG for the purchase of 300 MW per annum up to 2005, 
- In 1990 with Vereinigte Elektrizitatswerke Westfales AG for the purchase of 600 MW 
per annum up to 2003.  
The duration of these contracts extended beyond the time that the markets were 
opened up for competition.  
Following the transposition of the first electricity directive, Directive 96/92/EC, into 
national law through the 1998 Law, the exclusive right of the SEP was abolished. The 
operation of the high-voltage network was transferred to the SEP’s subsidiary, TenneT, 
which became a national network operator in 1998 and assumed ownership of the 
national network in 2001.69   
According to the 1998 Law, transmission networks are operated by TenneT under the 
supervision of the Director of the Service for Implementation of Control of Energy 
Supply (hereafter the DTE). Article 36 of the 1998 Law made the DTE responsible inter 
alia for laying down the conditions for access to the systems. On 12 November 1999, 
the DTE adopted conditions governing the operation of the system for the cross-border 
transmission of electricity, the System Code.70 
In order to enable the SEP to fulfil its duty arising from the contracts, in 2000, the 
System Code, enacted the SEP preferential status in relation to the allocation of 
importation capacity after market liberalisation started. 1500MW out of the 3200MW of 
available electricity import capacity on cross-border lines was reserved on a preferential 
basis for the SEP. Moreover, a preferential access right was granted to the SEP after 
2000 by the Overgangswet (Transitional Law on the electricity generation sector). The 
Overgangswet provided that at the most 900 MW until 31 March 2005, and at the most 
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750 MW cross-border transmission capacities from 1 April 2005 to 31 March 2009 for 
the transmission of electricity, were allocated to the designated company, i.e. the SEP, 
where such transmission served to implement the energy purchase agreements 
concluded in 1989 and 1990.71  
Other distribution companies operating in the market considered that the national 
provision distorted competition to their detriment and constituted an infringement of the 
principle of equal treatment contained in Article 7(5) of Directive 96/92/EC.72 As a result, 
this preferential status offered to the SEP was challenged before the DTE by the 
distribution companies. The DTE recognised that the preferences granted to the SEP 
constituted obstacles to the proper functioning of the electricity market. It considered 
that, since competition in the generation market was limited in the Netherlands, a 
reservation for an outstanding period of cross-border transmission would be a serious 
restriction on import facilities, and thus, on trade as well as the competition level in the 
electricity market. Nevertheless, with regard to the legislation in force at the time that 
the contracts were concluded, and also pursuant to a service of general economic 
interest, the DTE refused the claim. Furthermore, it was found that interrupting the 
existing contracts would amount to unacceptable interference regarding the legal 
certainty of the parties, as well as constituting a significant financial loss.  
Following the dismissal of the claim of the distribution companies by the DTE, they 
lodged an appeal against that decision with the Administrative Court for Trade and 
Industry. The claimants stated inter alia that the reservation of the import capacity for 
the electricity purchase contracts concluded by the SEP, which was no longer providing 
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services of general economic interest after the opening-up of the market, was in breach 
of the prohibition of discrimination laid down in both European and national law. The 
decision of the DTE, they continued, also ignored the interest in promoting the 
development of trade in the market in electricity. 
The Court of Justice examined the case as a result of a request by the Administrative 
Court for Trade and Industry for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU.73 The 
questions asked by the Administrative Court regarding a preliminary ruling were, first, 
whether Article 106 TFEU74 could justify granting a company, which was formerly 
entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interests and which 
entered into certain commitments in connection with such an operation, a preferential 
access right to enable it to fulfil those commitments after the particular economic task 
assigned to it had been completed. Secondly, the Administrative Court asked whether 
the granting of special rights in order to honour long-term electricity purchase contracts 
concluded in connection with a particular public task was compatible with the prohibition 
of discrimination contained in Article 7 of Directive 96/92/EC.75  
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According to the Advocate General, the problem in the case was not the scarcity of 
capacity but the method of distribution of this capacity. The network capacity concerned 
was distributed between market operators in favour of the SEP.76 A preferential 
allocation of import capacity could not be justified per se, as the SEP argued, on the 
basis of the existing long-term supply contracts that were concluded on the grounds of 
services of general economic interest, which had expired before the right of preferential 
access to import capacity was granted. However, an objective justification for the 
preferential treatment afforded to the SEP could be construed due to a combination of 
three factors. First, regarding the requirement for equal treatment in Article 7(5) of 
Directive 96/92/EC, preferential treatment was conditionally offered to the SEP through 
national legislation with a view to honouring the long-term purchase contracts that were 
concluded to fulfil public interest commitments before the Directive came into force.77 
Second, community law did not preclude market operators from signing long-term 
electricity supply contracts after the initiation of the Directive.78 Finally, the preferential 
treatment did not exceed the degree required in order to achieve its intended 
objective.79  
As a result, the Advocate General argued that the prohibition of discrimination under 
Article 7 of Directive 96/92/EC did not preclude the preferential allocation of electricity 
transport capacity based on a national legislative provision in so far as that preferential 
treatment did not exceed the bounds necessary to fulfil the long-term purchase 
contracts and in so far as those contracts were not contrary to EU law, in particular EU 
competition law. It was also indicated that there was no need for a separate 
examination related to any possible discrimination within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU, since the preferential treatment offered to the SEP was justified on the objective 
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grounds.80 It would have been inconsistent to conclude that there was objective 
justification for dissimilar treatment of the market participant while at the same time 
considering the same rule to be the cause of an abuse within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU.81 
In contrast to the opinion of the Advocate General, the Court of Justice deemed the 
priority access right granted to the SEP to be discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 7(5) of Directive 96/92/EC. Accordingly, the task of providing services of general 
economic interests and the possible financial loss of the SEP that would result from the 
cancellation of the long-term energy supply contracts could not be accepted as 
objective justifications for the capacity on the network reserved for the SEP on a priority 
basis. Besides, the Court indicated that in order to eliminate some of the consequences 
of liberalisation, a transitional regime provided under Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC82 
could have been implemented.83  Under that provision Member States may seek 
derogations from Article 7 and 16,84 in the case where commitments given before the 
entry into force of the Directive may not be honoured on account of its provision. 
In accordance with Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC, applications for derogation had to 
be submitted by Member States no later than one year after the Directive came into 
force.85  However, the Netherlands did not apply for a temporary derogation from the 
application of Article 7 and 16 of Directive 96/92/EC. According to the Court of Justice, a 
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Member State could not unilaterally decide to disregard Article 7 or 16, because, 
otherwise, the procedure, criteria and limits set out in Article 24 would be 
meaningless.86 The SEP, therefore, could not benefit from the derogation.87 
On the other hand, the Advocate General argued that Directive 96/92/EC should be 
implemented in the light of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of 
legitimate expectations, which requires, in particular, that the ‘substantive rules of 
Community law must be interpreted … as applying to situations existing before their 
entry into force only in so far as it clearly follows from their terms, objective, or general 
scheme that such an effect must be given to them’.88  By virtue of Article 28 of the 
Directive, there was nothing in the Directive extending its validity, to justify the 
conclusion that it was intended to apply to situations existing prior to the enactment of it. 
In other words, there were no clear and certain provisions in Directive 96/92/EC in 
relation to the continued existence of long-term purchase contracts concluded in 1989 
and 1990 before the Directive came into force.89 Therefore, Directive 96/92/EC should 
not be interpreted as having a retroactive effect. From this point of view, the SEP 
claimed that it was entitled to fulfil the international contracts by reason of the principle 
of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice objected to the SEP pleading the principle of the 
protection of legitimate expectations, because the SEP, as a prudent and circumspect 
trader, could have foreseen that the adoption of a Community measure was likely to 
affect its interests.90 According to the settled case law, any trader on the part of whom 
an institution has promoted reasonable expectations may rely on the principle of the 
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protection of legitimate expectations.91  However, if a prudent and circumspect trader 
could have foreseen that the adoption of a Community measure was likely to affect his 
interests he cannot plead that principle if the measure is adopted. Furthermore, traders 
cannot have a legitimate expectation that an existing situation that is capable of being 
altered by Community institutions in the exercise of their discretion power will be 
maintained. This is particularly true in an area such as the common organisation of the 
market, the objectives of which require constant adjustment in order to meet changes in 
economic circumstances.92     
The Court of Justice reinforced this objection by stating that the first stage of market 
liberalisation, which began in the late 1980s with fundamental steps towards completing 
the internal energy markets by abolishing regional and national monopolies, gave 
signals of possible further liberalisation.93 Therefore, it could not be suggested that the 
Community institutions created well-founded expectations on the part of the SEP that a 
monopoly for the importation of electricity into the Netherlands would be maintained or 
that the SEP would be allowed to enjoy a preferential right to use the network for the 
cross-border transmission of electricity until the expiry of the international contracts 
which had been entered into.94 According to the Court of Justice, thus, the SEP, as a 
prudent and circumspect trader, should have foreseen that possible measures that 
could be adapted in order to liberalise the energy markets one step further would most 
probably affect its interests.      
With regard to the principle of legal certainty, the Court of Justice claimed that the 
principle requires in particular that new legal rules imposing changes on market 
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participants are clear and precise so that they may be able to ascertain unequivocally 
their rights and obligations and take steps accordingly.95 Moreover, the legislature 
should take into account the particular situations of the participants and provide 
adaptations to the application of these rules. These requirements were satisfied by 
Directive 96/92/EC under Article 24, which allows special situations of participants such 
as the SEP within the context of the liberalisation of the market in electricity to be taken 
into account. The Directive offered Member States the possibility of derogation from 
Article 7 of the Directive with regard to operating commitments or guarantees granted 
before the Directive entered into force.96 Therefore, the SEP could not claim the 
circumstances in the case as justification for the priority access rights granted to it on 
the grounds of the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate 
expectations.  
To sum up, the Court of Justice assessed the legitimacy of the preferential access right 
given to the SEP in 1999 and 2000 by considering the historical reasons behind that 
right. In contrast to the assessment of the Advocate General, the Court of Justice found 
that this background, namely the existing long-term purchase contracts concluded in 
order to fulfil the task of the SEP to import electricity for public distribution, could not be 
a legitimate justification for the preferential access right. According to the Court, a 
Member State should not be able to prevent the Community from undertaking or 
pursuing the liberalisation of the market in electricity with void general economic 
interests. The Court as a result built its decision on Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC, 
which provided an opportunity to Member States to adjust their national circumstances 
pursuant to the legal and economic changes within the Community. On the other hand, 
since the Court of Justice did not accept making long-term purchase contracts 
concluded by the SEP subject to preferential treatment as the Advocate General had, it 
did not analyse the lawfulness of the long-term purchase contracts or the preferential 
access right from a competition law point of view. However, it stressed that there was 
no obligation in the Directive to revoke the contracts. Nevertheless, according to the 
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Court, it was clear that the Directive did not allow the rules to be breached on the 
grounds that such a breach was necessary in order to honour those contracts.  
The judgment implies that preferential network reservations should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis by taking into consideration the discriminatory aspect of them. If 
there is an objective justification behind these reservations their lawfulness is likely to 
be approved. In the case, however, the Court verified that to grant a priority access right 
on the basis of a legal context that expired after the enactment of the Directive and that 
could have been derogated from third party access under Article 24 of the Directive was 
discriminatory.97 As a result, there was no need for an individual assessment in order to 
see the discriminatory nature of the preferential right, as the discriminatory nature of the 
legal provision granting the right was clear. However, if long-term preferential 
reservations stem from other factors rather than a former legal context, the 
discriminatory nature of the reservations should be examined on a case-by-case basis. 
Likewise, if the reason behind giving a preferential access right do not fall into the scope 
of Article 24 of the Directive, it is necessary to individually verify whether the preferential 
right amounts to discrimination for other market operators, and whether there is an 
objective justification.98 This approach should apply to any preferential network 
reservations granted before or after the Directive came into force.    
In 2006, almost a year after the decision, the Commission published a staff working 
paper on the effects of the VEMW judgement.99 In the paper, the Commission claimed 
that ‘as a consequence, the grant to an undertaking of preferential transmission or 
distribution capacities must be considered as being discriminatory and is precluded by 
Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2008’.100 It continued by stating 
that, ‘under the Directive and the Regulation, only the priority allocation of transmission 
or distribution capacities is incompatible with Community rules. Long-term supply 
contracts are not per se invalid under the Court judgment, although they cannot be 
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subject of preferential treatment’.101 This comment may illustrate that the Commission 
interpreted the judgment to mean that granting preferential access should be 
categorically prohibited unless there has been derogation from third party access. It 
seems that this interpretation goes too far, since the Court of Justice did not actually 
categorically forbid long-term preferential network reservations.102 On the contrary, the 
Court highlighted the importance of the individual assessment of preferential 
reservations. Accordingly, as mentioned before, priority access rights should be handled 
on a case-by-case basis in order to assess whether they are discriminatory as well as 
whether there is an objective justification for providing such rights.  
In addition, according to the Commission, the principles of the protection of legitimate 
expectations and of legal certainty could not be justifications to derogate from the non-
discriminatory rules contained in Directive 96/92/EC. Again, the Court of Justice did not 
mean that. What the judgment of the Court of Justice amounted to is that a market 
operator could not expect the legislation to remain unchanged. Yet, it could expect that 
special circumstances of those affected by the change would be considered, and that 
an adaptation period would be provided within the amended legislation.103 Since the 
letter was provided under Article 24 of the Directive the Court of Justice did not accept 
any argument based on the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of 
legal certainty. As there will be situations which cannot be handled under the scope of 
Article 24, it cannot be stated that the protection of legitimate expectation and legal 
certainty should be kept out of the consideration in the cases of preferential network 
reservations.      
Within the judgement of Republic of Slovakia, the Advocate General showed the extent 
to which the interpretation of the VEMW judgment by the Commission went far-beyond 
what the Court deemed appropriate.104  
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2. The Republic of Slovakia Judgment of the European Court of Justice 
In an infringement proceeding initiated by the Commission before the Court of Justice 
against the Slovak Republic under Article 258 TFEU,105 the Commission claimed that 
Slovakia had failed to fulfil its obligation under Article 9(e) and 20(1) of the second 
electricity Directive, Directive 2003/54/EC, which concerned non-discriminatory third 
party access to the transmission system on the basis of published tariffs.106 The 
concern of the Commission stemmed from the conditions of a private law contract 
between a Swiss company, ATEL, and a state-owned network operator in Slovakia, 
SEPS. Pursuant to the contract, ATEL was supposed to pay over half of the 
construction costs of the still-to-be-constructed line from Poland to Slovakia, in return for 
priority access to the line for a defined and non-renewable period of 16 years. In 
bringing the case before the Court of Justice, the Commission built its opinion on the 
VEMW judgment, and alleged that the priority access given to ATEL was contrary to 
Slovakia’s obligations under Article 9(e) and 20(1) of Directive 2003/54/EC. According 
to the Commission, granting preferential capacity for cross-border transmissions was 
precluded by Directive 96/92/EC unless this preferential treatment were authorised by 
the derogation set out in Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC.   
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However, Advocate General Jaaskinen did not agree with the Commission, and 
criticised its argument from two different perspectives. First, according to the Advocate 
General, it would be injustice to categorically accept the noncompliance of preferential 
reservations with third party access as a breach of EU law unless there is derogation 
given by the Commission, because the requirement for derogation by Member States 
may not be technically realisable for every situation. Member States were able to 
request derogation from third party access under Directive 96/92/EC for one year after 
the Directive entered into force, i.e. until 20 February 1998. In the case of Republic of 
Slovakia, the contract concerned was concluded in 27 October 1997 between ATEL and 
SEPS. On 16 April 2003, Slovakia signed the Treaty of Accession, and in 1 May 2004 it 
joined the EU. Meanwhile, on 16 June 2003, Directive 2003/54/EC and Regulation 
1228/2003 were published, and on 4 August 2003 these entered into force. Therefore, 
when the investment contracts were concluded Slovakia was not even a member of the 
EU. Thus, it was not expected that Slovakia would apply for derogation from third party 
access under Directive 96/92/EC or that it would amend the contract concerned 
pursuant to Directive 2003/54/EC. Second, considering previous decisions in which, 
given the necessity and importance of investments in the energy sectors, long-term 
priority access rights granted in order to secure investments were accepted as 
efficiency gains from a competition law point of view, the observation of the Commission 
that priority access is not allowed unless permitted by a corresponding derogation, does 
not correspond with the idea of balancing market liberalisation with the need to attract 
and protect investments.107 
Besides, the Advocate General highlighted that ATEL’s preferential access right 
amounted to discrimination within the meaning of Directive 2003/54/EC, and could not 
be justified on the basis of its financial participation. This priority right granted to ATEL 
was not covered by an exemption from the obligation of third party access in 
accordance with the official derogation procedures of Regulation 1228/2003 for 
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electricity.108 Thus, the Advocate General considered that, in the absence of an official 
exemption, allowing investors to be treated differently would amount to permitting a 
small group of undertakings to buy priority access, which was against the very aims of 
Directive 2003/54/EC and of EU energy policy in general.109   
After arguing that preferential treatment violated the Directive, the Advocate General 
next examined whether such discrimination was objectively justified. Consequently, it 
was found that, with regard to Article 351(1) TFEU,110 the priority access rights had 
been granted before the accession of the Slovak Republic to the EU, so Slovakia could 
not be held to be in breach of its obligation under Articles 9 and 20 of Directive 
2003/54/EC. Moreover, it was pointed out that this conclusion was also compatible with 
the derogation provisions set out in Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC and Article 7 of 
Regulation 1228/2003. 
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The Court of Justice concluded the investigation by deeming that preferential access 
was granted to ATEL regarding the investment contract, and, under Article 351(1) 
TFEU, it was not affected by the provision of Directive 2003/54/EC.111 In other words, 
the Court of Justice justified the non-compliance with third party access through 
international protection of a foreign investor’s priority access right to the network.  
In contrast to the Advocate General, the Court of Justice did not verify whether ATEL’s 
priority access right was against the third party access obligation. Nevertheless, the 
judgment is significant in terms of clarification of the law. First of all, the case reviewed 
the strict interpretation of the Commission. It illuminated that long-term priority access 
rights are not inherently and categorically illegal. Therefore, it was pointed out that these 
rights should be assessed individually. Secondly, it showed that while assessing the 
legitimacy of long-term priority access rights, possible objective justifications should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. This approach will provide regulatory stability for 
investors to have a long-term pay-back period for capital intensive investments. Thirdly, 
it was indicated that even in situations where an investment is considered as an 
objective justification for a preferential access right, an exemption from third party 
access should be officially provided by the Commission in order to prevent large-scale 
undertakings from buying preferential rights by making investments without fulfilling the 
conditions listed in Regulation 1228/2003. Finally, the Advocate General highlighted a 
very particular fact here. It stated that since the preferential access right was granted 
before Slovakia joined the EU, Slovakia was not responsible for the non-implementation 
of the provisions of Directive 2003/54/EC.  
Overall, the VEMW and Republic of Slovakia judgments show the appraisal of 
preferential cross-border network reservations under EU secondary law through 
infringement procedures. Both indicate that priority access rights that have granted 
should be examined on a case-by-case basis by taking into account how and why these 
rights are provided with the consideration of the tension between scarcity of cross-
border transmission network capacity, i.e. the necessity of investments in these 
networks, and the objective of the creation of a single energy market in the EU. The 
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next section will add another dimension to this discussion by evaluating long-term 
preferential network reservations on the basis of EU competition law.  
B. The Approach of the European Commission of Preferential Network 
Reservations under EU Competition Law 
The decisions examined here will show that competition concerns related to preferential 
network reservations can also derive from abusive conduct by vertically integrated 
undertakings acting in favour of their affiliated supply firms. In this circumstance, the 
investigations are carried out by the Commission under the scope of the essential 
facilities doctrine. In addition, the cases will demonstrate that if a priority access right is 
granted for the sake of an investment in cross-border transmission infrastructure the 
Commission will finalise the investigation without a prohibition decision since the 
investment is recognised as an efficiency gain, i.e. an objective justification under Article 
102 TFEU. After the assessment of the antitrust investigations of the Commission, the 
chapter will continue with a discussion on the possibility of the acceptance of long-term 
supply contracts as objective justification for preferential network reservations under 
Article 102 TFEU. 
1. The Assessment of Preferential Network Reservations under Article 102 
TFEU: GDF Suez and E.ON Gas  
As mentioned before, the monopolisation of cross-border transmission networks 
through granting long-term priority access rights can be assessed under Article 102 
TFEU, depending on the market power of the right holders. An abuse can arise where a 
system operator applies dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with customers, 
thereby placing other market participants at a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, (i) 
freeing some transmission capacity that is mainly blocked by preferential network 
reservations, (ii) alleviating capacity related foreclosure, and (iii) eliminating dissimilar 
conditions for other market players, have become the priority aims of the Commission 
under such antitrust investigations.112  
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The GDF Suez and E.ON Gas decisions of the Commission can be given as two 
important examples of capacity release in order to create room for potential 
competitors.113 They do not directly address the problems arising from the connection 
between pre-liberalisation long-term purchase contracts and long-term preferential 
network reservations. Yet, they do point out that the Commission pursues the approach 
of the Court of Justice adopted in VEMW in terms of the strict implementation of third 
party access. Additionally, the decisions clearly indicate ‘the internalisation of the new 
trend of moving from the traditional long-term monopoly nature of energy sectors 
towards a competitive market model’.114   
a) The GDF Suez and E.ON Gas Decisions  
In the GDF Suez and E.ON decisions, the Commission claimed that the undertakings 
concerned may have abused their dominant positions within the meaning of Article 102 
TFEU in the form of refusal to supply.115 In GDF Suez, the Commission initiated a 
formal antitrust proceeding after finding that certain behaviour by GDF Suez might have 
prevented or reduced competition in downstream supply markets through long-term 
reservations of transport capacity and underinvestment in import infrastructure.116  The 
competition investigation was addressed to GDF Suez and its subsidiaries that own and 
operate the gas transport network in most of France.  
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In the preliminary assessment, the Commission demonstrated that GDF Suez held a 
dominant position in the gas import and supply markets. The Commission’s analysis 
showed that there were several barriers to entry to the French market because of 
difficulties relating to the international purchase of gas, bottlenecks in import capacity 
and limited access to storage. GDF Suez’s strong position in the gas supply markets, 
achieved by vertical integration throughout the economic chain, was guaranteed for the 
foreseeable future regarding its reservation of long-term capacity. In addition, GDF 
Suez’s gas infrastructure and import capacity, including interconnection capacity, 
constituted an essential input, as access to this infrastructure and import capacity was 
an objective requirement in order to be able to supply gas in the balancing zones of 
GDF Suez’s network. Also, it was impossible to reproduce a new infrastructure that 
could constitute an effective competitive constraint on GDF Suez’s infrastructure, 
because of technical, legal and economic barriers.     
The Commission considered that GDF Suez might have abused its dominant position 
by foreclosing for a long period access to gas import capacity in the balancing zones, 
thereby restricting competition in the markets for the supply of gas.117 This capacity had 
been reserved for historical reasons and assigned to GDF Suez without any transparent 
or non-discriminatory procedure. There was, therefore, considerable unsatisfied 
demand from third party shippers. As a result, market entry for potential competitors in 
the gas wholesale market was blocked. Moreover, a strategic limitation of the 
investment by GDF Suez in existing import capacity was identified by the Commission 
as a refusal to supply, as this was making it even more difficult for third parties to import 
gas into France.118    
To address these concerns, GDF Suez proposed to release approximately 10% of the 
total long-term reservations of gas import capacity into France, including both LNG re-
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gasification terminals and pipelines, in favour of third-parties, and to continue to reduce 
the share of the reservations to below 50% by 2014.119 Within the limits of Regulation 
715/2009, GDF Suez was permitted to book interruptible and short-term capacity.120 
Similar to GDF Suez, E.ON held a dominant position in the gas transport market as well 
as in the wholesale and retail supply markets.121 In the preliminary assessment, the 
Commission claimed that E.ON may have abused its dominant position by way of long-
term bookings on its gas transmission system.122 It was also demonstrated that E.ON 
had booked, on a long-term basis, until 2019, most of the firm and freely available 
capacities at the entry points giving access to its grid. As a result, there was no gas 
transmission capacity available to competitors of E.ON wanting to transport gas into 
E.ON’s network. Consequently, they were faced with a permanent capacity bottleneck, 
which severely limited the volume of gas transported to their actual or potential 
customers. 
The Commission concluded that E.ON’s long-term reservations amounted to a refusal 
to supply an essential input and constituted an abuse of its dominant position. 
Moreover, the Commission deemed that the use of network capacity by the essential 
facility holder for its own supply business was not sufficient to objectively justify an 
abuse under Article 102 TFEU. Following the investigations, E.ON proposed to commit 
to a significant, structural reduction of its long-term gas capacity reservations. The 
capacity release corresponded to around 15% of entry capacities into its gas 
transmission grid. In addition, there will be further reduction in the high-caloric gas 
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market area (up to 50%) as well as in its grid for low-caloric gas (up to 64%) by 2015.123 
Similar to GDF Suez, the decision did not prevent E.ON from booking short-term and 
interruptible capacity. Moreover, E.ON can book long-term capacities under the 
condition that its overall booking shares decrease over time until reaching the 
thresholds of 50% and 64% by 2015.124   
In both decisions, the commitments were accepted by the Commission in order to 
achieve an immediate and long-term release of capacity, which would also result in a 
permanent structural change in the market given the duration of the commitments 
(quasi structural effect). As a result of the long-term capacity releases, the capacities 
would be handed back on a lasting basis, which would guarantee that the effect of the 
commitments would not be dependent on the companies’ future behaviour.125 In this 
sense, it was expected that the commitments would help to promote the allocation of 
the capacity of cross-border pipelines in Germany and France on the basis of non-
discriminatory and transparent capacity allocation and congestion management 
methods in compliance with ex-ante regulatory rules. Therefore, it can be stated that the 
Commission seems to have achieved a regulatory objective through commitment-based 
enforcement. 
Similarly, it seems that the Commission attempts to strengthen the third party access 
regime by imposing behavioural remedies that can improve transparent and non-
discriminatory capacity allocation and congestion management in the energy markets. 
For instance, in the Marathon settlement,126 the concern was the joint refusal to grant 
access to continental European gas pipelines by a group of European gas companies. 
The case was triggered by a company, Marathon, a Norwegian subsidiary of a US oil 
and gas producer. Although the complaint was withdrawn after Marathon and the 
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European companies reached a commercial settlement the Commission continued the 
investigation under EU competition law considering the interests of the Community.127 In 
order to conclude the proceedings, the undertakings concerned proposed, first, with 
respect to congestion management, to introduce a use-it-or-lose-it principle and to 
develop a secondary market in which capacity holders could trade capacity rights 
acquired from the pipeline owners. Second, so as to improve transparency of their 
access regimes, they agreed to publish on their websites the contracted and available 
capacity at all entry and exit points, both for internal and external connections. Third, 
they committed to improving their handling of access requests in order to limit the 
reasons justifying refusals. The Commission welcomed the commitments as they could 
contribute to better functioning of the gas transmission market. However, these 
commitments went beyond the existing regulatory provisions at this stage of the 
liberalisation.128 The decision was superior to current legislation, and also, showed that 
the mandatory introduction of a regulated third party access regime was a necessity for 
the completion of market liberalisation in the energy markets. The decision itself could 
be recognised as a reflection of the intention of the Commission as stated by Mario 
Monti, the previous Competition Commissioner, that: “… competition policy can 
contribute effectively to ensure a fair and non-discriminatory access to national gas 
pipelines”, and “… the Commission is fully committed to foster the liberalisation process 
by chasing anticompetitive behaviour”.129  
All of these cases show that the application of the essential facilities doctrine in the 
energy sectors is not limited to refusal to supply cases, but is extended to 
discrimination, transparency requirements, and inadequate investment and so on. The 
extension of the doctrine also appears to be a consequence of the deficiencies of 
market regulation. The problems in the energy markets remain the same: (i) transparent 
and non-discriminatory methods to allocate the capacity are not implemented efficiently 
and effectively; and, (ii) ownership requirements are not fulfilled. Hence, vertically 
integrated undertakings can still take advantage of their transmission systems to protect 
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or strengthen the market positions of their affiliated arms in relevant markets.130 
Therefore, it seems that the Commission tends to use antitrust investigations in order to 
eliminate the market deficiencies deriving from insufficient and inefficient 
implementation of sector-specific regulatory provisions. As seen in the above-mentioned 
decisions, the Commission attempts to facilitate the proper implementation of third party 
access and vertical unbundling, or widen the limits of these regulatory rules, in order to 
improve the market regulation one step further. However, this strategic behaviour by the 
Commission might be detrimental rather than beneficial to the future of the energy 
markets given that it could increase legal uncertainty. Legal uncertainty, in particular in 
the recently liberalised energy markets, could ultimately decrease the incentive of 
market operators to invest and reduce the number of new entrants. Hence, it may 
hinder market integration and competition, as will be discussed within the next chapter.     
Other than the GDF Suez and E.ON decisions, several antitrust investigations show that 
the Commission has a different approach to preferential network reservations if certain 
efficiencies are gained from these reservations. Apparently, in some circumstances, the 
preferential allocation of cross-border transmission capacity can be objectively justified. 
For instance, a possible objective justification for such unequal treatment might be an 
investment in transmission capacity. The essential element here is that the competitive 
disadvantage to competitors of long-term preferential access is counterbalanced by the 
investment in transmission infrastructure. As will be seen below, it is clear that long-term 
preferential reservations seem to be objectively justified when tied to a new investment 
in cross-border capacities. After that, there will be a discussion on other possible 
objective justifications, such as long-term supply contracts with efficiency gains.  
2. Investment in Capacity of Cross-border Interconnectors vs. Priority Access 
Rights: Viking Cable and UK-France Submarine Cable  
The case law indicates that, under certain circumstances, to grant a priority access right 
to a company with market power may not be an infringement of EU competition law, if 
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there is an investment that can be recognised as an efficiency gain that objectively 
justifies this preferential right.131    
In Viking Cable, in 2000, the Commission received a notification pursuant to former 
Regulation 17/62 of three agreements concluded between E.ON (a vertically integrated 
electricity company in Germany), Statkraft (a Norwegian state-owned company active in 
the production, supply and trade of electricity), and Statnett (a Norwegian state-owned 
company responsible for the operation of the national grid). The agreements concerned 
the creation and operation of a joint venture, Viking Cable, for the construction and 
operation of a new sub-sea cable between Norway and Germany for the transmission of 
high-voltage electricity.132  
According to the agreements, Viking Cable would be owned by Statnett and E.ON and 
would have a transmission capacity of 600 MW. 133  The agreements provided for an 
exchange of electricity between Norway and Germany. The power delivery would take 
place from Statkraft to E.ON for a maximum output of 600 MW and 1200 GWh per year 
for 25 years. The electricity would be delivered through a short-term exchange between 
the companies, with a duration of one day or less, via the spot exchange in Norway. 
The agreements granted Statkraft and E.ON the exclusive right to use Viking Cable for 
a period of 25 years.  
The contracting parties claimed that in order to secure the viability of the investment in 
transmission capacity it was necessary to have a priority access right for 25 years. In 
addition, they stated that the fulfilment of the power exchange agreements was 
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contracting parties via Viking Cable. Remaining two agreements were the Shareholders Agreement 
concerning the terms and functioning of Viking Cable, and the Master Agreement by which Statkraft 
assigns all of its rights and obligations under the Shareholder Agreement to Statnett.   
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dependent on that full transmission capacity on Viking Cable being available to Statkraft 
and E.ON on demand. With the consideration that Viking Cable would result in new 
capacity being added to the transmission connections between Germany and Norway, 
the Commission took a favourable view towards the long-term power exchange 
agreement as well as the long-term preferential network reservation. 
First, this decision is aligned with the general idea of EU competition policy, since the 
Commission may let a dominant undertaking engage in anticompetitive conduct that is 
indispensable and proportionate to the goal allegedly pursued by the company, as long 
as this conduct produces an economic efficiency gain which outweighs the negative 
effects of this anti-competitive behaviour.134 Second, it is parallel with the approach that 
can be seen in the provision of exemptions from third party access under Article 17 of 
electricity Regulation 714/2009 and Article 36 of gas Directive 2009/73/EC.135 As the 
                                                          
134
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decisions given before then would have been based on electricity Regulation 1128/2003 and gas 
Directive 2003/55/EC. For further discussion see C. Kessel, L.  Meeus and C. Schwedler ‘Experience with 
Interconnection Merchant Projects under Regulation (EC) 1228/2003: Prospects for Regulation (EC) 
714/2009’ (2011) Vol.18 Utilities Law Review 787; K. Kuijlaars and G. Zwart ‘Regulatory Issues 
Surrounding Merchant Interconnection’ (2003) Office for Energy Regulation, the Netherlands 
http://www.marketdesign.se/images/uploads/2003/cp_061603_2_zwart_kuijlaars.pdf; G. Brunekreeft, 
‘Regulatory Issues in Merchant Transmission Investment’ (2005) Vol.13 Utility Policy 395; P. Joskow and 
J. Tirole ‘Merchant Transmission Investment’ (2005) Vol. LIII The Journal of Industrial Economics 237; A. 
De Hauteclocque and V. Rious, ‘Reconsidering the European Regulation of Merchant Transmission 
Investment in Light of the Third Energy Package: The Role of Dominant Generators’ (2011) Vol.39 
Energy Policy 56; J. Gans and S. King ‘Access Holidays for Network Infrastructure Investment’(2003)  
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construction and operation of interconnectors is very capital intensive and risky the 
investor can require the reservation of transfer capacity in order to ensure repayment of 
the loan.  
On the other hand, for already existing and amortised interconnectors owned by 
dominant firms, the Commission has been particularly harsh and intervened on several 
occasions to ensure that long-term reservations do not block market access for 
competing suppliers.136 It seems that the Commission has indeed systematically 
deemed long-term capacity reservations to be an abuse of dominant position under 
competition law and required that most of these capacities be freed up. The decision 
concerning the submarine interconnector between the United Kingdom and France is an 
example of the enforcement of competition law in order to free up some interconnector 
capacity.137 The Commission found that a system where the total capacity of the 
interconnector was reserved for EDF, for the export of electricity to the UK, could be 
violating competition law, in particular Article 102 TFEU. The submarine interconnector 
was jointly owned by the transmission system operators of the UK and France, which 
held dominant positions in the market for the transmission of electricity between the UK 
and France. Granting a priority access right in favour of EDF placed its competitors in a 
dissimilar and disadvantaged position by letting EDF circumvent the rules for capacity 
allocations applicable to others.138 Considering the Commission’s concerns, the 
operator of the submarine infrastructure agreed to open up access to the infrastructure. 
The relative but general antitrust tolerance towards risky infrastructure investment 
seems not to be applied to existing and amortised infrastructure.139  
Overall, it is fair to say that to defend existing long-term network reservations on the 
grounds of objective justifications seems rather difficult and limited to new 
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investments.140 Accordingly, unless there is an exemption from third party access 
through ex-ante regulation, or there is an investment in transmission network capacity, 
which can be considered as an efficiency gain, long-term preferential network 
reservations are considered anticompetitive. The extent to which it is possible to claim 
an objective justification defence on the basis of an associated long-term supply 
contract under Article 102 TFEU will be discussed below. 
V. Can Existing Long-term Supply Contracts Objectively Justify Preferential 
Network Reservations under Article 102 TFEU?  
So far this chapter has shown how ex-ante regulation facilitates the effective and fair 
allocation of cross-border interconnectors and pipelines through regulatory rules, and 
how EU competition law should in theory have a complementary role in the solution of 
the problem of discriminatory capacity allocation. Yet, it has also shown how, in 
practice, the Commission has developed a more interventionist approach through 
antitrust settlements. Given this strategic approach by the Commission, the case law 
implies several important outcomes. It clearly shows that the aim of the Commission is 
to eliminate market deficiencies as well as the infringement of EU competition law 
through antitrust enforcement. It also shows that the Commission attempts not only to 
increase scarce capacity of cross-border transmission networks by identifying 
investments as objective justifications under Article 102 TFEU, but also to promote 
efficient use of them by imposing capacity release commitments on the undertakings 
concerned. Moreover, it is indicated that the Commission has not been tempted to take 
into consideration existing cross-border long-term supply contracts as a justification 
within investigations into related priority access rights. Therefore, a question that arises 
is, to what extent is it possible to claim an existing cross-border long-term supply 
contract as an objective justification during the investigations of a related long-term 
preferential network reservation under Article 102 TFEU?141   
                                                          
140
 Hauteclocque and Talus, supra n 114, 30-31 
141
 A dominant undertaking that engages in abusive anticompetitive conduct could avoid being subject to 
EU antitrust enforcement, if this conduct results in procompetitive effects by way of efficiency gains that 
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Supposing a hypothetical context, similar to that within the VEMW decision, in which a 
cross-border transmission network operator preferentially reserves its network capacity 
in order to honour a long-term electricity import contract concluded with a nuclear 
electricity generator that has just entered an electricity generation market within a 
neighbouring Member State. Within this context, a likely competition concern of the 
Commission would be refusal to supply under the essential facilities doctrine as 
occurred in the GDF Suez and E.ON Gas decisions. An efficiency gain that could be 
claimed by the network company as an objective justification defence142 under this 
hypothetical question would be a cost efficiency resulting from the long-term contract143 
as the final price of electricity would be cheaper than the final price of domestic 
electricity (assuming that domestic electricity is produced through gas-power plants and 
thus, since the generation cost is higher than for a nuclear-based power plant, the 
consumer price is greater than the consumer price of imported electricity).144 Moreover, 
the company could boost its defence by claiming that if there was not a long-term 
contract concluded due to the preferential network reservation, there would not be a 
new entrant investing in nuclear technology for electricity generation and thereby no 
cost efficiency would occur. Vice versa it could be argued that if the network company 
was not be able to preferentially book its network capacity there would not be a long-
term contract promoting this new investment. In the light of these arguments, it should 
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be underlined that, while assessing the legitimacy of preferential network reservations, 
the interconnection between long-term supply contracts concluded among Member 
States and preferential network reservations as well as possible efficiencies stemming 
from the contracts (if there are any) should be taken into consideration.  
On the other hand, should there be a risk of elimination of effective competition in the 
relevant downstream market through preferential network reservations, it does not seem 
that any sort of economic efficiency linked to associated long-term supply contracts 
would be accepted as an objective justification, considering the Guidance on the 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 102. Accordingly, an undertaking under 
investigation should demonstrate that the efficiency is sufficient to guarantee that no net 
harm to consumers is likely to arise. The undertaking concerned is expected to show, 
with a sufficient degree of probability, and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that the 
following cumulative conditions are fulfilled: (i) the efficiency is likely to be generated as 
a result of the conduct subject to the investigation; (ii) the conduct is indispensable to 
the realisation of the efficiency; (iii) the likely efficiency brought about by the conduct 
outweighs any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the 
affected markets; and, (iv) effective competition in the market will not be eliminated.145 
Regarding the last condition, the Guidance explicitly states that a conduct can only be 
assessed under the scope of the objective justification defence if ‘the conduct does not 
eliminate effective competition removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition. … Where there is no residual competition and no foreseeable 
threat of entry, the protection of rivalry and the competitive process outweighs possible 
efficiency gains. In the Commission’s view, exclusionary conduct which maintains, 
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creates or strengthens a market position approaching that of a monopoly can normally 
not be justified on the grounds that it also creates efficiency gains.’146  
As regards this provision, even though cost efficiency occurs, it seems that the 
tendency of the Commission is to make a decision favouring competition in the energy 
markets, in particular, with the consideration of the fact that one of the main objectives 
of the market liberalisation policy in energy is to create a well-functioning competitive 
market. The market foreclosure of competitors may counter the liberalisation objective 
and decrease consumer welfare in the longer term.147 As a result, it seems that the only 
possible justification to have an individual exemption for a preferential cross-border 
network reservation under EU competition law is an investment in network capacity 
regarding the scarcity of networks and the privileged objectives of the EU in the 
European energy markets.148  
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to address the problem of long-term preferential network 
reservations of cross-border interconnectors and transmission pipelines, as granted 
preferential access rights are considered to be an obstacle to market integration and the 
development of competition in the energy markets in Europe.  
The chapter first assessed the problem by taking into account two different angles: EU 
secondary law and EU competition law, since the Commission attempts to solve the 
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problem through these two legal tools. The chapter found that  EU secondary law 
promotes transparent and fair network allocation through regulatory provisions such as 
third party access and vertical unbundling, whereas EU competition law aims at 
preventing market operators with market power from abusing their positions by 
engaging in unilateral anticompetitive conduct in the form of refusal to supply, 
discrimination, strategic under-investment and so on. Thus, the chapter indicated that, 
in theory, there is a complementary relationship between EU secondary law and EU 
competition law. However, in practice, regarding the competition decisions of the 
Commission, it was pointed out that the Commission tends to adopt a rather 
interventionist approach. Before analysing the decisions of the Commission and the 
Court of Justice, the chapter looked at the relationship between long-term supply 
contracts and preferential network reservations as network reservations can be made 
on the basis of existing long-term supply contracts. This section of the chapter 
concluded that these associated contracts might be taken into account while assessing 
preferential network reservations, in particular in certain situations where the long-term 
supply contracts generate economic efficiencies.   
Under the case law section, the chapter first evaluated the VEMW judgment of the 
Court of Justice, since this judgment had an enormous impact on the approach that the 
Commission adopted to assessing the legitimacy of preferential access rights. In this 
case, an existing priority access right could not be justified by an association with long-
term supply contracts signed before the first regulatory Directive entered into force. It 
was deemed discriminatory unless the Member State concerned had consulted for 
derogation from third party access under Article 24 of Directive 96/92/EC. This new 
trend was also adopted by the Commission through a staff working paper on the effects 
of the VEMW judgement, and pursued within investigations into long-term network 
reservations under EU competition law.  
The GDF Suez and E.ON decisions of the Commission showed that preferential 
network reservations by a network company in favour of its affiliated supply company 
would be assessed under Article 102 TFEU and considered as an abuse of dominance 
in the form of namely, refusal to supply and discrimination. Also, the Marathon decision 
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along with GDF Suez and E.ON, demonstrated that commitments with a quasi-structural 
effect, proposed through antitrust settlements, are more than welcomed by the 
Commission, as they are sufficient to eliminate the anticompetitive behaviour of the 
incumbents as well as market deficiencies. On the other hand, Viking Cable showed 
that the Commission seems to have a favourable opinion regarding the provision of a 
long-term priority access right to a dominant undertaking, if this granted priority access 
right results in an efficiency gain such as an investment in cross-border transmission 
capacity, which outweighs the anticompetitive effect of the right. Overall, the analysis of 
the case law showed that, according to the Commission, preferential cross-border 
transmission network reservations can only be objectively justified on the basis of an 
investment in network capacity or granted exemption from third party access through 
ex-ante regulatory provisions. This outcome indicated that the Commission pursues the 
objective of market regulation and aims at balancing equal and fair access to 
interconnectors by market players with the development of interconnector capacities 
through new investments, which are promoted by assessing them as objective 
justifications.  
Finally, the chapter examined a hypothetical case in order to indicate that under some 
circumstances preferential network reservations might be objectively justified on the 
basis of long-term supply contracts concluded among Member States if these contracts 
produce efficiencies. Nevertheless, while carrying out this analysis, the chapter took into 
account the approach that the Commission has adopted in the newly liberalised 
markets. Accordingly, the Commission tends to take a view in favour of an improvement 
in competition, and states that effective competition in downstream markets cannot be 
sacrificed on the grounds of any kinds of efficiencies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF REGULATION 1/2003 IN 
THE EUROPEAN ENERGY MARKETS 
I. Introduction 
The new competition regime in the EU came into force with the modernisation of 
European competition law in May 2004. Council Regulation 1/2003 on the 
implementation of the rules of competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty1  
(Article 101 and 102 TFEU) replaced Regulation 17/62 and fundamentally changed the 
system of enforcement of EU competition law by extending the powers of the European 
Commission.2 The introduction of the new method of solving cases - commitment 
decisions3 - and the imposition of new and improved remedies, via Article 7 and Article 
9, are two examples of the most important changes.  
Regulation 1/2003, for the first time, entails a public settlement procedure where the 
Commission can conclude its investigations by rendering commitments binding upon 
the undertakings that propose these commitments, instead of issuing a prohibition 
decision, as long as the commitments address the Commission’s concerns over 
competition. When the Article 9 procedure was passed into law, commitment decisions 
were expected to remain an exceptional, alternative mechanism in the Commission’s 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
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toolbox.4 However, in fact, over the past years, they have become a cornerstone of 
antitrust investigations at the EU level.5  
On the one hand, certain advantages of antitrust settlements such as the efficient and 
swift resolution of competition problems are undeniable. On the other hand, the 
commitment-based antitrust enforcement poses a number of issues such as the 
imposition of far-reaching or insufficient commitments,6 a lack of clarification regarding 
the law and legal uncertainty. A broad discretionary power granted to the Commission 
under Article 9, the implementation of a softened test for the proportionality of 
commitments, and finally limited judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions can be stated 
as being the main reasons behind these problems.  
Given the number of antitrust investigations in the energy sectors (i.e. electricity and 
natural gas) concluded through Article 9, public settlement procedures seem to play a 
more significant role in these markets than in others. 10 out of the 34 commitment 
decisions given since May 2004 are related to energy while the other decisions are 
related to various markets.7 Moreover, since May 2004, only two antitrust investigations 
in energy have been concluded through the prohibition procedures under Article 7 of 
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Regulation 1/2003.8 In this regard, the generalised implementation of commitment 
decisions in the recently liberalised energy markets may worsen the effects of 
commitment-based enforcement in terms of less clarification with regard to the law, 
legal uncertainty and the risk of not eliminating the Commission’s concerns. In addition, 
the excessive use of public settlement procedures might harm the functioning of the 
energy markets due to the fact that a decrease in legal certainty may discourage 
undertakings from investing or new entrants from entering the markets. Thus, while the 
aim of the Commission is to create more liberalised and competitive energy markets 
through commitments, excessive use of public settlement may have the opposite effect. 
Table 4: Antitrust cases in energy closed through commitment decisions between May 
2004 and November 20149  
No Case  Case 
Number 
Year Legal Basis 
1 Distrigaz COMP/37966 2007 102 
2 E.ON-German Electricity Wholesale 
Market 
COMP/39388 2008 102 
3 E.ON - German Electricity Balancing 
Market 
COMP/39389 2008 102 
4 RWE Gas Foreclosure COMP/39402 2009 102 
5 GDF Foreclosure COMP/39316 2009 102 
6 EDF - Long-term Electricity Contracts 
in France  
COMP/39386 2010 102 
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7 SvK – Swedish Interconnector COMP/39351 2010 102 
8 E.ON Gas Foreclosure COMP/39317 2010 102 
9 ENI COMP/39315 2010 102 
10 CEZ COMP/39727 2013 102 
 
As a result, the aim of this chapter is, first, to point out the possible detrimental effects of 
the excessive use of public settlement in the energy markets, and then to examine 
certain energy cases finalised on the basis of commitment proceedings under 
Regulation 1/2003 in order to discuss the appropriateness of commitment decisions in 
the energy markets. Also, the chapter aims at providing a hypothetical legal framework 
that could help addressing the shortcomings of commitment procedures mentioned 
above.  
The chapter is thus organised in the following manner. First, the chapter will clarify the 
application of Article 9 of Regulation of 1/2003 from the substantive and procedural 
aspects. Additionally, the motivations of the Commission and undertakings to pursue 
commitment proceedings rather than prohibition decisions will be analysed. Second, the 
chapter will discuss the possible detrimental effects of the generalised use of antitrust 
settlements particularly in the recently liberalised energy markets. Third, the decisions 
of the Commission concluded through structural or behavioural remedies will be 
examined in order to assess the proportionality of commitments, as well as to see 
whether the Commission uses Article 102 TFEU and Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 as 
regulatory tools to eliminate the deficiencies of the energy markets. Finally, the chapter 
will conclude with a number of observations on the need to introduce a more 
comprehensive legal framework for the use of commitment decisions in the energy 
markets, which may also be considered for the use of commitment proceedings in 
general. 
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II. Implementation of Competition Rules by the European Commission under 
Regulation 1/2003 
Before the modernisation of EU competition law, a settlement procedure existed in the 
form of informal decisions made by the Commission so as to close investigations when 
the Commission and undertakings concerned reached an agreement on certain 
behavioural changes.10 However, this procedure did not allow the Commission to legally 
bind the undertakings under investigation to behavioural or structural remedies through 
a formal decision. Nor did it provide the Commission with a mechanism to force the 
undertakings to fulfil the commitments through imposing a periodic penalty payment or 
fine.11 With the modernisation of antitrust enforcement, these shortcomings have been 
eliminated through the enactment of Article 9.  
This part of the chapter will evaluate first, prohibition decisions under Article 7, and then, 
commitment decisions under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 in order to understand the 
factors that contribute to these different types of decisions. This will then help to explain 
why the Commission and the undertakings under investigation prefer to engage in 
commitment proceedings as well as the detrimental effects that are likely to be derived 
from commitment decisions. However, before that, given the importance of the principle 
of proportionality within the context of the chapter, the next section will provide brief 
information about this principle for further clarification.  
A. The Principle of Proportionality in EU Law 
Although the principle of proportionality12 was occasionally mentioned in early cases in 
the Court of Justice, recognition of the principle as a “general principle of law” can be 
traced back to 1970s.13 The general principle of EU law essentially requires that 
                                                          
10
 F. Cengiz ‘Judicial Review and the Rule of the Law in the EU Competition Law Regime after Alrosa’ 
(2011) Vol.7 European Competition Journal 127, p. 127 
11
 H. Schweitzer, ‘Commitment Decision under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003: The Developing EC 
Practice and Case Law’ (2008) EUI Working Papers Law 2008/22 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1306245> accessed 02 June 2011, p. 2 
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 The principle of proportionality, which is a general principle of public law, has been developed 
particularly in French administrative and German criminal law. See P. Graig, EU Administrative Law 
(Oxford University Press 2006)  
13
 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesekkschatf v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 
1125; F. G. Jacobs, ‘Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community 
Law’ in E. Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999), p. 270 
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measures adopted by EU institutions must be proportionate to the objectives they 
pursue.14 The principle is a criterion for the lawfulness of any act by the institutions of 
the EU, including decisions taken by the Commission.15 According to the case law of the 
Court of Justice, the application of the principle can be tested through a three-part test: 
(i) a test of suitability - this assesses whether the measure is suitable to achieve a 
legitimate aim; (ii) the least restrictive alternative test - this assesses whether the 
measure is necessary to achieve this aim; and (iii) proportionality stricto sensu - this 
establishes whether the measure will have any excessive effect on the applicant’s 
interests.16 
Despite the very abstract nature of the principle, an objective analysis in the judicial 
review for the principle is conducted by the EU courts.17 They assess the 
appropriateness and necessity of a measure in relation to the specific aim pursued by 
the institution that has adopted the measure in a question. Within the context of 
commitment decisions, as will be seen below, the principle of proportionality is directly 
related to the exercise of the Commission’s discretionary power granted through Article 
9 of Regulation 1/2003 in terms of deciding which antitrust enforcement procedure 
should be pursued and the enforcement of the proposed commitments on the 
undertakings concerned. In addition, the principle of proportionality, in theory, may 
provide relevant grounds for the judicial review of commitment decisions so as to 
ascertain the suitability and necessity of the commitments implemented by the EU 
Courts.    
However, as will be seen below, the application of the principle of proportionality and 
the limits of judicial scrutiny under commitment decisions are softened and restricted. 
This approach can actually be seen as one of the main reasons for certain problems 
resulting from commitment-based antitrust enforcement such as over-enforcement 
without eliminating the main competition concerns of the Commission. This problem is 
becoming more visible particularly in the European energy markets, because several 
                                                          
14
 Case C-66/82 Fromancais SA v FORMA [1983] ECR 395; Case C-181/84 Man (Sugar) Ltd v 
Internvention Board for Agricultural Produce (IBAP) [1985] ECR 2889 
15
 Case C-441/07 P Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2010] ECR I-5949 
16
 Jacobs, supra n 13, 270 
17
 Cengiz supra n 10, 145 
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investigations concluded through informal/formal settlement proceedings. Besides, the 
proper application of the principle is rather important in the energy markets, as the lack 
of proportionality increases the legal uncertainty, which may deter energy companies 
from making new investments and dissuades potential entrants from entering the 
markets.   
Given the significant role of legal certainty in terms of the development of a well-
functioning energy market, finding a solution for this problem is becoming more 
important. Hence, this chapter will attempt to propose a hypothetical guideline, which 
will provide several measures that could increase the appropriateness of commitments 
and extend the limits of judicial review. Before that, there will be an analysis of 
prohibition and commitment procedures as well as a discussion of their impacts on the 
energy markets. 
B. Prohibition Proceedings under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 
Article 7 provides that where the Commission finds an infringement of Article 101 or 102 
TFEU, it may require the undertakings concerned to bring the infringement to an end.18 
In order to do that the Commission can impose on the undertakings concerned 
behavioural or structural remedies (with/out a fine) within the limits of the principle of 
proportionality; in other words, where the remedies are appropriate to the infringement 
and necessary to effectively bring it to an end.19 Structural remedies can only be 
imposed either where there is no equal behavioural remedy or where any equal 
                                                          
18
 Article 7(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1: ‘Where the 
Commission, acting on a complaint or on its own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of Article 81 
or of Article 82 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings and associations of undertakings 
concerned to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural 
or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring the 
infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can only be imposed either where there is no 
equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be more 
burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. If the Commission has a 
legitimate interest in doing so, it may also find that an infringement has been committed in the past’. 
19
 R. Whish and D. Bailey, Competition Law (7
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2012), p. 254; With regard 
to the wording of the article, in order to prohibit an activity, the Commission should, first, find an 
infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. If the infringement is still going on the Commission can impose 
remedies so as to bring the infringement effectively to an end. Such remedies imposed on the 
undertakings concerned might be behavioural or structural. A behavioural remedy can be negative, i.e. 
stopping a certain kind of conduct (a cease-and-desist order), for example refraining from a certain 
conduct or similar conducts that pose the same anticompetitive results in the future, or positive, i.e. 
ordering an undertaking to do something. 
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effective behavioural remedy would be more burdensome for the undertakings than the 
structural remedy. Recital 12 of the Regulation highlights the importance of the principle 
of proportionality by adding that changes to the structure of an undertaking would only 
be proportionate where there is a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement 
that derives from the very structure of the undertaking. A possible example of this could 
occur where a vertically integrated undertaking consistently refuses to allow its 
competitors to have access to an essential facility or discriminates against downstream 
competitors in relation to a vital input; another example could arise where an 
undertaking repeatedly engages in a margin squeeze.20 Finally the Commission can 
complete the proceedings for a prohibition decision by imposing a fine under Article 23 
of Regulation 1/2003, as a separate punitive feature of the prohibition decision.21  
Under antitrust enforcement, the remedies imposed on undertakings might have 
different impacts pursuant to the subject matter of the infringement investigated by the 
Commission. Under an investigation into a breach of Article 101 TFEU, a potential 
remedy imposed by the Commission cannot do more than bringing the conduct to an 
end, because of the characteristic of Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits all agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices between undertakings which prevent, restrict or 
distort competition in the relevant markets. On the other hand, the impact of remedies 
imposed under Article 102 TFEU can be regulatory in nature, since Article 102 TFEU 
incorporates certain procedures or substantive characteristics more typically associated 
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 Ibid, 254 
21
 P. Lowe and F. Mier-Rigaud, ‘Quo Vadis Antitrust Remedies’ in B. E. Hawk (ed.), Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy (Juris Publishing, Inc. 2008), pp. 597-611; The 
imposition of remedies and fines should not be confused. Remedies are not a way of punishing 
undertakings that engage in anticompetitive conduct, nor are they used to compensate the parties 
harmed by the infringements. They are obligations or conditions imposed on the undertakings concerned 
in order to bring infringements to an end as well as to create a competitive market, at least as much as it 
was before the infringements occurred. This approach aligns with an effect-based approach to unilateral 
behaviour, where an emphasis is placed on analysing the effects of certain behaviour.  
On the other hand, the punitive feature of Article 7 is rendered by the imposition of a fine. While fines are 
able to deter the undertakings concerned or other undertakings from engaging in similar infringements in 
the future, they may not be able to eliminate the effects of infringements or, restore market functioning. If 
the effects of an infringement can still be perceived at the time of the adjudication of a prohibition 
decision, the Commission may impose structural or behavioural remedies in order to create competitive 
market conditions - as they were before the infringement. This is a result that cannot be achieved through 
the imposition of a fine. 
See P. Hellstrom, F. Maier-Rigaud and F. W. Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (2009) Vol.76 
Antitrust Law Journal 43 p. 50 ; Wind, supra n 2, 662-665 
139 
 
with regulation such as providing access to an essential facility (refusal to supply), or a 
price policy for this essential facility (margin squeeze), which are at the same time under 
the scope of sector-specific regulation.22 
However, this difference seems to be diminished within the informal settlements 
between the Commission and the parties concerned during energy investigations. As 
seen within the second chapter, in OMV/Gazprom,23 OMV offered a set of behavioural 
remedies with regulatory effects such as the improvement of third party access, 
although, the subject matter was a long-term supply contract including a territorial 
restriction clause under the scope of Article 101 TFEU, which could have been ended 
through a cease-and-desist order.24 Furthermore, in DUC/DONG,25 the undertakings, in 
addition to a cease-and-desist order, agreed on contract-unrelated commitments such 
as establishing new supply relationships with new entrants, and introducing an 
improved access regime for DONG’s off-shore pipelines in order to enhance 
competition in the market.26 As will be seen, this approach has gradually changed with 
the modernisation of EU competition law. The Commission seems to be more careful 
about the adequacy and appropriateness of the commitments imposed on undertakings 
in the energy markets, in particular since the Alrosa judgment27 of the Court of Justice.28 
In this regard, it can be stated that the introduction of commitment-based antitrust 
enforcement, which replaced informal settlement procedures under former Regulation 
17/62, has improved the proportionality of commitments compared to informal 
settlements on the basis of energy cases. Nevertheless, the application of the principle 
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 N. Dunne, ‘Commitment Decisions in EU Competition Law’ (2014) Vol.6(3)  Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 399, p. 414 
23
 OMV/Gazprom (Case COMP/38085) [2005]  
24
 Commission, ‘Competition: Commission secures improvement to gas supply contracts between OMV 
and Gazprom’ IP/05/185  
25
 DONG/DUC (Case COMP 38187) [2003] 
26
 Commission, ‘Commission and Danish competition authorities jointly open up Danish gas market’ 
IP/03/566 
27
 Case C-441/07 P Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2010] ECR I-5949 
28
 It has been argued that, after the Alrosa Judgment of the Court of Justice, the proper implementation of 
principle of proportionality reduced since the Court limited the impact of the principle under commitment 
decisions. Yet, on the basis of energy cases, it is more realistic to see that after Alrosa Judgment the 
Commission started to include a separate section for the principle within its decisions, which did not occur 
under informal settlement proceedings. Therefore for the energy cases, it can be stated that after the 
enactment of Article 9 and the Alrosa Judgment the importance of the principle of proportionality 
increased.     
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of proportionality is still weak under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 and there are still 
some problems stemming from this lack of proportionality as will be discussed below. 
The next section will evaluate commitment proceedings on the basis of procedural and 
substantive law.      
C. Commitment Proceedings under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
Under Article 9 of the Regulation, the Commission is granted the power to render 
suggested commitments by undertakings binding upon them, instead of giving a 
prohibition decision, when the commitments eliminate the concerns of the Commission 
over competition.29 The wording of the article and Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 
elucidates the three aspects of giving a commitment decision.30 The first aspect is the 
intention of the Commission to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be 
brought to an end. The second is a proposal comprising a set of structural or 
behavioural commitments by the investigated undertaking, which address the 
Commission’s concerns regarding competition. The final aspect is to bind the 
undertakings to these commitments by a commitment decision without a further 
                                                          
29
 Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1: 
‘1. Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end 
and the undertakings concerned offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the 
Commission in its preliminary assessment, the Commission may by decision make those commitments 
binding on the undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude 
that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission. 
2. The Commission may, upon request or on its own initiative, reopen the proceedings: 
(a) where there has been a material change in any of the facts on which the decision was based; 
(b) where the undertakings concerned act contrary to their commitments; or 
(c) where the decision was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the 
parties.’ 
30
 Recital 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1: ‘Where, in the course 
of proceedings which might lead to an agreement or practice being prohibited, undertakings offer the 
Commission commitments such as to meet its concerns, the Commission should be able to adopt 
decisions which make those commitments binding on the undertakings concerned. Commitment 
decisions should find that there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission without concluding 
whether or not there has been or still is an infringement. Commitment decisions are without prejudice to 
the powers of competition authorities and courts of the Member States to make such a finding and decide 
upon the case. Commitment decisions are not appropriate in cases where the Commission intends to 
impose a fine.’ 
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extended investigation showing the existence of an infringement. After the decision, 
there should be no remaining grounds for action by the Commission.31  
Commitment decisions do not state whether or not there is or has been an infringement 
of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU. The only legal effect of commitment decisions is to close 
the investigation on the basis that the commitments offered by the undertakings fully 
address the Commission’s concerns over competition.32 This feature of commitment 
decisions may cause several outcomes. From a legal point of view, commitment 
decisions produce legal and functional uncertainty, because (i) they reduce established 
infringement, which decreases clarification of law, and reduces clear and consistence 
precedents, and (ii) they diminish the assessment of the detrimental effects of an 
infringement on competition in the relevant markets.33  
From an investigated undertaking’s point of view, non-establishment of an infringement 
may have two significant results. First, logically, the Commission cannot impose a fine 
on the undertakings concerned under Article 9 without a decision stating the existence 
of an infringement. Once the Commission decides to follow the Article 9 procedure, it 
should terminate the investigation without enforcing any fine, as long as the 
undertakings do not break the remedy agreement.34 Besides, according to Recital 13 of 
Regulation 1/2003, commitment decisions are not appropriate where the Commission 
intends to impose a fine. Thus, the commitment procedures for the undertakings 
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 This leads to two different views among scholars: (i) some support that an alleged anticompetitive 
conduct concerned becomes no longer one that, as a matter of administrative priority, the Commission 
wishes to pursue as a result of the elimination of the Commission’s concerns through commitments; (ii) 
whereas others argue that commitments must completely remove all the concerns of the Commission. 
For the first view see Commission Notice on the Handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty [2004] OJ C101/65;Whish and Bailey, supra n 19, 255-261; W. Wils 
‘Settlement of EU Antitrust Investigations: Commitment Decisions under Article 9 of Regulation No. 
1/2003’ (2006) Vol.49(3) World Competition 345, p. 360 
For the opposing argument see D. Waelbroeck, ‘The Development of a New “Settlement Culture” in 
Competition Cases. What is left to the Courts?’ in C. Gheur and N. Petit (eds.) Alternative Enforcement 
Techniques in EC Competition Law (Bruylant 2009), p. 221 
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 Cengiz supra n 10, 130 
33
 A. Gautier and N. Petit, ‘A Policy in Search of a Framework: Scope, Duration, Remedies, etc.’ 
(Commitments in EU Competition Policy Conference, Liege Competition and Innovation Institute/Brussels 
School of Competition, June 2014) 
34
 Article 23(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. For instance, the 
Microsoft decision (Case COMP/39530), the Commission imposed a € 561 million fine on Microsoft for 
not complying with the commitments accepted under commitment proceedings in 2009. 
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concerned can be a strategic concession that helps them to avoid a significant fine by 
offering more onerous commitments.35 Second, not finding an infringement may secure 
the undertakings from being a part of follow-on litigation in the national courts.36 It may 
also limit the reputational damages typically associated with prohibition decisions.37 
These two outcomes can motivate the undertakings under investigation to propose a set 
of far-reaching commitments in order to convince the Commission of their readiness to 
start commitment proceedings.  
Given the possibility of the imposition of far-reaching commitments on the basis of 
Article 9, it might be crucial to highlight the differences between the types of remedies 
and commitments that could be imposed under Article 7 or 9 as well as the application 
of the principle of proportionality. As mentioned before, while the remedies imposed 
under Article 7 are based on the finding of an infringement, under Article 9 a set of 
commitments is proposed on the grounds of the Commission’s concerns. Thus, under 
prohibition decisions the adequacy of the remedies imposed is approved through 
economic facts that are found during investigations. Besides, the proportionality of the 
remedies is guaranteed by the wording of the rule. For the implementation of structural 
remedies, there should be no equally effective and less burdensome behavioural 
remedies, and also, the infringement should stem from the very structure of the 
undertaking.38 Therefore, the enforcement of a structural remedy might be justified 
through the repetition of a similar infringement that could not be prevented by the 
behavioural remedies enforced in the former investigation of the same undertaking. 
Clearly, under Article 7, structural remedies can be utilised as a last resort so as to end 
or deter infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.39  
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 For instance, in the OPCOM decision (Case COMP/39984), the Commission recently deemed to 
impose a fine of just over € 1 million on OPCOM, Romanian Power Exchange, for abusing its dominant 
position in the Romanian market. 
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 Lowe and Mier-Rigaud, supra n 21, 607-608; Lang, supra n 4, 265-324; W. Wils, ‘The Use of  
Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and Principles’ (2008) Vol.31 World Competition 
335, pp. 340-341 
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 C. J. Cook, ‘Commitment Decisions: The Law and Practice Under Article 9’ (2006) Vol.29(2) World 
Competition 209, p.212; Lang, supra n 4, 265-324 
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 Recital 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 
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 W. Wang, ‘Structural Remedies in EU Antitrust and Merger Control’ (2011) Vol. 34  World Competition 
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However, no criteria are provided for the imposition of commitments within the Article 9 
procedures. For this reason, there was a discussion over the application of the principle 
of proportionality under Article 9 in the Alrosa judgment of the Court of Justice.40 In the 
judgment, the General Court claimed that the examination of the proportionality of the 
commitments should be the same regardless of which antitrust enforcement procedure 
was being followed. According to the General Court, the voluntary nature of 
commitment proceedings does not relieve the Commission of complying with the 
principle of proportionality. The fact is that the voluntary submission of commitments 
does not make them necessary and appropriate. Therefore, the Commission is obliged 
to ascertain the proportionality of the commitments proposed on the basis of Article 9 as 
if they had been imposed under Article 7.41 The Commission did not agree with the 
General Court and argued that the approach of the Court disregarded the fundamental 
differences between those two provisions, and also negated the practical effect of 
Article 9. In addition, the Commission argued that it should be considered that under 
Article 9 undertakings offering a set of commitments make a choice about the way in 
which they intend to address competition concerns and should be ready to have them 
made binding upon themselves.   
The Court of Justice observed that the application of the principle of proportionality may 
vary depending on whether it is considered in a prohibition or commitment decision. The 
administrative efficiency rationale and the participatory nature of the commitment 
regime require application of a different, lighter proportionality test for commitment 
decisions compared to the test applied in prohibition decisions. Accordingly, under 
Article 9, the Commission is confined to verifying that the commitments proposed by the 
undertakings address the competition concerns in an antitrust investigation, and that the 
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 Case T-170/06 Alrosa v Commission [2007] ECR II-260, para. 105 
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 De Beers and Alrosa are two commercial companies operating in the diamond market. Following an 
antitrust investigation over an abuse of dominance of the Commission, in 2006, De Beers submitted 
commitments that would ensure the complete cessation of the supply of rough diamonds between De 
Beers and Alrosa. The Commission made these commitments binding under Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003 (Case COMP/B-2/38381). Alrosa applied to the General Court for the annulment of the 
Commission’s commitment decision. Alrosa argued that the Commission had breached the principle of 
proportionality and conducted a manifest error of assessment by accepting individual commitments that 
would result in the entire cessation of the trade relationship between the parties, whereas less onerous 
measures would address the concerns over competition.  
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undertakings have not offered less onerous commitments that also adequately address 
these concerns. In other words, the commitments accepted by the Commission must be 
the least restrictive of all of the commitments offered by the undertaking concerned. 
Also, these accepted commitments must not go manifestly beyond what is necessary to 
address the Commission’s concerns.42 Consequently, while concluding investigations 
on the basis of Article 9, the Commission is not obliged to seek out less onerous 
solutions than the commitments offered by the undertakings. Nor does it have to 
compare these commitments with the measures that might be imposed in a prohibition 
decision or consider as disproportionate any commitments that go beyond these 
potential measures. According to the Court of Justice, undertakings therefore 
consciously accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what the 
Commission itself could impose on them under Article 7.43   
The observation of the Court of Justice indicates that it does not seem to take the reality 
of situations into account.44 Regarding the procedural law of commitment decisions, the 
undertakings concerned may not be aware that the set of commitments they offer may 
go beyond what would be imposed under an Article 7 decision. According to the 
procedure pursued under Article 9, an investigated undertaking can contact the 
Commission at any point in time to explore its readiness to enter into a commitment 
decision. Following the proposal of the undertaking, a State of Play meeting is offered to 
the undertaking at which the Commission presents its preliminary competition concerns 
arising from the investigation and indicates a timeframe within which the discussion on 
potential commitments should be concluded.45 After the State of Play meeting and once 
the Commission is convinced that the undertaking is seriously interested in submitting 
adequate formal commitments addressing its concerns over competition, a preliminary 
assessment should be drafted. This preliminary assessment summarises the main facts 
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 Sadowska, supra n 12, 185 
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 Case C-441/07 P Alrosa Company Ltd v Commission [2010] ECR I-5949, para. 48 
44
 Y. Botteman and A. Patsa, ‘Towards a more Sustainable Use of Commitment Decisions in Article 102 
TFEU’ (2013) Vol.13 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Advance Access 1, p. 9 
45
 This meeting provides undertakings, shortly after the opening of proceedings, with an opportunity to 
give their initial reactions to the issues identified by the Commission. At a sufficiently advanced stage in 
the investigation, the meeting gives the undertakings an opportunity to understand the Commission’s 
preliminary view on the status of the case following its investigation and on the competition concerns 
identified.  
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of the case and identifies the competition concerns.46 The undertaking concerned 
proposes a set of commitments on the basis of the preliminary assessment by the 
Commission, i.e. without having fully-analysed the economic-based evidence.47 
Therefore, it is hard to believe that undertakings can draft a set of sufficient and 
necessary commitments. Within this procedural context, it seems that, in practice, even 
before the delivery of a preliminary assessment to an investigated undertaking, the 
undertakings and the Commission may reach an agreement over the potential 
commitments that will be offered.48 This makes it even more difficult for the firm to 
realise and consciously accept that the commitments may go beyond what the 
Commission would impose under a prohibition decision.49  
Besides, apparently undertakings under investigation do not have the monopoly on 
initiatives on commitments. Before a market test, the Commission can ask them to 
modify the text.50  Although the commitments are voluntarily submitted, ‘the Commission 
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 These procedural steps can only be taken if the undertaking concerned informs the Commission of its 
willingness to engage in commitment proceedings shortly after the initiation of an investigation. 
Otherwise, a statement of objections could already have been submitted by the Commission and, in that 
instance the provision of a preliminary assessment would be unnecessary.  
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 In the Coca-Cola decision (Case COMP/A.39116/B2), it appears that a draft set of commitments was 
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 The aim of a ‘market test’ is to ensure the effectiveness of suggested commitments to address the 
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could make proposals during discussions on how to modify certain elements of the text, 
and may even provide certain drafting proposals on a specific issue’.51 Even though the 
undertakings do not have to adjust the commitments according to the suggestions of the 
Commission, this illustrates that, particularly regarding the unequal bargaining strength 
between the Commission and the companies, the commitments may have been set by 
the Commission in some cases.52   
The Commission’s contribution to a set of commitments can be assessed from two 
different aspects: first, the undertakings concerned can gain important insights into the 
Commission’s perspective and intentions during a discussion regarding modification of 
the text of the commitments.53 Second, the Commission may use settlement 
proceedings as an alternative mechanism for market regulation since regulatory 
objectives could be achieved more swiftly through commitment decisions.54 Besides, 
commitment decisions grant the Commission the ability to achieve market objectives 
that ex-ante sector regulation has failed to deliver, through ex-post antitrust 
intervention.55 However, such wide competence seems to damage legal certainty, as 
will be discussed below. 
Overall, the substantive aspect of commitment decisions seems largely uncertain. This 
might be because of the fact that the Commission has not expanded upon what types of 
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commitments would address its concerns under different scenarios of possible 
infringement of EU competition law.56 Even though Regulation 1/2003 provides a body 
of soft law clarifying the characteristics of Article 9, the Commission has not published 
any guidance for potential commitments, except for a short memo and a Competition 
Policy Brief, which were announced on the Commission’s webpage.57  Thus, it might be 
unmanageable for undertakings to either draft a clear set of commitments or develop a 
strategy that will be pursued during a settlement process.     
D. Potential Reasons for the Use of Commitment-based Enforcement Policy 
from the Aspect of the European Commission and Undertakings 
1. Reasons for Undertakings to Propose a Set of Commitments 
Decisions given under Article 9 are often considered attractive for undertakings as there 
is no established infringement that might render them being subject to a fine as well as 
private litigation.58 Moreover, commitment decisions tend to reduce the negative 
publicity for undertakings.59 
Risk-averse undertakings may propose far-reaching commitments in order to avoid 
prohibition decisions. If the Commission and the parties cannot reach an arrangement 
following the settlement negotiations, or if the undertakings concerned do not propose 
commitments, the Commission can initiate a prohibition procedure. The probability of 
having a prohibition procedure renders risk-averse undertakings offering far-reaching 
commitments so as to secure a commitment decision rather than going through an 
antitrust investigation and appeal process, in particular in view of the litigation and other 
related legal costs, and the relatively uncertain nature of the EU antitrust policy.60      
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Although under some circumstances commitment proceedings can be lengthy and 
complex, undertakings can still avoid a time-consuming, expensive and complicated 
procedure involving controversy over facts, economic assessment and legal rules by 
suggesting commitments in order to close investigations.61  
2. Reasons for the Commission to Conclude Cases through Commitment 
Decisions 
Commitment decisions, under some circumstances, can be attractive to the 
Commission as well. If the Commission does not intend to impose a fine and the 
anticompetitive practice concerned can be ended with the same result that would have 
been achieved by a prohibition decision the Commission may prefer to make 
commitments binding upon the undertakings concerned in order to close the 
investigation in an easier, and perhaps quicker and less controversial way.62 In such 
situations, commitment decisions can help the Commission to reduce an institutional 
cost that would arise under a prohibition decision, thereby enabling it to tackle more 
cases. 
Similar to the undertakings concerned, the Commission may prefer to follow 
commitment proceedings if an investigation requires complex and complicated 
economic analyses. Following the establishment of the guidance on the application of 
Article 102 TFEU, the Commission has been confronted with a heavier evidentiary and 
methodological burden in investigations over abuse of dominance.63 The Commission is 
required to develop plausible and well-articulated theories of harm that are supported by 
economic evidence in order to establish dominance and the abuse of it. The rise of an 
economic-based approach in antitrust enforcement policy may encourage the 
Commission to circumvent the economic complexity through commitment proceedings 
especially where economic theory does not provide a solid foundation for prohibiting a 
certain conduct but where the empirical evidence points out a tangible risk of harmful 
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exclusion.64 In such situations, through Article 9 procedures, the Commission could 
reach commitments that eliminate all of its concerns without dealing with the complexity 
of Article 102 TFEU.65  
Another advantage of commitment decisions from the Commission’s point of view could 
be a weak form of judicial review against commitment decisions.66 This may increase 
the incentive of the Commission to finalise investigations through commitment decisions 
in cases for which there might be a greater need to establish a legal precedent through 
a prohibition decision, since the more novel the theory of harm, the greater the risk of 
annulment by the European Court.67 In Alrosa, the Court of Justice held that judicial 
review for Article 9 decisions is limited to whether the Commission’s assessment is 
manifestly incorrect.68 When this weak form of judicial scrutiny is combined with a 
softened form of the proportionality test, this implies that wide remedial discretion is 
granted to the Commission under the Article 9 procedures. As clarified by the Court of 
Justice, ‘the General Court could have held that the Commission had committed a 
manifest error of assessment only if it had found that the Commission’s conclusion was 
obviously unfounded, having regard to the facts established by it’.69  In other words, as 
long as the Commission imposes the least onerous commitments necessary to address 
its concerns from among those offered by the parties the decision is deemed to pass 
judicial scrutiny.70 Besides, although the undertakings concerned can challenge the 
refusal of the Commission to accept the commitments suggested by the undertakings, it 
seems unlikely that such an appeal would succeed.71 As the General Court claimed, the 
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Commission is never obliged to accept commitments instead of giving a prohibition 
decision so as to bring proceedings to an end.72 Consequently, commitment 
proceedings under Article 9 provide discretionary leeway to the Commission without any 
serious degree of judicial supervision.73 In the light of such discretion, it can be argued 
that the Commission is able to implement its own sectorial policies through 
commitment-based enforcement as seems to happen in the energy markets.74       
Therefore, other motivations of the Commission to conclude investigations through 
commitment proceedings might be to obtain quasi-regulatory commitments that would 
not be imposed under prohibition decisions given the strict application of the principle of 
proportionality.75 The capability of the Commission under Article 9 to impose 
commitments that could help to achieve regulatory policy objectives within regulated 
markets may lead to misuse of this process.76 It seems that, regarding the 
Commission’s tendency to employ EU competition law aggressively to dispel regulatory 
market failures, the abuse of Article 9 procedures by the Commission may continue in 
this way. 
Last but not least, the disposition of the Commission with regard to relying on 
commitment decisions may derive from the policy orientation of the Commissioner 
responsible for competition policy. To greater or lesser extent enforcement priorities in 
EU competition policy may change pursuant to the socio-economic agenda of the 
Commissioner.77 For instance, during Joaquin Almunia’s78  term as Vice President of 
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the European Commission responsible for competition policy the Commission has 
adopted fourteen commitment decisions and four prohibition decisions.79 According to 
Almunia, Article 9 procedure is ‘an excellent tool to keep good competitive conditions in 
the Single Market’.80 This may be indicative of a preference on the part of the Vice 
President for negotiated outcomes. However, this approach raises the question of 
whether this is a new trend in EU antitrust enforcement policy, which will be pursued 
regardless of changes at the top of the Directorate General for Competition.    
The next section will assess the application of commitment proceedings in the EU, and 
discuss possible detrimental effects of the generalised use of commitment-based 
enforcement particularly in energy. Before that, the findings in this section regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of commitment decisions for the Commission and the 
undertakings concerned will be summarised in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Advantages and disadvantages of commitment proceedings for the European 
Commission and energy companies (*Source: Own illustration) 
Commitment 
Proceedings  
Advantages Disadvantages 
For the 
companies under 
investigations 
No fine 
Less negative publicity 
No follow-up private litigation 
More concession through 
far-reaching commitments 
 No dealing with the complexity of 
Article 102 TFEU 
Legal uncertainty and 
insufficient body of case law 
and guidance 
 A relatively short procedure Less likely to result in a 
successful appeal 
 Possibly obtaining an important 
insight into the European 
Commission’s perspective and 
intentions 
Less contribution to antitrust 
enforcement in terms of 
clarification of the rules, and 
a clear precedent 
 Less costly  
 Undertakings might find it more 
comfortable to propose 
commitments and to deal with a 
single interlocutor (the Commission 
rather than a national regulatory 
authority) considering the ongoing 
liberalisation process 
 
For the 
Commission 
The application of a softened test 
for the proportionality of 
commitments 
 
Risk of the implementation 
of insufficient commitments 
 The implementation of far-
reaching, more flexible, 
consensual commitments 
 
Unclear identifications of 
antitrust violations may 
significantly limit the 
accountability of the 
Commission 
 No need to deal with the 
uncertainty state of Article 102 
TFEU to draft any complex 
remedies 
 
 Weak form of judicial review-less 
likely to be subject to an appeal 
 
 Less costly  
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E. A General Analysis of and the Likely Detrimental Effects of Commitment-
based Enforcement Policy   
This section of the chapter will shed some light on commitment decisions in terms of 
current situation of commitment proceedings and possible problems that may be 
created through excessive implementation. It is clear that commitment-based 
enforcement can bring some advantages in terms of procedural economy in a situation 
where the subjects of the investigation are based on a robust body of case law and 
adequately tested theories of harm. However, in an instance where concerns over 
competition are likely to raise novel questions under EU competition law or rely upon 
controversial theories of harm, such as excessive pricing or refusal to supply, the Article 
9 procedures do not seem to be able to eliminate the risk of ambiguity of law. In 
addition, under such circumstances, due to the lack of analyses during Article 9 
procedures, the commitments imposed on the undertakings concerned may fail to 
address the concerns of the Commission.   
Insufficient clarification regarding the circumstances in which commitment proceedings 
can be used raises the question of whether the alleged market distortions should be 
addressed through a commitment or, rather, a prohibition decision, i.e. a question 
regarding the appropriateness of commitment decisions. The recently published 
Competition Policy Brief to a certain extent clarifies this issue.81 According to the Policy 
Brief, the Commission cannot base its decision on Article 9 when it intends to impose a 
fine, for instance in the case of a secret cartel for which an alternative cartel-settlement 
procedure exists.82 Moreover, it adds that the Commission should not conclude an 
investigation through commitment proceedings if a legal precedent needs to be set. 
Also, it is stated that commitment decisions are more convenient where the primary aim 
of the Commission is not punishment for past behaviour, but adjusting it in the future.   
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However, cases handled by the Commission through commitment proceedings are 
puzzling in this sense. First of all, there is no clarification regarding why the Commission 
intends (or does not intend) to impose a fine. Given decisions such as Telefonica83 and 
Deutsche Telekom,84 the Commission appears to be apt to impose a fine where an 
undertaking abuses its dominant position through margin squeeze. However, in the 
RWE decision, as will be discussed below, the Commission preferred to conclude the 
investigation into a margin squeeze through commitment proceedings, even though it 
could have imposed a fine as well as structural remedies under a prohibition decision.85 
Second, it is stated that commitment proceedings might be more appropriate when the 
concerns over competition are grounded on a robust body of case law and adequately 
tested theories of harm. Nevertheless, the case law indicates that investigations that are 
likely to raise novel questions under EU competition law or that involve very harmful 
conduct can be concluded through commitment decisions.86 For instance, in the Google 
case,87 the concerns of the Commission raised a novel question under EU competition 
law in terms of Google’s anticompetitive behaviour in relation to online research and 
online advertising. Yet, apparently, the case will be finalised through commitment-based 
enforcement given that adversarial proceedings would not bring immediate effects or 
necessarily deliver a better outcome for consumers according to Almunia.88 In addition, 
in the E-Books decision, the concern of the Commission was a concerted practice 
among four publishers and Apple, which was possibly developed in order to raise the 
retail prices of e-books.89 Despite the fact that the concern of the Commission was not 
far from cartel conduct the investigation was concluded through a commitment decision. 
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This ambiguity over commitment proceedings seems to result from the wide remedial 
discretion of the Commission, which is strengthened through the softened application of 
the principle of proportionality as well as limited judicial review.90 Generalised use of 
commitment-based enforcement mainly stemming from this widened discretion of the 
Commission is likely to create certain detrimental effects particularly in the energy 
markets. These effects can be categorised into two groups: (i) the creation of legal 
uncertainty, and (ii) the intervention of the Commission particularly in the regulated 
markets.    
1. The Creation of Legal Uncertainty  
Commitment proceedings may undermine legal certainty in the markets, since they 
provide less guidance on permitted and prohibited practices under the European 
competition rules. The positive outcomes prohibition decisions result in, such as the 
clarification of novel legal issues and the identification of theories of harm supported by 
economic-based evidence, are likely to be lost if disputes are negotiated rather than 
adjudicated.91 This danger recently became clearer in the energy markets given the 
drastic decline in prohibition decisions, which provide legal certainty for future 
investigations by the Commission by clarifying the legal boundaries and legal principles 
applied in previous cases.92 
By disclosing very few facts and including only cursory legal and economic analyses, 
commitment decisions have very little precedential value. Thus, the business 
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community does not have enough examples to carry out self-assessment of its business 
practice. Therefore, businesses may test the legitimacy of certain practices by engaging 
in them and, under anticompetitive investigation, find a quick way out by proposing far-
reaching commitments.93 In such situations, the question will not be whether the 
conduct complies with EU competition law but rather ‘how much a dominant firm is 
willing to give to buy the right to engage in anticompetitive conduct’.94    
Furthermore, it seems that the lack of legal certainty or more generally less clarification 
of the rules harms the objective of the creation of a single market, because asymmetric 
information and increase in cost, due to the legal uncertainty, is likely to discourage 
market participants from making an investment and potential competitors from entering 
the markets.95 Thus, an excessive use of commitment-based enforcement in the 
recently liberalised energy markets may be detrimental for the development of 
competition. As a result, apparently, prohibition decisions and commitments cannot be 
considered as perfect substitutes in the energy markets. Indeed, for commitment 
proceedings to work, prohibition proceedings should be a viable option.96 
2. The Intervention of the Commission in the Regulated Markets  
As mentioned before, commitment-based enforcement in EU competition law seems to 
be convenient tool for the Commission to facilitate market regulation, since commitment 
proceedings permit the Commission to prospectively influence the behaviour and/or 
structure of individual firms.97 Given that the Commission has broad discretion to 
approve commitments that would not have been imposed under prohibition decisions, 
commitment decisions may be adopted in sectors where the Commission is pursuing a 
specific aim such as creating a well-functioning competitive market.98 The increase in 
the number of investigations concluded through commitment decisions in the energy 
markets as well as in the number of behavioural and/or structural commitments imposed 
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on investigated undertakings implies that the Commission is attempting to create a 
single and competitive well-functioning energy market through these commitments, 
which may resemble regulation rather than real antitrust enforcement.99 
The Article 9 procedure provides the Commission with quasi-regulatory powers by 
allowing it to build up a desirable market structure, which it otherwise could not. The 
limitation of contract duration/volume is a typical example of such influence (Chapter 
2).100 Furthermore, under commitment proceedings the Commission is able to tailor the 
remedies to both the specific market conditions and its competition concerns. In most of 
the energy cases to date, the issues have been the difficulty for the competitors of 
incumbents to enter the market or explore their market powers. The commitment 
procedure has allowed the Commission to reach agreements on very detailed plans to 
introduce flexibility in market access, inter alia through divestiture of the ownership of 
specific generation or network businesses, as will be seen below, and through 
behavioural remedies such as freeing up some network capacities (Chapter 3).  
This intervention of the Commission may at some points be beneficial for market 
operators as it removes regulatory shortcomings from the market. On the other hand, 
thanks to the wide remedial discretion of the Commission, less-strict application of the 
principle of proportionality and the limited judicial review of Article 9 decisions, the use 
of ex-post antitrust enforcement for ex-ante market regulation under commitment 
proceedings may increase the legal uncertainty for market operators, regulators and 
national courts, as mentioned above.101   
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In the next section, the focus will be on certain investigations in the energy markets that 
were concluded through commitment proceedings, particularly with regard to the 
appropriateness of the structural or quasi-structural commitments imposed on the 
undertakings concerned, in order to analyse whether the Commission has certain 
regulatory objectives in its antitrust investigations in the energy sectors. After that, the 
chapter will attempt to provide a hypothetical framework (a guideline) for better use of 
commitment proceedings.  
III. Case Law  
As mentioned before, a number of commitment decisions in the energy markets show 
the eagerness of the Commission to solve competition problems in these markets on 
the basis of Article 9. The ambition of the Commission may stem from the potential of 
commitment decisions to (i) introduce competition into the markets more quickly than 
prohibition decisions, and (ii) achieve regulatory goals that would be difficult to achieve 
through sector regulation. This is because the market regulation in the energy sectors 
has not been fully completed, since to a large extent it incorporates political 
compromises. While prohibition decisions constrain the scope of the Commission’s 
remedial action due to the principle of proportionality, commitment decisions allow it to 
impose structural or behavioural remedies that go beyond what would be imposed 
under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003.  Therefore, it is significant to examine the 
decisions of the Commission, namely E.ON,102 CEZ,103 RWE,104 ENI,105and SvK.106 The 
aim of analysing these cases is to assess the appropriateness of the commitments 
imposed in terms of addressing the concerns of the Commission. After that, the chapter 
will propose a hypothetical legal framework guideline, which could eliminate these 
deficiencies and increase the efficiency of commitment proceedings.    
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A. The Analysis of The European Commission’s Decisions 
In the cases examined below the concerns of the Commission were related to network 
foreclosures stemming from the probability of the undertakings abusing their 
dominant/collective dominant positions in different ways. In the E.ON decision, the 
Commission stated in the preliminary assessment that E.ON, a vertically integrated 
energy company, had a collectively dominant position with RWE and Vattenfall in the 
German electricity wholesale market,107 and may have abused its dominant position by 
withdrawing available capacity.108 Additionally, according to the preliminary assessment, 
E.ON was dominant in the market for secondary balancing energy in the E.ON network 
area, in which E.ON TSO (the transmission system operator owned by E.ON) acted as 
a monopolist. The Commission’s concerns were that E.ON may have abused its 
dominant position in the network through increasing its own cost in order to favour its 
production affiliate and pass on the cost to the final consumers, and through preventing 
power generators from other Member States from selling balancing energy into the 
E.ON balancing market.109 Similarly, in the CEZ decision,110 the concern of the 
Commission was that CEZ, the incumbent electricity producer in the Czech Republic, 
may have abused its dominant position in the Czech electricity market, in particular by 
hindering the entry of competitors, in breach of EU competition rules. The Commission 
claimed that CEZ's behaviour, in particular its hoarding of capacity in the transmission 
network, may have resulted in preventing competitors from entering the Czech 
wholesale electricity market.111 
                                                          
107
 According to the established case law, undertakings occupying a joint dominant position may engage 
in joint or individual abusive conduct. Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar [1999] ECR II-2969, para.66; Joined 
Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275 
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 The withdrawal of generation capacity by a dominant undertaking is considered an abuse of dominant 
position and thereby against Article 102 TFEU. Such action causes serious harm to all kinds of consumer 
groups by directly increasing the prevailing price in the spot market as well as by indirectly raising the 
prevailing price in long-term markets. As the consumers in electricity markets have limited capacity to 
show a reaction to the price signals, and furthermore, as building new generation capacity requires long 
lead times, capacity withdrawals are severely detrimental to consumers.    
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 Commission, Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
Cases COMP/B-1/39.388 — German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/B-1/39.389 — German 
Electricity Balancing Market OJ C 146 
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 CEZ (Case AT/39727) Commission Decision C(2013) 1997 final [2013] 
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In the RWE decision, RWE, a vertically integrated company, may have abused its 
dominant position in the gas transmission market as well as in the downstream gas 
supply markets within its grid by refusing its actual and potential competitors’ demand to 
access its network facilities, and also, by squeezing its rivals’ margins in the 
downstream gas supply markets. Likewise, in the ENI decision, according to the 
Commission’s Statement of Objections, ENI was a vertically integrated company 
holding a dominant position in the market for the transport of gas to and into Italy by 
means of its ability to effectively control and influence the use of all viable international 
pipelines for shipping gas into Italy. ENI also controlled all of the viable network 
infrastructures and owned the transmission system operator, which held significant 
capacity/use rights regarding those import pipelines. Additionally, ENI had a significant 
portfolio of long-term gas import contracts and it remained a gas producer in its own 
right both in Italy and abroad. Therefore, ENI had a dominant position in the wholesale 
supply market in Italy as a whole and in particular in the market for supplies to gas fired 
power plants and the market for supplies to large industrial customers. The 
Commission’s concerns over competition were that ENI may have been deliberately 
hoarding and degrading its network capacity as well as strategically limiting investment 
in its network.  
In the SvK decision, the Commission suspected that Svenska Kraftnät (SvK), the 
Swedish monopoly transmission system operator, may have abused its dominant 
position by limiting export transmission capacity on Swedish electricity interconnectors 
to neighbouring countries and thereby hindering competition as well as the proper 
functioning of the single market in electricity.112 However, SvK claimed that export 
capacity limitation was necessary to lighten internal congestion in its electricity 
transmission network. However, this argument was not accepted as an objective 
justification, as the Commission focused on the objectives of the internal market rather 
than the objective of market efficiency, in other words economic welfare.  
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 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings against Swedish electricity Transmission 
System Operator concerning limiting interconnector capacity for electricity exports’ MEMO/09/191 
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Under the antitrust settlements, pursuant to the concerns of the Commission, the 
investigated companies proposed structural or behavioural remedies such as the 
divestiture of generation or network business, or the introduction of new bidding 
zones113 in the Swedish electricity market. Having briefly discussed the decisions, the 
chapter will continue with individual in-depth examinations of each decision.   
1. The E.ON Decision 
As mentioned above, in the E.ON decision, the first concern of the Commission was 
with regard to the German wholesale electricity market. According to the preliminary 
assessment, E.ON might have had the incentive and ability to withdraw generation 
capacity given its broad generation portfolio including its base-load (nuclear, hydro and 
coal) and high-cost (hard coal, gas, oil) generation capacities. The Sector Inquiry 
demonstrated that in competitive short-term markets, prices are set by the short-run 
marginal cost (hereafter SRMC)114 of the plant producing the last unit of electricity that 
is required to meet demand.115  The last or marginal unit needed to meet demand is 
also the one with the highest SRMC of all units, i.e. the most expensive one for 
consumers, running at a given point in time. In this sense, it is significant to underline 
that the SRMC of the price setting unit determines the revenues not only of the owner of 
the marginal plant, but also of all of the other units called on to produce in any given 
hour, i.e. the sale price of all other units. As a result, the Commission deemed that the 
broad generation portfolio of E.ON might have provided a greater incentive and ability to 
withdraw generation capacity in order to increase the revenue of its generation plants to 
the detriment of the final consumers,116 in particular given the inflexibility of demand and 
the non-storability of electricity.117  
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 The introduction of new bidding zones in the electricity market in Sweden means that the electricity 
market will be divided into zones and electricity will be traded separately in each of these zones. Thus, 
there will be a different price for electricity in each zone depending on the bids of the participants as well 
as the balance between the supply and demand in each zone.  
114
 SRMC mainly consists of the fuel costs and other different production costs of a plant. 
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 DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724, para.368-372 
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 According to economic literature, to conclude long-term supply contracts in the wholesale electricity 
market may mitigate the potential pricing abuse. If a big share of E.ON’s capacity is bound through long-
term contracts its incentive and ability to reduce output in order to manipulate the price would be reduced, 
since less volume is traded in the spot market and the higher price is set only for the un-contracted 
capacities. (See P. Joskow and E. Kahn, ‘A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing behaviour in California’s 
Wholesale Electricity Market during summer 2000: The Final Word’ (2002) Vol.23(4) The Energy Journal 
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The Commission also considered that price increases in spot markets through the 
withdrawal of generation capacity could affect forward markets as they are driven by the 
corresponding trend in short-term prices.118 As a result, according to the Commission’s 
investigation, E.ON may have withdrawn or refrained from bidding a certain amount of 
capacity into the Germany power exchange even though that capacity was available 
and would have been profitable to run.119  
In the preliminary assessment the Commission also raised concerns that, in order to 
limit the volume of electricity traded in the wholesale market, E.ON may have deterred 
actual or potential competitors from entering the generation market by offering new 
competitors participation in an E.ON power plant and by signing long-term supply 
contracts. It appeared to the Commission that E.ON may have wanted to combine the 
withdrawal of generation capacity with this strategic behaviour so as to maintain 
wholesale price levels, which were higher than under competitive circumstances.120  
The second concern of the Commission was over the German balancing market.121 
E.ON TSO (the transmission system operator belonging to E.ON) may have purchased 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1, pp. 1-36).  In the decision, however, the Commission did not mention whether or not the volume of 
E.ON’s generation sold under fixed-price long-term contracts. Due to the lack of information, it can be 
argued that the Commission assumed that the most of electricity generated by E.ON was traded in the 
spot market, because in this situation the incentive and ability of E.ON to withdraw generation capacity 
would be in the highest level. As a result of the fact that under an Article 9 procedure the Commission 
does not have to support its concerns with economic-based evidence it did not underline the theory of a 
profitable capacity withdrawal. See M. Sadowska, ‘Energy Liberalisation in Antitrust Straitjacket: A Plant 
too Far? (2011)  Vol.34(3) World Competition: Law and Economics Review, p. 16  
117
 P. Chauve and others, ‘The E.ON Electricity Cases: An Antitrust Decision with Structural Remedies’ 
(2009) No.1 Competition Policy Newsletter, pp. 1-4 
118
 According to the Sector Inquiry, prices in the forward markets can be influenced by the volatility of spot 
prices in the future. Thus, undertakings with market power in the generation market may influence price 
changes in forward markets by withholding part of their generation capacity; this results in price volatility 
in the spot markets. Consequently, withholding generation capacity not only increases spot market prices 
but also raises forward market prices as a result of the increase in demand even though the forward 
market prices were much higher than the prices in the spot market before the withdrawal of the capacity. 
DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724, para. 376     
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 Commission, Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in 
Cases COMP/B-1/39.388 — German Electricity Wholesale Market and COMP/B-1/39.389 — German 
Electricity Balancing Market’   OJ C 146 
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 Commission Decision of 26 XI 2008 related to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market and 
COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing Market), para. 50-55  
121
 Balancing power services: As electricity cannot be stored, balancing mechanisms are indispensable to 
balance the difference between forecast and actual electricity demand and production. Therefore, there 
must be properly operating balancing services for the accurately functioning electricity markets. The 
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secondary balancing power instead of tertiary balancing power122 in favour of its own 
generation affiliate which was the main operator in the secondary balancing market. By 
doing so E.ON TSO had increased its own cost. Yet, it did not become worse off as it 
passed on the additional balancing costs to the final consumers.  Moreover, the 
Commission stated in the preliminary assessment that E.ON may have prevented the 
import of balancing energy by power producers from other Member States into the 
E.ON balancing area so as to reserve the German balancing area for German power 
producers. As a result, E.ON had discriminated against power producers from other 
Member States on the grounds of nationality.123 
a) The Commitments and Proportionality 
Pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, E.ON proposed to divest power plants and 
its transmission network in order to address the concerns of the Commission 
established in the preliminary assessment as well as to bring to a rapid close the 
potentially protracted competition cases.124   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
balancing mechanism is under the control of transmission system operators. They should constantly 
monitor networks and take balancing measures when necessary.  
122
 Secondary and tertiary balancing powers are part of separate product markets because of their 
technical specifications such as the different lead times with which they are called upon (within a few 
minutes for secondary reserves and within a quarter of an hour for tertiary reserves) as well as the 
technical requirements for their provision on the part of the power plants themselves. Yet, both types of 
reserves are called on by the transmission system operator for the purpose of balancing systems and the 
transmission system operator has some flexibility to order either of the two reserves in order to resolve 
some unbalances.  
123
 Commission Decision of 26 XI 2008 related to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market and 
COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing Market), para. 50-55 
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 Chauve and others, supra n 117, 1-4 
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E.ON divested:  
 Source of 
Generation 
Total Amount 
of Generation 
Capacity 
Amount of 
Divested  
Total 
Amount of 
Divested 
Capacity 
Base-load 
Generation 
hydro (run-over-
river           and 
pump-storage) 
985.7 MW 678,38 MW 2783,88 
MW 
 
nuclear 5263 MW 1501 MW 
lignite 1289 MW 604,5 MW 
High-cost 
Generation 
hard coal 3114 MW 1744,6 MW 2235,6 MW 
 gas fired 491 MW 491 MW 
oil fired unknown 0 MW Total: 
5019.48MW 
 
On the one hand, the Commission stated that the commitments suggested by E.ON 
were necessary and proportionate to remove E.ON’s incentive and ability to withdraw 
generation capacity, which stemmed from the structure of E.ON’s power plan 
portfolio.125 First, there were no behavioural remedies that would have been as effective 
as the divestment of generation capacity in that controlling E.ON’s bidding behaviour on 
an hourly basis for a large number of plants might have been demanding as well as 
more burdensome for E.ON than the structural solution.126 Second, as the concerns 
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 Commission Decision of 26 XI 2008 related to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market and 
COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing Market) 
126
 Possible behavioural remedies might have been to force E.ON to utilise long-term supply contracts in 
order to reduce E.ON’s incentive to withdraw generation capacity, as after making long-term supply 
contracts the profitability of withdrawing would be less, since there would not be enough electricity to 
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arose due to the very structure of E.ON’s generation capacity, i.e. E.ON’s large portfolio 
of power plants, there was a substantial risk of a lasting or repeated infringement.  
On the other hand, there are several studies that discuss whether the structural 
commitments imposed on E.ON were the most efficient and proportionate remedies to 
address the abuse of strategic capacity withdrawal.127 According to Sadowska, the 
commitments did not directly address the alleged strategy of unilateral capacity 
withdrawal, the risk of which the Commission wanted to eliminate in the first place.128 
Her work shows that the divestiture remedies did not significantly change the structure 
of the generation capacity in terms of the proportion of each technology and the sources 
used to generate electricity within the total generation portfolio of E.ON, although the 
Commission, while reasoning the case, attached the greatest importance to the size 
and structure of E.ON’s generation portfolio. It simply scaled the generation portfolio 
down in terms of figures.129 Nevertheless, even though the structure of the generation 
capacity was not actually changed, it was lessened, and the market was opened to 
other operators. As a result, the divestiture reduced E.ON’s incentive and ability to 
withdraw generation capacity, which was one of the objectives of the commitment 
proceedings, since the total withholding decreases as the number of generators 
increases.130   
The E.ON decision, given the economic literature, may also be criticised in terms of the 
divestiture of both base-load generation capacities, namely hydro, nuclear and lignite, 
and high-cost generation capacities, such as hard-coal, gas-fired and oil-fired. 
According to economic evaluations, the divestiture of solely high-cost generation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trade in spot markets. Yet, as stated in the preliminary assessment, long-term supply contracts were used 
so as to deter actual or potential competitors from entering the wholesale market.  
127
 Tapia, and Martzari, supra n 101, 460-471 
128
 Pre- and post-divestiture the percentage of hydro energy in electricity generation is 12%; the 
percentage of nuclear energy in electricity generation is 33%; the percentage of lignite coal energy in 
electricity generation is 5% (it was 3%); the percentage of hard coal energy in electricity generation is 
28% (it was 27%); the percentage of gas energy in electricity generation is 16% (it was 18%); the 
percentage of oil energy in electricity generation is 4% (it was 5%); and the percentage of other energy 
sources in electricity generation is 2%, for the total generation capacity of E.ON; Sadowska, supra n 116, 
460-471 
129
 Ibid 
130
 P.Hellstrom, F. Maire-Riguad, and F. W. Bulst, ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’ (2009) Vol.76 
Antitrust Law Journal 43, pp. 54-58 
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capacities could be more effective in decreasing the incentive of undertakings with a 
dominant position to abuse their power,131 and in reducing wholesale electricity 
prices.132 According to Federico and Lopez, the divestment of marginal plants, i.e. high-
cost generation plants, can reduce prices by seven times more than the divestment of 
base-load plants.133 Furthermore, targeted divestiture can reduce prices more 
significantly than a cross-the-board divestiture.134 The divestiture of high-cost 
generation capacities may reduce the generator’s incentive to use its assets 
strategically.135 The E.ON decision therefore does not entirely correspond with this 
economic assessment as the decision entails not only the divestiture of high-cost 
generation capacities but also the divestiture of base-load generation capacities. 
However, this does not mean that the structural remedies imposed in the E.ON decision 
were completely inappropriate to remove the concerns of the Commission. The 
commitments proposed by E.ON reduced the market power of E.ON, and thus the 
market concentration. In addition, the Commission claimed that the selection of verified 
power plants in terms of fuel and technology was necessary and proportionate to meet 
the concerns clarified in the preliminary assessment. It was also sufficient and 
appropriate to balance the power plant portfolio of other market operators, which should 
consist of plants along the entire merit curve, i.e. base-load plants and flexible plants.136  
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 According to the Sector Inquiry, withdrawing energy generation might be more profitable for a 
dominant undertaking if it has a wide portfolio of electricity generation. When the undertaking constrains 
electricity generation by limiting the capacity of base-load plants, it will fully cover its loss with the 
increase in price due to the high-cost generation capacities; DG Competition Report on Energy Sector 
Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724, para. 368-372; M. Arellano and P. Serra, ‘A Model of Market 
Power in Electricity Industries Subject to Peak Load Pricing’ (2007) Vol.35 Energy Policy 5130, p. 5134 
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 This is because the technology used for electricity generation has a significant impact on price 
formation. Since high-cost generation plants require relatively more expensive raw material for energy 
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base-load power plants; G. S. Crawford, J. Crespo, and H. Tauchen ‘Bidding Asymmetries in multi-unit 
auctions: Implications of Bid Function Equilibrium in the British Spot Market for Electricity’ (2007) Vol.25 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation 1233, p. 1258 
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 G. Federico and A. L. Lopez, ‘Selecting Effective Divestment in Electricity Generation Markets’ (2011) 
Vol.21 European Transections on Electrical Power 1914, p. 1921   
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 Commission Decision of 26 XI 2008 related to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market and 
COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing Market), para. 84 
167 
 
Besides, the decision indicates another aspect of commitment proceedings. It seems 
that, while making the decision, the Commission took into account the findings of the 
Sector Inquiry and imposed the disposal of base-load generation. The Sector Inquiry 
clarifies that, in the electricity generation markets, most of the newly-built generation 
capacities are based on gas-fired plants as well as wind and other renewable 
generation facilities.137 This analysis was supported in the E.ON decision by the 
Commission, which noted that only gas-fired capacity was added to the German 
electricity generation market by new entrants because the investment in base-load 
generation requires higher fixed cost and new entrants find it more attractive to invest in 
peak generation such as gas-fired plants (Chapter 2).138 Therefore, the E.ON’s 
competitors did actually have access to peak-load generation. As a result, in order to 
cover the divestiture of base-load generations in the decision, the Commission seemed 
to reason that the divested plants would help actual and potential competitors to access 
new plants and plants with technologies that they did not possess. This would allow 
them to have a more balanced portfolio and more capacity to exert competitive pressure 
on E.ON in the wholesale electricity market.139   
To sum up, the implementation of structural remedies by the Commission might not be 
completely irrelevant, since there was a substantial risk of a lasting and repeated 
infringement of competition law. Yet, the attitude of the Commission, such as its 
handling of the investigation as a tool to eliminate market deficiencies by imposing 
structural remedies, can be discussed on the grounds of whether a divestment of power 
plants representing a cross section of E.ON’s generation portfolio was the most suitable 
remedy for a strategic capacity withdrawal. Indeed, it seems that the set of 
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 DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry 10 January 2007 SEC(2006) 1724, para. 407 
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 Regarding the concerns over the balancing market, E.ON divested its Transmission System Business. 
The divestiture of the transmission network along with the system operation activity of E.ON was found 
sufficient and proportionate by the Commission, since its concerns stemmed from an inherent conflict of 
interest within E.ON as a vertically integrated electricity company controlling both transmission and 
production/supply of electricity.  Besides, a behavioural remedy managing E.ON’s purchasing behaviour 
would have been more burdensome, and furthermore, this remedy would not have prevented E.ON from 
engaging in discriminatory conduct against operators from other Member States who wanted to enter the 
German balancing market (Chapter 3). Commission Decision of 26 XI 2008 related to a proceeding under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity 
Wholesale Market and COMP/39.389 — German Electricity Balancing Market), para. 86-88  
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commitments proposed by E.ON was drafted as a result of negotiations between the 
Commission, which was pursuing the goal of energy liberalisation, and E.ON, which 
was considering its own strategic interests. Furthermore, the Commission’s choice 
between prohibition and commitment proceedings is questionable, due to the fact that 
its concerns over the anticompetitive conduct of E.ON were likely to raise novel 
questions under EU competition law, in particular regarding the complexity of electricity 
markets. By concluding the investigation through adversarial proceedings, the 
Commission could have carefully identified electricity markets, precisely clarified its 
concerns and supported them with economic-based evidences. This would have 
increased legal certainty as well as providing a precedent for other energy companies 
and also for national courts and/or competition authorities, specifically considering the 
similarities between the general structures of the national electricity markets within the 
EU. In addition, under a prohibition decision, the Commission could still have extracted 
the same structural remedies imposed on E.ON in the case had these remedies been 
found to be proportionate. With regard to this point, the main reasoning behind the 
application of a commitment procedure might be that the commitments proposed by 
E.ON may not have been imposed by the Commission under Article 7 of Regulation 
1/2003 considering the strict application of the principle of proportionality within this 
procedure.  
2. The CEZ Decision 
In the CEZ decision, the Commission considered that the conduct of CEZ, a state-
owned incumbent operator in the Czech electricity market, may have led to a substantial 
distortion in competition and resulted in the enhancement of CEZ’s dominant position. 
The suspected illegal conduct excluded potential competitors and raised prices in the 
Czech wholesale electricity market.140 
According to a preliminary assessment, during the relevant period, CEZ was most likely 
a dominant company in the market for the generation and wholesale supply of electricity 
with regard to three indicators, namely, the structure of the Czech wholesale electricity 
market, CEZ’s control over certain types of electricity generation, and finally, high 
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 Commission, ‘Antitrust: Commission confirms inspections in Czech electricity sector’ MEMO/09/518 
169 
 
barriers to entry.141 CEZ, in addition to electricity generation, was operating in several 
areas of the electricity and lignite sectors and enjoying access to the cheapest sources 
of generation such as nuclear and lignite. Given that all significant generation projects 
had been developed by CEZ, it remained difficult for new entrants to enter the electricity 
generation and wholesale supply markets. Furthermore, CEZ controlled the largest 
distribution system operator.    
The Commission, in the preliminary assessment, took the view that CEZ may have 
pursued a strategy to prevent new entry to the market for the generation and wholesale 
supply of electricity. As part of that strategy, CEZ may have made a potentially pre-
emptive reservation in an electricity transmission system by referring two alternative 
projects: lignite-fired or gas-fired power generation capacity. However, the reservation 
did not correspond to genuine generation projects.142 As a result, the Commission 
deemed that, due to the pre-emptive reservation of CEZ, its competitors could have 
been prevented from having access to the transmission network, which constituted an 
indispensable input, i.e. an essential facility for every large scale electricity generator.143 
In particular, CEZ may have prevented the entry of a competitor, which (i) was pursuing 
a competing project in lignite-fired capacity to be connected to the transmission network 
through a network substation144 at which CEZ had made its potentially pre-emptive 
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 In 2010, the market shares of the largest competitors of CEZ were [0-15] %; Commission Decisions of 
10/04/2013 addressed to CEZ,a.s. relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreements (AT/39727 – CEZ) C(2013) 
1997 final, para. 14-17 
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 Regarding the lignite-fired generation capacity, according to the preliminary assessment of the 
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the project. Concerning the gas alternative, the reservation was not backed by the project concerned, 
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1997 final, para. 32    
143
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generation project to a specific network substation linked to the transmission network, because there was 
not sufficient capacity at that substation in view of the previous reservation made by CEZ; Commission 
Decisions of 10/04/2013 addressed to CEZ,a.s. relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreements (AT/39727 – CEZ) 
C(2013) 1997 final, para. 33 
144
 For the transmission of electricity generated by large-scale power plants, the electricity must be 
injected into the transmission system, and this injection must be done through a specific connection point, 
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reservation, and (ii) presumably could have, in the long run, developed a wider portfolio 
of generation units. 
Consequently, the Commission took the preliminary view that CEZ had prevented, or at 
the very least considerably delayed, the entry of a new competitor into the market by 
making a potentially pre-emptive reservation in the electricity transmission network with 
the aim of depriving other undertakings of the means of competing and, ultimately, of 
preventing them from entering the market. 
a) The Commitments and Proportionality 
CEZ undertook to divest one of the following generation assets in the Czech Republic to 
a suitable buyer, subject to approval by the Commission: 
- Pocerady lignite-fired power plant (1 000 MW); or  
- Chvaletice lignite-fired power plant (800 MW); or  
- Detmarovice coal-fired power plant (800 MW), or 
- Melnik III lignite-fired power plant (500 MW) and Tisova lignite-fired power plants 
(Tisova I — 184 MW and Tisova II — 112 MW); both power plants (Melnik III and 
Tisova) can be sold separately. 
CEZ agreed not to acquire direct or indirect influence over the divested generation asset 
for a period of 10 years.145 
The observations received in response to the market test notice of the Commission, 
pursuant to an Article 9 procedure, raised some doubts as to the suitability of the 
Detmarovice power plant to meet the identified competition concerns. As regards the 
results of the market test, CEZ removed the Detmarovice power plant from the list of 
proposed commitments. Other than that, the market test confirmed that the structural 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a so-called network substation. In other words, the connection point of the power plant and the 
transmission network is this network substation. 
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commitments voluntarily offered by CEZ were sufficient to address the concerns of the 
Commission without imposing disproportionate conditions on either CEZ or third parties. 
The commitments in their final form satisfied the Commission. The transfer of some of 
CEZ's generation capacity to a competitor represented a proportionate and clear-cut 
solution. The divestiture of some generation capacity was necessary in this case, as no 
other type of remedy could have effectively addressed the effects of CEZ's conduct. 
Acquiring any of these assets could allow the buyer to establish itself in the Czech 
market for the generation and wholesale supply of electricity. The new entrant could 
then gradually develop a wider portfolio of generation assets and compete effectively 
with CEZ.  
The former Commission Vice-President responsible for competition policy, Joaquin 
Almunia, claimed that ‘More competition leads to lower prices. The divestiture of 
significant generation capacity will allow a new player to enter the Czech electricity 
market and to compete with the incumbent CEZ. This will benefit for all electricity 
customers’.146 
In order to assess the necessity and sufficiency of the commitments implemented by the 
Commission it is crucial to look deeply at the structure of the Czech electricity market. 
The market is composed of electricity producers, a transmission system operator, 
distribution system operators, a market operator, electricity traders and customers.147 
From an energy regulation point of view, the amendment to the Energy Act, through 
which the Czech Republic have implemented Directive 2009/72/EC, contains important 
provisions on full ownership unbundling.148 In theory, CEPS, a transmission system 
operator for the sole electricity transmission grid in the Czech Republic, has been fully 
unbundled from electrical energy producers and distributers since September 2009, as 
confirmed by the national regulatory authority of Czech Republic, the Energy Regulation 
Office. However, in reality, the application of full ownership unbundling has not been 
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completed properly since both CEPS and CEZ are controlled by the State but by 
different ministries.149 Even though the companies are managed by different ministries it 
is hard to guarantee no connection between them while giving decisions over their 
commercial activities. Therefore, the divestiture of certain generation assets of CEZ 
may promote ownership unbundling.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to state that the imposition of structural commitments would 
be sufficient to entirely eliminate the concern of the Commission, which was inefficient 
allocation of transmission capacity in the Czech Republic in the first place, as CEPS still 
has the incentive and ability to make preferential network reservations in favour of CEZ 
(Chapter 3).150 The main problem seems to result from the remaining market 
deficiencies. In this sense, there are two other possible ways in which this problem 
could have been handled: a prohibition procedure under EU competition law; or the 
Commission could have started an infringement proceeding against the Czech Republic 
under Article 258 TFEU (Chapter 3). With regard to the former, the Commission could 
have addressed the problem more effectively by properly defining anticompetitive 
conduct and imposing a different set of commitments, such as use-it-or-lose-it, along 
with the divestiture of generation assets in order to improve a secondary market where 
network capacity that was unused by CEZ could be allocated to another market player. 
However, apparently, the Commission found it more appropriate to bind CEZ to solely 
structural commitments more appropriate, due to the possible procedural burden of a 
prohibition decision. On the other hand, the Commission would have preferred to follow 
an infringement proceeding under Article 258 TFEU rather than an antitrust proceeding 
in order to completely eliminate the market failure. Under this alternative option, the 
Czech Republic could have been forced by the Court of Justice to properly implement 
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vertical unbundling, which might have prevented CEPS from engaging in 
anticompetitive network reservation. 
To sum up, the CEZ decision of the Commission can be seen as another attempt to 
remove regulatory failure by enforcing EU competition law. Besides, regarding the aims 
of the Commission in the energy markets, such as to adjust the future behaviour of 
dominant undertakings commitment decisions might be found by the Commission to be 
more appropriate then prohibition proceedings, as in these markets the speed of the 
enforcement might be significant for the effectiveness of the commitment.  
3. The RWE Decision 
As mentioned before, RWE is a vertically integrated gas company, with activities in the 
production and import of gas; it holds a dominant position in the German gas 
transmission markets within its network area. In the preliminary assessment, the 
Commission suspected that RWE, in the gas transmission, storage and downstream 
gas distribution businesses, may have abused its dominant position by means of refusal 
to supply and margin squeeze.151  
According to the preliminary assessment of the Commission, RWE TSO (the 
transmission system operator owned by RWE) may have refused access to its network 
by various means related to RWE TSO’s capacity management. The Commission 
deemed that RWE may have understated the capacity technically available to third 
parties. In fact, it was found that on many bottleneck points RWE actually used 
significantly more capacity than indicated by RWE TSO as being the maximum 
technical capacity. This understatement clearly led to unjustified refusals and deterring 
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transport customers from requesting transport capacities. The significant difference 
between the capacity indicated and that actually used also pointed to a strategy aimed 
at keeping the transport capacities in favour of its own affiliate for a long period of time 
as well as foreclosing potential third transport customers. Furthermore, the 
Commission’s investigations showed that the transmission requests of RWE’s 
competitors were regularly and systematically rejected and that the reason given was 
scarce transmission capacity.152  
These facts may demonstrate that there was neither a functional third party access 
system nor an effective congestion management system, which could actually have 
avoided many of the refused and delayed capacity requests, which harmed third party 
transport customers and ultimately consumers. The Commission therefore claimed that 
RWE TSO’s intention may have been to protect RWE from new competitors in the retail 
market rather than to attract new transport customers. Third party shippers were, as a 
result of this intention, only granted a fraction of the transport capacity on RWE’s 
transmission grid in order to prevent them from competing in an effective manner in the 
downstream supply markets.153 
Regarding the second concern of the Commission, margin squeeze, the preliminary 
assessment stated that RWE may have intentionally set its transmission tariffs at an 
artificially high level in order to squeeze its competitors’ margins in the downstream gas 
supply markets.154 According to the Commission, there was evidence that the network 
tariffs were creating asymmetric cost effects to the detriment of downstream competitors 
of RWE. The preliminary assessment illustrated that certain types of clauses covered by 
network tariffs, which were elevating the costs of the tariffs, were only applied to third 
party users. Moreover, RWE TSO’s rebates increased the existing cost disadvantages 
for RWE’s competitors in the downstream supply markets, as these rebates were only 
granted to RWE due to the long-term transmission contracts, although they were 
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technically available for all market operators.155 The preliminary assessment also raised 
concerns over the balancing system, which posed a negative impact on new entrants 
through high penalty fees and through high balancing costs, which were not paid by 
RWE due to an agreement signed between RWE TSO and RWE. These kinds of cost 
asymmetries prevented market operators from effectively competing with RWE in the 
downstream market.156             
a) The Commitments and Proportionality 
RWE agreed to divest its transmission system business including the entire current 
German high-pressure gas transmission network with a total length of approximately 
4000 km. According to the Commission’s decision, the commitments suggested by 
RWE were suitable to remove the Commission’s concerns over competition. The 
disposal of RWE’s transmission business would guarantee that RWE’s control over the 
transmission network would be removed thereby preventing the company from 
engaging in similar anticompetitive practices relating to the access to its network in the 
future. These structural remedies were also necessary, since there was no behavioural 
remedy that would be as effective as the divestiture, which could be easily monitored 
and administered without generating more costs for RWE.157   
Furthermore, the Commission deemed that, without a structural remedy, the incentives 
to further engage in such behaviour would not have been removed effectively, because 
the anticompetitive unilateral behaviour of RWE, on a lasting and repeating basis, 
stemmed from an inherent conflict of interest within RWE as a vertically integrated gas 
company, i.e. from the very structure of the undertaking (Chapter 3).158 Pursuant to the 
findings in Chapter 3, it can be stated that the structural remedies imposed on RWE 
seem to align with the Sector Inquiry as well as with the economic literature on vertical 
unbundling in the energy markets. Accordingly, full ownership unbundling is accepted 
as the best regulatory option to prevent a network firm from engaging in certain 
anticompetitive behaviours in favour of its affiliated supply company, as ownership 
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unbundling splits the interests of the network operator and the companies that are 
active in competitive parts of the industry.159 Generally speaking, although full 
ownership unbundling may pose some disadvantages such as the generation of double 
marginalisation and transaction costs it facilitates the creation of a level playing field by 
reducing cross-subsidisation and other distorting behaviours of network companies. 
Besides, it is clear that the negotiations between the Commission and RWE resulted in 
a set of commitments that can dispel the shortcomings of the gas markets pointed out 
within an OECD Report.160 The Report describes the conditions of the German energy 
markets within the time period in which the investigation was carried out by the 
Commission. According to the report, Germany implemented the EU unbundling 
requirements by choosing the weakest form of separation between network business 
and competitive services. While the EU required at least a legal unbundling under the 
second regulatory package, in Germany there was no operational and informational 
unbundling, as legal and accounting unbundling was progressing slowly. Whereas only 
a small number of transmission system operators had their own staff, strategic functions 
and a large part of operative services remained with the holding company. Apparently, 
such unbundling was not sufficient to eliminate the incentive and ability of the holding 
company to influence the network operator and obtain information that was close to 
other market players. In addition, only a few network operators were geographically 
separated from other affiliate companies or aimed at developing their own trademark. 
Also, the electronic information system containing integrated information on both the 
network and distribution was shared by two thirds of the legally unbundled 
companies.161 As a result, the report shows that the network operator that was owned 
and operated by the vertically integrated company could favour its affiliates. It could also 
discriminate against independent network users by asking overly high prices and 
imposing penalty charges. 
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Overall, it seems that, through commitment-based enforcement, the Commission not 
only brought E.ON’s alleged anticompetitive behaviour to an end but also prevented it 
from engaging in similar conduct in the future. It also eliminated the shortcomings of the 
domestic regulatory provisions through structural commitments.  
4. The ENI Decision 
As previously mentioned, ENI was an integrated state-owned gas company, with 
activities in the production and import of gas, the gas transmission and storage 
businesses, and the downstream gas distribution business. By the time the Commission 
issued its Statement of Objections, ENI solely or jointly controlled and held significant 
transmission rights for all of the existing gas importation infrastructure.162 With regard to 
the corporate structure of the pipelines at stake and the shareholding agreements, the 
Commission considered that ENI had the necessary information and the power to 
decide on the allocation of capacity on a short- and long-term basis as well as to carry 
out capacity enhancements. Moreover, ENI held a strong market position in the gas 
supply markets due to a significant portfolio of long-term gas import contracts. ENI’s 
market position was further strengthened by existing bottlenecks in the capacity 
combined with the difficulty of access to storage for its competitors. As a consequence, 
the Commission concluded that ENI held a dominant position both in the gas 
transmission market towards Italy and in the wholesale supply market as a whole.163  
The Commission had concerns over three different behaviours conducted by ENI 
related to its dominant position, and its power to control the use and enhancement of 
infrastructures. These behaviours were capacity hoarding, capacity degradation and 
strategically limited investment. In terms of capacity hoarding, the Commission found 
that ENI may have systematically reduced access to the gas transport infrastructure to 
third party traders by understating the capacity that was actually technically available. In 
addition, the Statement of Objections showed that ENI had carefully maintained direct 
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control over import capacity into Italy over time, and had secured primary capacity rights 
as a result of long-term capacity bookings on its infrastructure. With regard to capacity 
degradation, the capacity allocation had been designed in a way that reduced the value 
of capacity for ENI’s competitors by fragmenting the capacity, which had resulted in 
separate and uncoordinated capacity sales on complementary pipelines. The lack of 
coordination may have discouraged or prevented shippers from obtaining capacity.164  
The Commission also indicated that ENI may have strategically underinvested in its 
transport capacity in order to keep gas supply tight, although this was not profitable for 
ENI, as an operator of transport pipelines, due to the significant and credible long-term 
capacity demand from third party shippers on the pipelines. The limitation of 
investments was therefore meant to protect ENI’s own downstream profits to the 
detriment of profit on the transportation level in order to maximise its overall profits. In 
the decision, the Commission concluded that, in order to prevent competition and lower 
prices in the downstream markets through limiting third party access to transport 
capacity, ENI may have embarked upon a strategy of deliberately avoiding capacity 
expansion.165   
a) The Commitments and Proportionality  
Following the settlement proceedings under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, the 
Commission concluded the investigation by rendering several commitments suggested 
by ENI binding upon the incumbent. ENI committed to divesting its stakes in the 
transmission system operators of the pipelines TENP (the gas transmission system 
business in Germany), Transitgas (the gas transmission system business in 
Switzerland), and TAG (the gas transmission system business in Austria). With respect 
to TAG, ENI suggested that the stakes in TAG could be purchased by a public entity 
that was either directly or indirectly controlled by the Italian Government - which was 
likely to be Cassa Depositi Prestiti Spa (hereafter CDP).166 
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The Commission claimed in its decision that these commitments were necessary and 
sufficient to address the concerns directly related to the management of capacity on the 
import infrastructures. ENI would no longer be subject to the inherent conflict that it 
faced operating both as a transmission system operator and as a vertically integrated 
company, which gave ENI an incentive to engage in a profitable strategy to foreclose 
rivals in order to protect its margin in the downstream markets. Thus, in the future, ENI 
would not need to continue its anticompetitive conduct, for example refusing to grant 
access to these infrastructures, granting access in a less attractive manner, or limiting 
investment in new capacity to transport gas into Italy. Because of the structural basis of 
the anticompetitive conduct, the Commission argued that, in the absence of structural 
remedies, the incentive for ENI to further adopt the alleged anticompetitive behaviour 
would not have been removed. Decisions, with respect to both the day-to-day 
management of the gas transmission system and to investing in transport capacity 
should be taken not only independently by the transmission system operator, but also 
having regard for the commercial interests of the transmission system operator alone 
and not of any particular gas suppliers. Only by this means it is possible to remove the 
link between the decision on the transmission system operator level and the interests of 
downstream profitability.167 
In addition, according to the Commission, no behavioural remedies would have been as 
effective as the divestiture, as ENI’s repeated and long-lasting anticompetitive conduct 
derived from the structure of the undertaking. Moreover, the Commission supported the 
inadequacy of behavioural remedies by stating that, although monitoring the TSO’s 
behaviour had already formed an internal part of the regulatory framework, ENI could 
not be prevented from engaging in anticompetitive conduct. Thus, the divestiture was a 
clear-cut solution to the identified competition concerns.168     
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The ENI decision demonstrates two important points related to commitment-based 
enforcement. First, the status of ENI as a state-owned undertaking raises the question 
of what role the Italian Government played in the commitment proceeding between the 
Commission and ENI. On the one hand, the decision indicates that the Commission 
could have used its public power through antitrust settlement vis-à-vis undertakings, 
and perhaps Member States, in order to achieve the creation of a fully unbundled 
market structure in the European energy markets. On the other hand, the settlement 
procedure illustrates that a political power of a Member State can be used against the 
Commission, with the consideration of the divestiture of the ownership of the TAG 
pipeline to another state-owned company. Although it was quite clear that this structural 
commitment could not precisely address the concern of the Commission, it was satisfied 
with the idea of selling the stake to a state-owned entity, namely CDP, because the 
latter was independent of and unconnected to ENI. Also, the CDP had its own financial 
resources, competencies and incentives to develop the divested business as a viable 
and reliable entity.169 Therefore, the Commission seemed to be obstructed by the 
political intervention of the Italian Government while trying to eliminate regulatory 
deficiencies in Italy through antitrust enforcement. 
Second, similarly to the RWE decision, the set of structural commitments proposed by 
ENI seems to comply with the economic analyses and the findings of the Sector Inquiry 
on vertical de-integration (Chapter 3). However, despite the compliance of the proposed 
commitments with the economic assessment, the idea of using commitment-based 
enforcement to overcome certain regulatory failures in the Italian and German energy 
market could be rather harmful for the creation of a single and competitive energy 
market in Europe, since an environment with legal uncertainty or with the expectation of 
possible intervention by the Commission is not ideal for firms that are willing to enter the 
market or make an investment.170  
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5. The SvK Decision 
The SvK decision is a very interesting decision in terms of showing that full ownership 
unbundling might not be the most appropriate solution for efficient and effective 
utilisation of the capacity of cross-border interconnectors as well as market integration 
in the EU, an argument which contrasts with the discussion covered within the Chapter 
3. In 2009, the Commission decided to open formal proceedings against SvK regarding 
its possible anticompetitive behaviour in the Swedish electricity transmission market. 
(SvK is a state-owned administrative authority whose duty is to maintain, operate and 
develop the national transmission grid for electricity including all of the state-owned 
interconnectors with neighbouring countries.) According to the preliminary assessment, 
SvK has a monopoly in the Swedish electricity transmission market, as it has been 
granted an exclusive concession to operate the Swedish electricity transmission 
network.171    
The Commission initiated an antitrust investigation against SvK pursuant to a complaint 
by Dansk Energy (DaE), a commercial and professional organisation of Danish energy 
companies operating in Denmark, regarding the behaviour of SvK. According to the 
claim by DaE, SvK was limiting the transmission capacity of the Öresun interconnector 
between southern Sweden and eastern Denmark.172 By doing so, SvK had caused 
economic losses to Danish consumers, because, due to the export limitation from 
Sweden to Denmark, Denmark had to use more expensive thermal power plants to 
meet the electricity demand in Denmark.  DaE also claimed that SvK’s behaviour was 
detrimental to competition and trade within the single market, and thereby violated EU 
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competition law. Although the complaint was only about the Öresun interconnector, the 
Commission enlarged the scope of investigation to include the interconnectors on all of 
Sweden’s borders.   
In the preliminary assessment, the Commission identified its concerns as follows. It 
stated that SvK may have abused its dominant position by limiting the transmission 
capacity on the interconnectors between Sweden and its neighbours in order to reduce 
congestion in the internal transmission networks within Sweden; in other words, in order 
to shift congestion from the internal bottlenecks to the interconnectors (so-called 
congestion shifting).173 In order to achieve this aim, SvK may have artificially segmented 
the electricity market by treating requests for transmission for the purpose of 
consumption within Sweden differently from requests for transmission for the purpose of 
export. As a result, internal demand was satisfied whenever the network capacity was 
available whereas external demand was refused despite the availability of transmission 
networks.174 In this regard, SvK discriminated against third party network users who 
were willing to have an access to the interconnector in order to export electricity. Thus, 
the Commission considered this practice as an infringement of one of the fundamental 
principles of EU law, which is the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality. 
SvK defended itself by stating that it had adopted congestion shifting as a congestion 
management model rather than counter-trading175 or market splitting176 on the basis of 
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objective justifications such as economic efficiency considerations as well as the 
legitimate public interest.177 With the consideration of economic efficiency, SvK claimed 
that it had shifted congestion and that it preferred not to counter-trade because the cost 
of counter-trading was financed solely by Swedish grid users through the transmission 
tariffs. Although SvK offered several times to share the cost of counter-trading with the 
Danish transmission system operator these offers were declined.178 As a result, SvK 
shifted the congestion within the internal transmission network since counter-trading 
was not economically efficient for Sweden. Market splitting was not an economically 
efficient option as it would have been harmful for competition in the electricity markets 
through decreasing the number of market players in each bidding zone as well as for a 
common social-economic policy of Sweden by creating different final prices for 
electricity. Therefore, regarding the legitimate public interest, SvK argued that 
maintaining a common electricity market with a common price was an advantage for 
Sweden.179 There were genuine concerns that dividing the market into sub areas would 
have a negative effect on Sweden, as it would generate insufficient liquidity and a lack 
of competition in the wholesale and retail markets.180 It seems that having one price 
within Sweden has always been a part of the wider social-economic policy. In this 
sense, supply of electricity at a uniform price within Sweden might be considered as a 
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public economic interest.181 However, the Commission did not take the argumentations 
of SvK into consideration. It only mentioned in the decision that SvK did not provide 
sufficient evidence to objectively justify its conduct.      
The Commission, in the preliminary assessment, listed a number of severe effects of 
the practice of SvK on competition as well as on consumers. First, there was an 
immediate price effect, as more expensive resources had to be used in place of the 
energy not delivered from Sweden. In addition, consumers in Sweden were protected 
from higher prices, because the capacity limitation kept more of the relatively cheap 
electricity inside the country. Second, the long-term efficiency of the market was 
distorted by changing the incentives of the market players to build new transmission 
lines in order to eliminate bottlenecks as the congestion problems within Sweden 
became less obvious. Electricity producers’ incentives to develop generation plants in 
high-demand areas were also reduced as prices in those areas were lower than they 
would have been without any curtailment.182    
a) The Commitments and Proportionality 
In order to eliminate the concerns of the Commission SvK proposed to subdivide the 
Swedish transmission system into two or more price areas (bidding zones or price 
zones). In other words, it was proposed that the Swedish electricity market would be 
split into smaller markets (so-called market splitting). In each price zone, consumers 
and generators would submit day-ahead bids indicating what they want to consume or 
produce in this bidding zone. The capacity on the links between bidding zones would be 
fully available to the market. Even if congestion were to occur on the line between the 
two zones, a market-clearing mechanism183 would automatically adjust the amount of 
supply and demand cleared in each zone and set different prices so that the amount of 
electricity transmitted between the zones would be equal to the transmission 
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capacity.184 The market-clearing mechanism would thus eliminate the congestion. As a 
consequence, SvK would no longer need to curtail capacity on the interconnectors to 
other countries or any other line. In situations where internal congestion occurs within a 
price area, SvK also offered not to reduce the capacity on the interconnector, but to 
carry out counter-trading with these zones to relieve the congestion.185 In addition, as 
an interim remedy, SvK agreed that until market splitting was completed, it would 
reduce the transmission flow on internal bottlenecks preliminarily by counter-trading, 
and not by shifting it to the national borders.186    
According to the Commission, the principle of proportionality was satisfied in the case, 
as the commitments were sufficient to address the Commission’s concerns. Due to the 
introduction of two or more bidding zones into the Swedish transmission system, SvK 
would no longer need to curtail interconnector capacity on the Swedish border in order 
to relieve congestion in the internal transmission networks. The Commission also 
addressed the comments of respondents delivered to the Commission after the market 
test, and concluded that the commitments did not create any disproportionate 
disadvantages for SvK or third parties.187  
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Although the Commission seemed to be sure about the proportionality of these 
commitments, in order to scrutinise their appropriateness it seems necessary to 
examine them from an economic perspective as an economic analysis may provide 
precise information regarding the necessity and sufficiency of the commitments. 
According to Sadowska, the proportionality of commitments depends on whether the 
main objective of the Commission is economic efficiency or market integration.188 If the 
main goal of the Commission were to ensure economic efficiency in the Swedish 
electricity market, the most efficient method for congestion management would have 
been a combination of congestion shifting and counter-trading rather than market 
splitting. In this way, there would have been less of a burden for SvK as there would 
have been no implementation costs, and a single electricity price policy would have 
remained in Sweden. Also, this would have been equally effective to meet the 
Commission’s concerns regarding inefficient congestion management.  
However, apparently the main aim of the Commission was market integration. In this 
sense, market splitting may have been found to be more efficient, as there would be no 
capacity restriction on interconnectors, which may facilitate competition. Yet, still, the 
proportionality of the commitments seems problematic. This is because, although 
market splitting may result in an efficient allocation of transmission capacity, this would 
not exactly address the anticompetitive concerns regarding SvK’s abuse. SvK could still 
manipulate the declared cross-border capacities in order to keep prices at the same 
level within Sweden. Indeed, despite market splitting, it could still shift congestion for 
purely strategic reasons such as to achieve price uniformity. Therefore, market splitting 
alone, without a monitoring system, would not be sufficient to address the Commission’s 
concerns. This means that the Commission might have breached the principle of 
proportionality, in the sense that the accepted commitments might not address the 
concerns set out in its preliminary assessment. 
The proportionality of the commitments can also be assessed from a legal point of view. 
Under the existing ex-ante regulatory rules in force SvK could not be forced to introduce 
market splitting, as transmission system operators specify the congestion management 
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method, including congestion shifting, to relieve internal congestion.189 However, the 
implementation of congestion shifting is bound to certain conditions by the congestion 
management guideline annexed to Regulation 714/2009, as congestion shifting might 
be detrimental to competition, international trade and market integration.190 According to 
the annexed guideline, transmission system operators are allowed to shift congestion 
when needed and justify it on grounds of (i) operational security, (ii) cost-effectiveness, 
and (iii) the minimisation of negative impacts on the internal electricity market. 
Therefore, SvK could have shifted its internal congestion on the basis of cost-
effectiveness since congestion shifting not only increases economic welfare as it keeps 
relatively cheap electricity inside the national market, it also promotes cost-effectiveness 
for the network operator, as the network operator does not have to meet the cost arising 
from counter-trading.191 On the other hand, the annexed guideline explicitly states that 
congestion shifting can be used as a short-term solution until more efficient long-term 
solution is adapted. In this sense, it is remarkable to note that the implementation of 
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congestion shifting would be difficult to justify in an instance where other kinds of 
methods such as market splitting are considered as a long-term solution to internal 
congestion.     
As a result, it can be stated that SvK seems to have proposed a set of commitments 
which go slightly beyond what the Commission could have achieved through EU 
secondary law, because, first, the ex-ante regulatory rules in force do not entirely forbid 
transmission system operators from shifting internal congestion to the borders, even 
though the implementation of congestion shifting is limited with certain conditions, and 
should be kept short. Second, EU secondary law could only promote efficient 
management of internal congestion, without imposing a particular method on 
transmission system operators. If transmission system operators restrict the capacity of 
interconnectors so as to relieve internal congestion, the ex-ante regulatory rules could 
only require them to develop an alternative method which would not harm electricity flow 
through cross-border lines. Nevertheless, this alternative method and its introduction 
date would be chosen by the transmission system operators.192 Consequently, in the 
SvK decision, the Commission actually pushed through market splitting into Sweden on 
the basis of commitment-based enforcement.   
This decision demonstrates several significant points in terms of energy regulation. 
First, unlike other decisions examined within this chapter, in the SvK decision, the 
transmission system operator is a fully unbundled network company. This implies that 
even full ownership unbundling may not eliminate all barriers to market integration 
(Chapter 3). Therefore, in order to promote the objective of a single energy market, 
perhaps there should be a monitoring mechanism to supervise the behaviour of network 
companies. Second, SvK seems to pursue certain practices for the socioeconomic 
public interest such as, without an extra counter-trading cost, maintaining a uniform 
price within the Swedish electricity market regardless of any profit maximisation 
objective. However, apparently the Commission did not consider the existence of public 
interest and cost efficiency as objective justifications. Instead, it pursued and favoured 
the aim of market integration in the EU. Third, the decision shows that commitment-
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based enforcement can be a suitable tool to eliminate internal market problems when 
these problems are not solved or handled by Member States in a way that harms the 
objective of the EU to create a single integrated energy market. In this regard, the 
decision sends a signal to all network operators within the Member States to consider 
the sake of the common market objective of the EU when solving their internal 
congestion problems.193  
Having analysed the cases handled by the Commission on the basis of Article 9 of 
Regulation 1/2009, the chapter will attempt to provide a proposal for more efficient and 
sustainable use of commitment proceedings by taking into account the previous 
observations of the Chapter regarding the commitment-based enforcement policy of the 
EU.     
IV. More Efficient and Sustainable Use of Commitment Proceedings: Is It 
Possible? 
Antitrust settlements under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 no doubt result in procedural 
economy. However, this procedural economy must be weighed against the value of 
deterrence and legal certainty in order to obtain a balance between administrative 
efficiency and a clear precedent.194 An attempt to create this balance might be the first 
step towards more efficient and sustainable use of commitment proceedings and it can 
be achieved with a more comprehensive guideline that provides further clarification and 
additional measures on the basis of substantive and procedural law.  
As mentioned above, within the Competition Policy Brief, the Commission points out 
that a prohibition proceeding should be followed if it is significant to set a legal 
precedent that clarifies the theory of harm more exhaustively and gives more guidance 
to market players and national authorities. The Commission however may wish to take a 
further step so as to increase legal certainty and predictability for other market players, 
in particular for potential entrants and investors in the energy markets, by elaborating on 
the relevant factors used to choose the proceedings. The Commission may indicate 
that, even though the theory of harm rests on well-established case law, commitment 
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proceedings might not be appropriate in a situation where the deterrence effect of an 
antitrust enforcement is important to prevent other market players from engaging in 
similar anticompetitive conduct. For instance, sending deterrence signals to other 
market participants through prohibition decisions can be crucial in the energy markets, 
given that most of the market operators are former state-owned vertically integrated 
monopolies, which are most likely to abuse their dominant positions in both upstream 
and downstream markets through similar anticompetitive behaviours. 
The Commission may also consider providing additional measures in order to facilitate 
the proportionality between commitments and its concerns. This might be achieved, 
first, by increasing the knowledge of the undertakings concerned regarding the subject 
matter through providing a clear identification of the antitrust violation. Unclear 
information over possible infringements implies that no guidance is provided to 
companies so that they can appraise the appropriateness of the commitments they 
offer.195 The undertakings under investigations should thus be fully and properly 
informed about the Commission’s concerns.196 In addition, in order to prevent far-
reaching commitments the parties should be reminded of their procedural rights such as 
the right to access to the file, and also, that structural remedies can be imposed as long 
as there are no more efficient and less burdensome behavioural remedies. This could 
help to reduce the incentives to utilise commitment to enhance market regulations 
instead of to bring competition problems to an end.     
Second, the proportionality of commitments could be improved by increasing the 
transparency of commitment procedures not only for the parties under investigation but 
also for the business community, thereby safeguarding commitment-based antitrust 
enforcement from any political interference.197 Transparency within the context of 
commitment proceedings could be cultivated by giving more detailed rights to 
complainants (and to interested third parties only if the commitments imposed have a 
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significant impact on them).198 For instance, under prohibition proceedings complainants 
(and even sometimes interested third parties) can be heard and provided with a non-
confidential version of the Statement of Objections, whereas complainants do not have 
such a formal right under the Article 9 procedures.199 They can only make their view 
known during the Market Test stage on the basis of a brief summary of the case.200 
Although in practice the Commission may consult with complainants in order to assess 
the suitability of the commitments, a formal consultation mechanism, or providing 
complainants with the right to be heard, would be more helpful in evaluating the 
proportionality of the commitments imposed.201   
In addition to all of these, the scope of judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions might 
be extended beyond a manifest error standard, and a new approach similar to that 
developed under merger appeals might be adapted.202 Even though the Commission 
has wide discretion within Article 9 proceedings, the European Courts should be able to 
review commitment decisions in such a way that they can scrutinise ‘…whether that 
[existing] evidence [the Commission] relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent [and] also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be 
taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it’.203 The European Courts should also pay 
more attention to the appraisal of whether the commitments imposed are capable of 
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addressing the concerns of the Commission drafted within the preliminary assessment, 
given that in some energy settlements it has been argued that the commitments 
imposed have failed to properly deal with the Commission’s concerns. In this way, not 
only the proportionality but also the effectiveness of proceedings under Article 9 might 
be promoted.   
The judicial review of Article 9 decisions on the other hand should be limited to the 
Commission’s economic assessment, i.e. it should not be substituted by that of the 
General Court. The European Courts should not go beyond the Commission’s 
methodological choices while analysing the case.204 They should not engage in an 
attempt to examine the appropriateness of commitments based on new economic 
evidence or on their own analytical methodologies.205 Yet, the plausibility and 
persuasiveness of the Commission’s theories should be fully monitored regarding the 
factual evidence that it provides.206  
A legal framework clarifying the competence of the Commission in deciding which route 
to follow for antitrust enforcement and promoting the proportionality of commitments and 
also a new approach extending the limit of judicial scrutiny could bring more efficient 
and sustainable use of commitment proceedings. Such a novelty, while retaining the 
main advantages gained from commitment decisions such as the swift and efficient 
resolution of competition concerns, could reduce the risk of misuse of antitrust 
settlements by the Commission with the purpose of achieving its sector-specific 
regulatory goals. This may also increase legal certainty.               
V. Conclusion 
With the modernisation of EU competition law the Commission has been provided with 
the discretion to choose between prohibition and commitment proceedings as devices 
for antitrust enforcement. Although initially the Article 9 procedure was introduced as an 
alternative mechanism for case disposition where investigations might otherwise result 
in a prohibition, it has become one of the bases of antitrust enforcement in the EU since 
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2004. However, the application of commitment proceedings, as well as bringing some 
advantages for the Commission, the parties concerned and national authorities, also 
gives rise to some problems. This chapter thus attempted to display the possible 
efficiencies, such as a fast and more economical solution to competition problems, and 
the deficiencies, such as legal uncertainty, a lack of proportionality and the risk of 
political interference, of commitment decisions.  
Moreover, given the importance of commitment decisions in the energy markets, the 
chapter focused on the energy decisions of the Commission, which included 
structural/behavioural commitments imposed under the Article 9 procedure, namely the 
E.ON, CEZ, RWE, ENI and SvK decisions. These five decisions show that, under 
commitment proceedings, the commitments imposed on the undertakings concerned 
may go beyond what is necessary and sufficient and fail to address the concerns of the 
Commission. As a result, the chapter pointed out two important observations: first, 
under the Article 9 procedure, a lack of proportionality between the commitments and 
the alleged infringements is very likely by virtue of the characteristics of the 
proceedings. Second, this possibility increases instances of abusive use of commitment 
decisions so as to eliminate regulatory failure, thereby facilitating legal uncertainty and 
political intervention in the energy markets. 
To remove the deficiencies that stem from commitment-based enforcement the chapter 
proposed that it might be helpful to provide for market operators and national authorities 
a legal framework, for example a guideline. In this regard, the chapter argued that this 
hypothetical guideline might specifically clarify the circumstances under which the 
Commission prefers to follow commitment proceedings. For instance, the Commission 
might be required to pursue prohibition proceedings if there is a need for a deterrence 
effect of an antitrust enforcement for other market players. 
Moreover, the chapter suggested that more detailed mechanisms that enhance the 
proportionality of commitment as well as the transparency of producers could be 
provided. For example, the principle of proportionality could be facilitated by granting 
more information to the undertakings concerned regarding the subject matter of 
investigations. In addition, the transparency of the procedure could be improved by 
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increasing the participation of complainants in commitment proceedings. Furthermore, 
the chapter argued that the judicial review of commitment decisions could cover the 
appropriateness of the commitments in order to increase the capability of the decisions 
to dispel any serious concerns of the Commission.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this thesis was to critically examine the approach that the Commission 
adopted for competition investigations in the newly liberalised energy markets. The 
overarching finding of the thesis was that there has been a generalised trend in the use 
of commitment-based antitrust enforcement in the energy markets, which has eased the 
employment of competition law as a quasi-regulatory tool, and this trend seems to have 
generated problems in terms of legal uncertainty, economic efficiency along with 
political interventions in the energy markets. 
The decisions of the Commission in the energy sectors constituted a decisive role in 
determining the substance and shaping the structure of this thesis. The thesis 
addressed the problem of long-term supply contracts concluded within and between 
Member States, the problem of preferential reservations of cross-border transmission 
networks as well as the problem of the generalisation of formal antitrust settlements in 
the energy sectors.  
While analysing the case law, the thesis bore in mind that the traditional way of 
functioning in the European energy markets, which consisted of long-term contracting 
between vertically integrated incumbents, had had a significant impact on the 
determination of the dynamics of regulatory measures and also competitive reforms. 
The thesis also underlined that the idiosyncrasy of the European energy markets (i.e. 
insufficient vertical unbundling, inefficient implementation of third party access, 
undersized competition, and inadequate single market integration) has provided the 
Commission with the grounds for significant regulatory steps as well as antitrust 
investigations. Therefore, it seems that the Commission is compelled to tailor antitrust 
enforcement with regard to the characteristics of the energy markets.  
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As regards the problem of long-term supply contracts within Member States, the thesis 
indicated that the assessment of the contracts from a competition law point of view is 
rather complicated, regarding the ambiguous economic theories and empirical works 
examining the effects of these contracts. The Commission and national competition 
authorities may therefore need to trade-off between foreclosure and the positive effects 
of the contracts such as risk hedging and increasing the credibility of the contracting 
parties. Moreover, the thesis pointed out that the detrimental effects of the contracts 
could also stem from the contract clauses. Each long-term contract thus needs to be 
analysed individually by taking into consideration both the volume and duration of the 
contracts and the effects of these contract clauses. Consequently, policy instructions in 
each case are very much context specific. Yet, overall, the objective of the Commission 
and competition authorities should be to reach a compromise, which enables both 
effective spot market trading and a satisfactory degree of long-term contracting within 
the energy markets.       
While considering the problem of preferential reservations of interconnectors in 
electricity and cross-border pipelines in gas, the thesis indicated that the legitimate 
assessment of these reservations under EU competition law is rather complicated due 
to the fact that, first, transmission markets are under the scope of ex-ante market 
regulation, i.e. these reservations can be assessed under EU secondary law as well as 
EU competition law, and second, they can be made pursuant to two purposes: (i) in 
order to fulfil pre-liberalisation long-term supply contracts concluded among Member 
States; or (ii) in order to foreclose relevant downstream markets to actual or potential 
rivals. The case law demonstrated that under both scenarios the Commission tends to 
deem these reservations unlawful, regardless of the associated long-term supply 
contracts, unless there is a major investment in a transmission network, which could be 
proposed as an objective justification, or an exemption granted by ex-ante regulatory 
rules. This approach by the Commission could be justified from both an economic 
perspective and a regulatory policy point of view. According to the former, given the 
scarcity of capacity of cross-border transmission networks, the only way to allocate 
long-term competitive network capacity seems to enhance the physical capacity of 
these networks. According to the latter, one policy objective of market regulation is to 
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promote short-term, transparent and non-discriminatory allocation and use of 
transmission capacities in order to facilitate competition and market integration in 
energy. As these regulatory objectives cannot be realised through market liberalisation, 
the Commission employs competition law as a relevant instrument in order to achieve 
them.   
Furthermore, the thesis showed that the approach of the Commission to examining 
these preferential network reservations by dissociating them from existing long-term 
supply contracts might not be appropriate under certain circumstances given that long-
term supply contracts among Member States may result in competitive outcomes 
dissimilar to the contracts signed within Member states. Consequently, the thesis 
proposed that the Commission should take into consideration the existing long-term 
supply contracts underpinning preferential network reservations, as these contracts 
could be competitive depending on the markets structures of the importing or exporting 
Member States. However, with regard to the general approach of the Commission to 
objective justification defence under Article 102 TFEU, the thesis concluded that it 
seems that there is a very little chance of the Commission considering associated long-
term supply contracts as an objective justification for preferential network reservations.      
Finally, the thesis disclosed the generalised use of commitment-based antitrust 
enforcement in energy on the grounds of competition investigations finalised through 
Article 9 proceedings. In this regard, the thesis indicated the tendency of the 
Commission and the undertakings concerned to conclude competition investigations in 
energy through commitments. In addition, the thesis underlined that building energy 
markets through commitments seems rather risky given that competition dynamics are 
limited and not necessarily developed to generate efficient measures/remedies for 
market design. Also, the thesis highlighted that the commitments offered by the 
undertakings concerned are not necessarily capable of completely addressing the 
competition concerns of the Commission. Furthermore, general pro-entry bias 
competition decisions may reduce the predictability of competition investigations. As a 
result, it was argued that the cost of concluding competition investigations through 
commitments might be to destroy legal certainty and thus sacrifice the enhancement of 
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the energy markets. Overall, regarding the excessive use of commitment decisions in 
energy, the thesis proposed a framework guideline which may facilitate more efficient 
and sustainable use of public settlements without damaging the market development 
and legal certainty.  
To sum up, the thesis addressed the problem of the use of competition law by the 
Commission in the energy markets in order to achieve regulatory objectives, namely 
opening the markets to competition (i.e. market liberalisation), and promoting cross-
border trade that reinforces competition among Member States (i.e. market integration). 
Overall, the findings of the thesis lead to a more empirical research area. Further 
research could build on the analyses of commitment decisions in terms of their empirical 
effects within relevant national energy markets.  
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GLOSSARY 
Balancing - all actions and processes through which transmission system operators 
ensure that total energy withdrawals are equalled by total injections in a continuous 
way, in order to maintain the system frequency within a predefined stability range. 
Balancing energy - energy activated by transmission system operators to maintain the 
balance between injections and withdrawals 
Bidding zone - the largest geographical area within which market participants are able 
to exchange energy without capacity allocation. 
Capacity allocation - the attribution of cross-zonal capacity. 
Congestion - a  situation  in  which  an  interconnection linking national transmission 
networks cannot accommodate all physical flows resulting from international trade 
requested by  market  participants,  because  of  a  lack  of  capacity  of  the 
interconnectors  and/or  the  national  transmission  systems concerned 
Congestion  management - management  of the capacity portfolio of the transmission 
system operator with a view to  optimal  and  maximum  use  of  the  technical  capacity  
and the  timely  detection  of  future  congestion  and  saturation points 
Congestion management methods - congestion shifting, counter trading and market 
splitting 
Congestion shifting - a network operator through congestion shifting can reduce 
trading capacities with a neighbouring country in order to relieve congestion within a 
national transmission system. In other words, through this method congestion in the 
internal transmission networks is shifted to external transmission networks.  
Contractual congestion - a situation where the level of firm capacity demand exceeds 
the technical capacity 
Counter-trading - a network operator through counter-trading can affect the production 
and consumption patterns of market participants on both sides of the congestion line in 
order to reduce congestion. The network operator makes arrangements with individual 
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generators and/or large energy consumers. Accordingly, it pays generators to decrease 
or to increase their production in order to reduce the surplus or deficit of electricity. 
Alternatively, the network operator pays industrial consumers to change their 
consumption patterns.  
Cross-border balancing – exchanges of balancing energy and/or reserves between 
control areas and/or between bidding zones 
Day ahead market - means the market timeframe where commercial electricity 
transactions are executed the day prior to the day of delivery of traded products 
Explicit capacity allocation (explicit auction) - allocation of cross-zonal capacity only, 
without the energy transfer. Thus, market participants bid for available interconnector 
capacity which is purchased separately from the electricity that is the subject of the 
transaction. The capacity is auctioned for different time periods namely year, month, 
week, hour.  
Forward markets - electricity markets in which the duration of contracts concluded for 
electricity trade are set for more than 24-hours  
Forward capacity allocation - the attribution of long-term cross-zonal capacity through 
explicit auctions 
Market splitting - a division of the market into smaller price zones (price areas, bidding 
zones). Each price zone has its own day-ahead market in which sellers and purchasers 
participate.    
Implicit capacity allocation (implicit auction) - transmission capacity is managed 
implicitly by two or more neighbouring spot markets: network users submit purchase or 
sale bids for energy in the power exchange in the geographical zone where they wish to 
generate or consume, and the market clearing procedure determines the most efficient 
amount and direction of physical power exchange between the market zones. Hence, 
border capacity and energy are traded together. Implicit auctioning requires at least one 
power exchange in the area importing from the interconnector in question.     
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Interconnector - a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between Member 
States and which connects the national transmission systems of the Member State  
Intraday market - means the electricity market which operates within the day where 
commercial electricity transections are executed prior to the delivery of traded products 
Physical congestion - a situation where the level of demand for actual deliveries 
exceeds the technical capacity at some point in time 
Primary market - the market of the capacity traded directly by the transmission system 
operator 
Reservation of cross-border transmission capacity - a portion of available cross-
border capacity which is reserved for cross-border exchange of balancing reserves and 
thus is not accessible to market participants for cross-border energy trade.  
Secondary market - means the market of the capacity traded otherwise than on the 
primary market 
Storage  facility -  a  facility  used  for  the  stocking  of natural  gas  and  owned  
and/or  operated  by  a  natural  gas undertaking,  including  the  part  of  LNG  facilities  
used  for storage but excluding the portion used for production operations, and 
excluding facilities reserved exclusively for transmission system operators in carrying 
out their functions 
Transmission - the transport of energy on the extra high-voltage and high-voltage 
interconnected system with a view to its delivery to final customers or to distributors, but 
does not include supply 
Transmission system operator - a natural or legal person  responsible  for  operating,  
ensuring  the  maintenance  of and,  if  necessary,  developing  the  transmission  
system  in  a given  area  and,  where  applicable,  its  interconnections  with other  
systems,  and  for  ensuring  the  long-term  ability  of  the system to meet reasonable 
demands for the transmission of electricity 
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*Source: Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation 
1228/2003 [2009] OJ L 211/15; ENTSO-E, Network Code on Capacity Allocation and Congestion 
Management, 27 September 2012; ENTSO-E, Network Code on Forward Capacity Allocation, 1 October 
2013 
 
 
 
